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This dissertation provides a study and analysis of Old Testament theology’s 
discernment of God through hiddenness, silence, absence, and suffering and then brings 
into conversation notions of God drawn from these Old Testament traditions with notions 
of God drawn from an interpretation of the cross.  This exploration is done through an in 
depth study of Walter Brueggemann's Old Testament theology of God as both a challenge 
and a contribution to the interpretation of the cross of Jesus Christ in the works of Jürgen 
Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.   
The interpretations of the cross in the works of Moltmann and Sobrino recognize 
that the cross of Jesus Christ evokes a crisis for theology based in the discontinuity 
between the questions raised from the depths of suffering and the promises and purpose 
of God. Brueggemann discerns a similar crisis as central to Old Testament theology, a 
crisis that arises when the experience of suffering evokes questions and challenges for the 
 v
covenantal theology that is the dominant theology of the Old Testament.  All three 
scholars recognize that God’s life giving and transforming power is not extrinsic to but is 
revealed in the midst of the unresolved conditions of life in the world. This insight leads 
these scholars to insist that the essence of Christian faith emerges not through freedom 
from the conflict but through entering into the midst of the conflict with hope.  In the 
contemporary world the questions raised from the depths of suffering have become more 
sharply focused and beg for a response.  A dialogue between the Old Testament theology 
of God of Brueggemann and the theologies of the cross of Moltmann and Sobrino 
deepens understanding of both the questions raised by suffering and a biblical response 
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The heaven you promised, O God, 
does not move me to love you. 
The much feared hell does not move me nor stop me from offending you. 
You move me, O Lord, seeing you nailed to a cross and reviled; 
I am moved by the sight of your wounded body; 
I am moved by your sufferings and your death. 
Finally, I am so moved by your love 
that even if there were no heaven 
I would love you, 
and if there were no hell I would fear you.  You do not need to offer me anything for me 
to love you, 
for even if I did not expect what I hope for  
my love would be as great as it is now.1 
 
                                                 
1 Lope de Vega, quoted and translated by Marina Herrera in “Who do You say Jesus is?” in Reconstructing 
the Christ Symbol: Essays in Feminist Christology, ed. Maryanne Stevens (New York: Paulist Press, 1993), 
75. 
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 In the article, “Abraham Joshua Heschel: the Pathos of God,” John C. Merkle 
recounts a story that Abraham Heschel was fond of telling.1  The story involves two 
Jewish men, one wealthy and the other poor. Through the generosity of the wealthy man, 
they share a compartment on a train traveling from Warsaw to Paris in the late 1940’s.  In 
the evening, the wealthy Jew takes out his prayer shawl and begins to pray.  The poor 
Jew refuses to pray claiming that because of Auschwitz, he will never pray again.  The 
next morning, however, when the wealthy Jew once again takes out his prayer shawl and 
begins to pray, the poor Jew joins him.  When their prayers are completed, the wealthy 
Jew asks the poor Jew why he had changed his mind.  The poor Jew replies, “It suddenly 
dawned upon me to think how lonely God must be; look with whom He is left.  I felt 
sorry for Him.”2  This story illustrates one of Heschel’s most startling claims, a claim that 
he repeats in several books.  Heschel claims, “Faith is the beginning of compassion, of 
compassion for God.”3 
 A similar sentiment can be gleaned from a portion of a poem written by Dietrich 
Bonhoeffer during his imprisonment in Berlin during World War II.   
Men go to God when they are sore bestead, 
Pray to him for succor, for his peace, for bread, 
For mercy for them sick, sinning, or dead; 
All men do so, Christian and unbelieving. 
 
Men go to God when he is sore bestead, 
Find him poor and scorned, without shelter or bread, 
Whelmed under weight of the wicked, the weak, the dead’ 
                                                 
1 John C. Merkle, “Abraham Joshua Heschel: the Pathos of God,” Christianity and Crisis 45 no. 20 
(December 9, 1985): 493-496. 
2 Ibid., 493. 
3 Ibid. 
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Christians stand by God in his hour of grieving.4 
 
 The reflections of these two theologians, one Jewish and one Christian, arise from 
the ashes of the devastation caused by World War II.  Both men endured intense personal 
suffering during the war and had a profound awareness of the massive suffering left in 
the wake of the collapse of political, cultural and religious institutions in Europe.  Their 
contemplation of God in the midst of this experience of suffering, an experience of 
suffering that moved beyond rational explanation, led them to a deep understanding of 
God’s participation in the suffering of human beings.  In fact, both Heschel and 
Bonhoeffer indicate that the depth of God’s participation in human suffering is so 
profound that the relationship between human beings and God is one in which human 
beings are moved to compassion for God.   
 The insight that faith involves compassion for God opens the door to important 
questions.  Traditionally, God’s compassion for human beings is the subject of 
theological reflection but reversing the direction of compassion from human beings to 
God points to a revolution in the notion of God.  If God is the subject of human 
compassion, questions about God’s power, transcendence, and sovereignty arise.  In 
addition, the importance of the role and participation of human beings in a dialogical 
relationship with God is emphasized.  The painful life experiences of Heschel and 
Bonhoeffer led them to contemplate these questions and through that contemplation 
express insights into the relationship between human beings and God that challenge 
traditional notions of God.  
                                                 
4 Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Letters and Papers from Prison, edited by Eberhard Bethge (New York: 
Touchstone, 1997), 348-349. 
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Heschel and Bonhoeffer provide contemporary historical examples of the 
dialectical relationship between theology and experience.  While the painful life 
experiences of Heschel and Bonhoeffer led them to a profound understanding of God’s 
suffering with and for human beings, their insights were not entirely new but have roots 
in both Scripture and the Jewish and Christian theological traditions that are foundational 
for their faith.   
The Tanakh is the foundational source for Jewish reflection upon God’s 
participation in suffering.  The experience of slavery in Egypt, the Babylonian Exile, the 
Lament tradition, and the books of Job, Ecclesiastes and Lamentations provide resources 
for further refection on the theological theme of God’s participation in suffering.  Study 
and exploration of these sources in the Tanakh led to the Shekinah theology of the 
Rabbis’ and to Heschel’s articulation of the pathos of God.5      
In the Christian tradition, the Cross of Jesus Christ is the focal point for exploring 
God’s participation in suffering.  The theology of the cross is a “thin tradition” that has 
threaded its way through the history of Christian thought and practice.  This tradition’s 
focus is on the cross as the permanent question and crisis in all theology, a crisis that is 
not overcome in the resurrection.6  The basis of this crisis lies in the discontinuity 
between Jesus’ experience of God’s presence and activity during his life and ministry, 
and the stark experience of God’s silence and inactivity on the cross.   
The crisis, however, runs deeper than Jesus’ experience.  Behind that crisis lies 
the problem of suffering and the question suffering and the often painful experience of 
                                                 
5 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 267-274. 
6 Douglas John Hall, Lighten Our Darkness: Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross (Lima, Ohio: 
Academic Renewal Press, revised edition 2001), 104. 
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life in the world raises for understanding a God of promise, justice, righteousness and 
love, as well as the paradox of understanding God’s divinity revealed in God’s 
humiliation, self-surrender, helplessness, and humanity.  From this perspective, the cross 
is not the means for rising above the conditions of life and attaining access to the power 
and glory of God but is the challenge to enter into the midst of peril, suffering, and death 
with hope.  It does not discern the presence of God in success or power but finds God in 
the places of abandonment, and in the midst of all that seems to contradict God.   
The theology of the cross is a spirit and method for doing theology.7  This spirit 
and method recognizes that the crisis of the cross, as Moltmann describes in the title of 
his book, The Crucified God, is the foundation and criticism of all Christian theology.  It 
is always polemical, always arising in opposition to the prevailing theology of glory.  The 
cross raises epistemological questions about how to know and recognize God and makes 
visible the openness of the history of God for the history of the world. 
 The themes of the silence or absence of God, the suffering of God, and lament are 
central to systematic studies that are within the tradition of the theology of the cross.  
Surprisingly however, these systematic studies do not make use of Old Testament 
theology steeped in these same themes.  The Old Testament is referred to for background 
of New Testament texts and as a means for assessing Jesus’ self understanding but Old 
Testament theology’s discernment of God through hiddenness, silence, absence, and 
suffering are not addressed.  In addition, the integral role these traditions play in the 
formation of Israel’s faith are ignored. 
 Christian Old Testament scholars note that the traditions of lament and the silence 
or absence of God form an integral part of the faith of Israel that calls for a human 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 111. 
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response of faithful protest, complaint, and insistence to God.  Samuel Ballentine, Walter 
Brueggemann, Donald Gowan, and R.W.L. Moberly are Old Testament scholars who in 
their respective studies of lament and the silence of God in the Old Testament discuss the 
cost of the suppression or neglect of these traditions for Christian scholarship and 
practice.8  These scholars note that the result of neglecting these Old Testament traditions 
is suppression or denial of negative human experience as integral to faithful living. 
Accompanying this suppression are tendencies toward closure in theology rather than 
openness to questions, especially questions that might doubt emphases on obedience and 
trust as the primary responses of the faithful, and might give inadequate attention to the 
role and freedom of the human partner in the interrelationship between God and human 
beings.  
 As a result of the neglect of these and other Old Testament traditions, systematic 
treatments in the tradition of the theology of the cross are subject to weaknesses that beg 
to be addressed through interaction with Old Testament theology.  Those weaknesses 
include: difficulty sustaining the tension between the transcendence and immanence of 
God, the tendency to emphasize the relationship between God the Father and Jesus the 
Son while neglecting the relationship of Jesus to the kingdom and to Israel, neglect of the 
role and freedom of the human partner in the relationship between God and human 
beings, and a tendency to under-emphasize the importance of justice issues and the 
development of an adequate social ethic.9  
                                                 
8 Samuel Ballentine,  Prayer in the Hebrew Bible: The Drama of Divine-Human Dialogue (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1993),  5;  Walter Brueggemann, “The Costly Loss of Lament,” Journal for the Study of the 
Old Testament 36 (1986) 57-71;  Donald Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a 
Commentary (Louisville:  Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 12-24; R.W.L. Moberly, The Bible, 
Theology, and Faith  (Cambridge:  Cambridge University Press, 2000), 92-101.   
9 Hall, 137-154. 
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While the cross of Jesus Christ is the most radical expression of God’s embrace of 
pain in Christian theology, notions of God drawn from silence, hiddenness, and suffering 
are not absent from the Old Testament but in fact play an integral role in the formation of 
Israel’s faith.  The Crucified God is a New Testament discernment but the openness of 
the history of God for the history of the world, God’s embrace of pain, and the 
discernment of God through what seems to oppose God is an Old Testament testimony as 
well.10   
This dissertation will study and analyze Old Testament theology’s discernment of 
God through hiddenness, silence, absence, and suffering and then bring into conversation 
notions of God drawn from these Old Testament traditions with notions of God drawn 
from an interpretation of the cross.  This exploration will be done through an in depth 
study of Walter Brueggemann's Old Testament theology of God as both a challenge and a 
contribution to the interpretation of the cross of Jesus Christ in the works of Jürgen 
Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.   
The rationale for choosing Walter Brueggemann’s work in Old Testament 
theology is a simple one.  His corpus offers numerous resources for relating Old 
Testament theology of God to systematic interpretations of the meaning of the cross. 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology resonates with the theology of the cross in that it 
is both dialectical and polemical.  Brueggemann provides documentation and analysis 
that demonstrates that the Old Testament as speech about God contains both a testimony 
that expresses the majority voice in Israel's theology and a counter-testimony expressing 
                                                 
10 In his book, The Theology of the Jürgen Moltmann, Richard Bauckham proposes study of the revelation 
of God on the cross of Jesus Christ in the context of the Old Testament’s revelation of God as a way to 
more fully contemplate “God’s non-incarnate suffering.”  Richard Bauckham, The Theology of the Jürgen 
Moltmann (London: T & T Clark Ltd, 1995), 66-67. 
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the minority voice. The majority voice embraces a "common theology" that asserts that 
life is created and ordered under the governance of a sovereign God.  This theology is 
contractual, covenantal theology that generally identifies the order of creation with the 
current social arrangement of the ruling class. Such theology serves to legitimate the 
existing structure.  Brueggemann argues that what is remarkable about the Old Testament 
is that, while it claims this "common theology," at the same time it testifies to a crisis in 
that theology.  That crisis is given expression by the minority voice, a voice that 
embraces pain and through that embrace challenges the common theology of the majority 
voice. The crucial importance of the minority voice is expressed by Brueggemann.  He 
writes,  
Faith is against voicelessness, against a society in which speech 
about power and powerlessness is banished and in which social power is 
so concentrated that it need no longer listen and is no longer capable of 
hearing. …The primary critical function of the Bible is to keep the voice 
of hurt present in the public process.  That voice, so cherished and 
honored in the Bible, is the voice of the marginal, whose testimony is 
oddly transmitted to us in the canonical process, as the voice of God.11  
 
In addition to noting the importance of the minority voice for Old Testament 
theology, Brueggemann also points out the centrality of the dialectic of exile and 
homecoming.  He states that because the majority of claims about God’s presence and 
promises are made in the situation of exile, Yahweh’s presence is discerned as entering 
into exile with Israel in order to “transform exile into a viable place for life.”12    
                                                 
11 Walter Brueggemann, Old Testament Theology: Essays on Structure, Theme, and Text (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1992), 92. 
12 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997), 171. 
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According to Brueggemann, Yahweh enters into the risk and vulnerability of 
Israel’s life in the world in order to be in solidarity with Yahweh’s at-risk people.13  
Brueggemann writes that the New Testament dialectic of cross and resurrection is 
anticipated by the Old Testament’s dialectic of exile and homecoming.  In both 
testaments, the core and counter testimony remain in profound but necessary tension with 
one another.  This tension cannot be resolved because both testaments are dealing with 
God’s revelation in the midst of the unresolved conditions of life in the world. 
 Brueggemann discerns in Old Testament theology a notion of God that maintains 
a tension between God’s freedom and sovereignty and God’s fidelity to the point of 
pathos.  He also recognizes that in the Old Testament God is found where God’s people 
are in peril, in exile, among the oppressed, and in the midst of all that seems to contradict 
God.  Furthermore, he recognizes the importance that the silence, absence, and suffering 
of God play in the formation of Israel’s faith so that he describes submission to 
God and assertion over/against God as two divergent but equally important postures of 
faithful response for Israel. By acknowledging these postures, Brueggemann articulates 
the significant role of the human partner in the relationship between God and human 
beings. 
This dissertation begins with an in depth study and analysis of Brueggemann’s 
Old Testament theology of God focusing particularly on the crucial importance of the 
minority voice that embraces pain and challenges the majority voice that legitimates 
power structures and in so doing in fact challenges the prevailing perception of God's 
ways in the world.  The results of this study and analysis will then be brought into 
                                                 
13 Ibid., 201. 
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conversation with the "thin tradition" of the theology of the cross in the works of two 
influential contemporary theologians, Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.   
In regard to the second major element of the dissertation, Jürgen Moltmann and 
Jon Sobrino have been chosen because each has written interpretations of the cross that 
are widely read and discussed.  Each in differing ways has influenced theologians who 
have studied their interpretations of the Cross. Moltmann and Sobrino provide this 
dissertation, therefore, with two strong contemporary works in the tradition of the 
theology of the cross that complement each other. Moltmann and Sobrino have also 
engaged in mutual dialogue and work with similar theses, which each have developed in 
very different contexts. 
Jürgen Moltmann is a German Lutheran theologian writes in the context of post 
World War II Europe.  His book, The Crucified God, explores the meaning of the cross 
through the question of suffering.  The focus of Moltmann’s work is not on what the 
cross means for human beings but on what the cross says about God.  Influenced by 
Heschel, Moltmann finds manifested in the cross, the pathos of God – God’s suffering 
and sacrificial loving in solidarity with and for God’s people.  The strengths of 
Moltmann’s interpretation of the cross include his argument for a concept of God that 
begins in the cross and challenges the presuppositions of theism, and his articulation of 
Christ’s solidarity with the forsaken of the world.  Moltmann demonstrates how the God 
of theism, by separating the divine self from suffering also devalues human life.  Human 
life is vulnerable.  Love exists in vulnerability for one another.  In allowing for the 
suffering of love in God, for God’s openness to the open wound of suffering, Moltmann 
asserts the value of human life and love lived in God’s presence.   
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While Moltmann offers rich and challenging insights through a notion of God 
drawn from the revelatory event of the cross, his interpretation has some noteworthy 
shortcomings.  Moltmann does not adequately acknowledge either the tragic magnitude 
of suffering in the world or the presence of evil and the causes of rejection and 
forsakenness. In addition, his interpretation concentrates almost exclusively on the 
relationship between God the Father and Jesus the Son and does not pay adequate 
attention to Jesus’ relationship to the kingdom or to the role of human beings in their 
relationship to God.  Finally, he does not maintain the tension between the transcendence 
and immanence of God so that at times he seems to resolve that tension in resignation to 
suffering and at other times to resolve the tension by arguing for an eschatological 
panentheism that questions the meaning of human freedom and history and ultimately 
ends in a theology of glory.  
Jon Sobrino is a Spanish Catholic theologian and a Jesuit priest who lives and 
ministers in El Salvador.  Sobrino is influenced by Moltmann’s work and adopts a similar 
thesis for his interpretation of the cross, concentrating on drawing an understanding of 
God from the revelatory event of the cross.14  He moves beyond Moltmann, however, by 
analyzing that thesis through the lens of liberation theology and his own personal 
experience of living in the midst of poor, oppressed, and persecuted people.  Sobrino 
seeks to understand the relationship between the crucified God and crucified people of El 
Salvador.  Sobrino affirms many of the strengths of Moltmann’s work.  He articulates the 
importance of dialectical knowledge as an epistemological principle, views the cross as 
the outcome of God’s openness to history, and upholds the solidarity of God with God’s 
                                                 
14 Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological View, trans. Paul Burns and Francis 
McDonagh (New York: Orbis Books, 1993), 240-246. 
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suffering people.  In addition, Sobrino’s work corrects several of the weaknesses in 
Moltmann’s interpretation of the cross.  Through the lens of liberation theology, Sobrino 
draws attention to the “anti–kingdom” and therefore to the reality of evil and the causes 
of rejection and forsakenness.  He also moves beyond Moltmann’s emphasis on the 
relationship between God the Father and Jesus the Son to include Jesus’ relationship to 
his mission and therefore to the kingdom.  In this move, Sobrino claims an understanding 
of Jesus’ divinity through a relational versus ontic identity and works to articulate an 
understanding of Jesus’ faith.  Finally, Sobrino is more successful than Moltmann in 
maintaining the tension between God’s transcendence and immanence. 
Sobrino draws on the Old Testament in order to articulate a notion of Jesus’ faith 
experience, as well as to appeal to traditions that would influence Jesus’ conception of his 
mission.  Sobrino’s analyses of the faith of Jesus, Jesus’ relationship to his mission, and a 
relational versus ontic understanding of Jesus’ divinity offer insights that could be 
enriched through dialogue with Old Testament theology of God. In addition, a dialogue 
between the Old Testament theology of God of Brueggemann and the theologies of the 
cross of Moltmann and Sobrino can contribute to challenging and enriching some key 
theological points that Moltmann and Sobrino share. Among the points that this study 
proposes to address are: 
• The knowledge of God drawn from hiddenness, absence, and silence; 
• The significance of history and the openness of God to history; and  
• The discernment of God’s fidelity to the point of pathos and its meaning for 
the interrelationship of God and human beings. 
 12 
Methodology and Chapter Topics 
 
This study will begin with a presentation of Brueggemann’s approach and method 
for doing Old Testament theology.  In the first chapter, issues of interpretation in 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology will be addressed.  These issues include: the role 
of rhetoric and imagination, speech as response to exile, intertextuality, the importance of 
the dialectical and dialogical quality of the text, the open and polyvalent quality of the 
text, the relation of Jewish and Christian readings vis-à-vis each other, and the question 
of supersessionism.  In addition, Brueggemann’s model for interpreting the Old 
Testament involving the dialectic of testimony and counter testimony will be given 
attention.  Finally, themes of major importance to this study in Brueggemann’s works, 
such as the theodicy question and the matrix of exile, will also be featured in this chapter. 
A discussion of Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology concentrating on the 
counter testimony of Israel will be the major topic of the second chapter.  Here the focus 
will be the themes of God’s hiddenness, ambiguity, suffering, and silence, and the 
importance of these themes for Old Testament theology and the notion of God.  
Brueggemann’s analysis of the role of lament as a public voicing of pain, grief, and 
sorrow in the unfolding drama between God and Israel will also be given substantial 
attention.   
 The third chapter will concentrate on the interpretation of the cross in the 
theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.  The mutual dialogue and similar 
themes in the work of Moltmann and Sobrino will be addressed.  This chapter will also 
provide some assessment of the contribution each makes to the theology of the cross, and 
the strengths and weaknesses of their interpretations of the meaning of the cross.  
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  The fourth chapter is the pivotal chapter of this study. Through summary 
analysis of the work of Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino, it will bring into 
conversation notions of God drawn from Old Testament traditions with notions of God 
drawn from interpretations of the cross.  Included will be a discussion of the use of the 
Old Testament in the work of Moltmann and Sobrino, the questioning of presuppositions 
in their work that ignore Old Testament theology, and the enrichments that insights from 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology can provide.  
 The concluding chapter will explore the implications of this study for Christian 
theology and practice.  The focus will be on the insights gained for a theology of the 
cross through the incorporation of Old Testament theology’s discernment of God in 
silence, absence, hiddenness, and suffering.  Attention will be given to Christian 
theology’s response to the theodicy question, the role and significance of history in 
Christian theology, the role and freedom of the human partner in the relationship between 
God and human beings, and the role of lament in Christian theology and practice.  
  The interpretations of the cross in the works of Moltmann and Sobrino recognize 
that the cross of Jesus Christ evokes a crisis for theology based in the discontinuity 
between the questions raised from the depths of suffering and the promises and purpose 
of God. Brueggemann discerns a similar crisis as central to Old Testament theology, a 
crisis that arises when the experience of suffering evokes questions and challenges for the 
covenantal theology that is the dominant theology of the Old Testament.  All three 
scholars recognize that God’s life giving and transforming power is not extrinsic to but is 
revealed in the midst of the unresolved conditions of life in the world. This insight leads 
these scholars to insist that the essence of Christian faith emerges not through freedom 
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from the conflict but through entering into the midst of the conflict with hope.  In the 
contemporary world, the questions raised from the depths of suffering have become more 
sharply focused and beg for a response.  A dialogue between the Old Testament theology 
of God of Brueggemann and the theologies of the cross of Moltmann and Sobrino will 
deepen understanding of both the questions raised by suffering and a biblical response 




Overview of Brueggemann’s Old Testament Theology 
 
This study proposes to explore Walter Brueggemann’s contribution to Old 
Testament theology in order to learn if his insights may enrich and perhaps even fill in 
what is lacking in the theologies of the Cross of Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.  It is 
fitting, therefore, that Brueggemann’s theology be treated at the outset.  In Part V of his 
Theology of the Old Testament, also the book’s final section, Brueggemann considers the 
question: What may “come next in Old Testament theology?”1 Any attempt to answer 
this question requires that one first have a good grasp of the state of biblical studies 
today. A succinct and helpful treatment can be found in Between Two Horizons: 
Spanning New Testament Studies and Systematic Theology.2  
Between Two Horizons, is a collection of essays written to address issues arising 
from the question, “What effects should an interest in theology produce in the reading of 
Scripture?”3  The editors, Joel B. Green and Max Turner, note several factors that 
influence the contemporary setting for biblical scholarship.  These factors include: a shift 
in the focus of biblical interpretation from “behind the text” issues to a focus on “in the 
text” issues and the theological community responding to the text, the rejection of the 
hegemony of historical critical methodology and an accompanying openness to 
methodological pluralism in biblical studies, and increased attention to the relationship 
                                                 
1 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997), 707. 
2 Joel B. Green and Max Tuner, eds., Between Two Horizons: Spanning New Testament studies and 
Systematic Theology (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 2000), 1. 
3 Ibid., 1. 
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between biblical studies and contemporary theology.4  It is noted that while this shift 
provides fresh approaches to the text it is also erodes shared foundations on which to 
build hermeneutical constructs.5  Green states that the dilemma for contemporary biblical 
theology is a false choice between modernity’s claim that textual meaning can be tied 
with certainty to historical reconstruction and post-modernity’s rejection of that certainty 
and subsequent positing of endless meanings with no criteria for evaluating a “good’ 
reading from a “bad” one.6   
While Between Two Horizons is focused on the relationship between New 
Testament studies and systematic theology, Walter Brueggemann’s methodology for 
interpreting the Old Testament is clearly set within the contemporary intellectual setting 
for biblical theology discussed in this book.  Brueggemann’s interpretation of the Old 
Testament is focused on “in the text” rather than “behind the text” issues.  He claims that 
not only is methodological pluralism necessary for a good reading of the Old Testament, 
but in fact pluralistic theological interpretations are formative for the Old Testament text 
itself.7  Finally, he insists that all good interpretation of the biblical text arises from and is 
influenced by the prevalent concerns and questions of the contemporary culture in which 
the theologian interpreting the text lives.8  The contemporary intellectual setting for 
biblical theology provides Brueggemann with the opportunity to take a fresh approach to 
the Old Testament.  At the same time, this setting also forces him to wrestle with the lack 
of certainty that exists for biblical theology because of the rejection of the certainty of 
historical reconstruction and the plurality of possible meanings arising from post-modern 
                                                 
4 Ibid., 4. 
5 Ibid., 12. 
6 Ibid., 238-239. 
7Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, xv-xvi.   
8 Ibid., 11-12.                                                                                                                                                                                     
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interpretations.  Brueggemann argues however that this lack of certainty is not merely a 
contemporary problem arising in the wake of post-modern interpretation.  Rather, lack of 
certainty is a theological problem that motivates the writing and formation of the Old 
Testament text and is ultimately rooted in the character at the heart of the biblical 
narrative, God.9   
 This chapter will present Brueggemann’s approach and method for doing Old 
Testament theology. Among the topics to be addressed are: issues of interpretation 
including the role of rhetoric and imagination, speech as response to exile, the importance 
of the dialectical and dialogical quality of the text, the open and polyvalent quality of the 
text, the relation of Jewish and Christian readings vis-à-vis each other, and the question 
of supersessionism.  In addition, Brueggemann’s model for interpreting the Old 
Testament involving the dialectic of testimony and counter testimony will be given 
attention.  Themes of major importance to this study in Brueggemann’s works, such as 
the theodicy question and the matrix of exile, will also be featured in this chapter. 
Old Testament Theology: Issues of Interpretation and Brueggemann’s Methodology  
 
Brueggemann begins his book, The Theology of the Old Testament, by recounting 
major movements in biblical interpretation from the Protestant Reformation to the 
contemporary situation.  Brueggemann claims that until the twentieth century scholarly 
biblical interpretation was linked to the Protestant Reformation through shared 
motivation.  He argues that a major issue for the reformers was the tension between 
evangelical faith based on scripture and the authority of church tradition.  Church 
tradition was perceived by the reformers as “a censoring activity that prevented the Bible 
                                                 
9 Ibid., xv, 42. 
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being taken on its own terms and being forced to conform to established categories and 
claims.”10  He points out that while, Luther and the reformers sought to free scripture 
from the authority of church tradition, that freedom rapidly found other forms of 
bondage, first in Protestant orthodoxy and then in the hegemony of historical critical 
methodology arising in the wake of the Enlightenment.11 
 Brueggemann notes that the rise of science and philosophical advances in the 
seventeenth century had a profound effect on epistemology in the field of biblical 
studies.12  The shift in confidence away from the authority of the institutional church and 
toward the authority of autonomous reason led to an emphasis on objectivity and 
detached scholarly evaluation of scripture.  Accompanying this effort to obtain objective 
knowledge was a positivism that claimed that “what is knowable can be exhaustively 
known by human thought.”13  Brueggemann argues that the apparent objectivity and 
detached scholarship of historical criticism was appealing to those engaged in the 
movement to allow the Bible to speak on its own terms free of established categories and 
claims.  Unfortunately, as it turned out historical criticism was not as objective or as 
detached as the proponents of this method believed it to be.14  The historical critical 
method for interpreting Scripture replaced the theological claims of church tradition with 
the rational, intellectual claims of the Enlightenment.  Enlightenment rationality was 
adverse to what Brueggemann calls the “hiddenness, density, and inscrutability of the 
text.”15  The difficulty the proponents of historical critical methodology had with the non-
                                                 
10 Ibid., 10. 
11 Ibid., 10-14. 
12 Ibid., 8-10. 
13 Ibid., 8. 
14 Ibid., 14. 
15 Ibid. 
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rational element of Scripture resulted in forcing the Old Testament to comply with the 
claims and categories of Enlightenment epistemology.  Brueggemann writes,  
The theological result is that much of what was crucial in the testimony of 
ancient Israel was explained away.  The literary result is that much of 
what was most interesting and compelling about the literature was 
“resolved” by cutting apart into sources and layers much that the artistry 
of the Bible intended to locate beyond such facile decoding.16 
  
 Brueggemann argues that the history of biblical interpretation following the 
reformation is a history plagued by the “oddness” of the biblical text.  He uses the word 
“oddness” to point to the tension that is consistently present between the claims of the 
Bible and the traditions of the institutional church.17  According to Brueggemann, the 
language and demands of the Bible are not easily tamed or reduced and therefore do not 
easily fit within the claims and categories of the institutional church.  The institutional 
church on the other hand insists that its foundational traditions are based on and in 
continuity with the Bible.   
 Brueggemann notes that the freedom the reformers sought to let the Bible speak 
on its own terms was a freedom that proved too difficult to maintain.  The “oddness” of 
the text was a challenge to the certitude sought by the reading communities of either the 
Reformed tradition or the Roman Catholic tradition.18  The “oddness” of the text was also 
a challenge to the community of scholars replacing the claims and categories of the 
institutional church with the claims and categories of Enlightenment rationality.  
Brueggemann argues that the freedom the reformers sought to let the Bible speak on its 
own terms was re-newed in the interpretation of Karl Barth.  Brueggemann points to 
Barth’s commentary on Paul’s letter to the Romans as a pivotal point in biblical 
                                                 
16 Ibid. 
17 Ibid., 5. 
18 Ibid. 
 20 
interpretation.  Barth recognized that the “oddness” of the text was theological and he 
challenged the presuppositions of historical critical methodology appealing to Anselm’s 
notion of “faith seeking understanding.”19    
 The pivotal turn in Barth’s work was the recognition that natural reason and 
contemporary philosophy should not be the starting point for interpreting the biblical text, 
but instead the biblical text should question and challenge natural reason and 
contemporary philosophy.  Barth claimed that the starting point for reading the text was 
faith in Jesus Christ.20  He argued that the Bible had its own unique claims and categories 
that were normative for faithful interpretation.  Barth’s work was charged with fideism, a 
charge that was not unfounded and yet his interpretive work revealed that the supposed 
objectivity of historical critical methodology was itself a form of philosophical fideism.21   
In the beginning of the twentieth century, the intellectual assumptions of cultural 
progressivism dominated the culture, the academy, and the church.22  The proponents of 
historical criticism influenced by the assumptions of cultural progressivism viewed the 
Bible as a series of religious developments progressing toward a “reasonable” religious 
culture.23  Barth’s work pointed to important aspects of the text that under this system had 
been ignored or considered outmoded based on a theory of cultural progressivism.  His 
dialectical theology emphasized the crises for human reason, faith and morality provoked 
by the biblical text.  Barth’s interpretation of the biblical text emphasized the importance 
of rhetoric and the relationship between speech and reality.24  While biblical 
                                                 
19 Ibid., 16-18. 
20 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Ibid., 16. 
23 Ibid., 12-13, 16.  
24 Ibid., 17-20. 
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interpretation in the post-modern period has moved beyond the work of Barth.  The 
importance of faith as a starting point for theological inquiry, the role of rhetoric, the 
relationship between speech and reality and the dialectical nature of the biblical text 
remain important themes in the Old Testament interpretation of Brueggemann.   
Surprisingly, Brueggemann states that the council of Trent was correct in 
asserting that biblical interpretation cannot be done outside of a faith tradition.25  He 
argues that the Tridentine formula of “scripture and tradition” recognizes that there is no 
“presuppositionless exegesis.”  Tradition, understood as the accumulative substance of                              
church teaching, appropriately provides a lens for interpreting scripture.26  The 
understanding of the importance of faith for interpretation is the factor that leads 
Brueggemann reluctantly to continue to refer to the Old Testament canon as the Old 
Testament rather than to refer to this canon as the Hebrew Bible.  Brueggemann is 
sensitive and supportive of the impetus to overcome supersessionism by replacing the 
name Old Testament with the Hebrew Bible and yet he argues this does not appropriately 
take into consideration the context of the interpreter.  Brueggemann clearly asserts that 
dialogue and at times even preference for Jewish interpretation is essential for the 
Christian interpreter.  At the same time however, it is essential to realize that the 
Christian interpreter reads the Old Testament toward the New Testament while the 
Jewish interpreter reads the same books toward the Talmud.27  These differences should 
not prevent dialogue between Christian and Jewish interpreters but the influence of 
different faith traditions on interpretation cannot be ignored.  While Brueggemann 
                                                 
25 Ibid., 4. 
26 Walter Brueggemann, An Introduction to the Old Testament: The Canon and Christian Imagination 
(Louisville, Kentucky: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003), 1-2. 
27Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 107-112. 
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upholds the importance of tradition as a presupposition for interpreting scripture, he 
nevertheless contends that it is imperative that faith traditions remain open to the 
questions and challenges posed by the text.28   
Brueggemann notes that contemporary biblical interpretation is described by the 
term postmodern.  He describes the term postmodern,  
I have no special brief for that term, but take it as a shorthand reference to 
the end of a cultural period that was dominated by objective positivism 
that made a thin kind of historical scholarship possible, and that granted 
interpretive privilege to certain advantaged perspectives.29 
 
Contemporary biblical interpretation takes place in the larger context of an 
epistemological break in Western culture.  That epistemological break came about with 
the realization that in the wake of the Enlightenment, knowledge had too easily yielded to 
claims of certitude which were then used to secure sociological, cultural and political 
power.30  Historical critical methodology had provided a means for using the biblical text 
to give legitimacy to the claims of certitude and forms of power in Western European 
culture.   
 Brueggemann points to the insights of Paul Ricoeur in order to highlight some of 
the major differences between postmodern interpretation and historical critical 
methodology.31  Brueggemann points out that Ricoeur insists on the importance of “in the 
text” and “in front of the text” issues as opposed to the “behind the text issues” that 
dominated historical critical interpretation.  Ricoeur notes that narrative is an essential 
aspect of the Old Testament text.  Narrative, as a form of literature, creates its own world 
and engages the imagination of the reader.  As the reader relates the world “in the text” to 
                                                 
28 Ibid., 105-107. 
29 Ibid., 61. 
30 Ibid., 60. 
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the world in which they are living, the possibilities expressed by the text are 
imaginatively generated and assert influence upon the world of the reader.32    Therefore, 
the world created in the text does not have to correspond or reflect to the reality “behind 
the text.”  Historical criticism’s focus on the “world behind the text” meant that the 
reality of the text was measured against historical reality “behind the text” but the power 
the text had for “construing, generating and evoking an alternative reality” was ignored.33   
 The power of the text to evoke an alternative reality lies in both the rhetoric of the 
text and in the imagination of the reading community.  Brueggemann insists that 
imagination is a “crucial ingredient” for Israel because it is through imagination that 
rhetoric has the power to evoke, generate and create alternative realities.  Imagination 
however has not been highly regarded by historical critical methodology which prefers 
“sober descriptiveness.”34  Brueggemann claims that while rhetoric has the power to 
evoke an alternative reality it at the same time “precludes excessive certitude.”35  He 
argues that the Western theological tradition has been uncomfortable with the lack of 
certainty “in the text” of the Old Testament.  He writes, 
Our intellectual inheritance has characteristically preferred “being” to 
rhetoric, and therefore has assumed that metaphysics is a much more 
serious matter than is speech.  The outcome is that issues of God are 
foreclosed before disputatious utterance rather than in and through 
disputatious utterance.36 
 
  Brueggemann claims that the connection between speech and reality is among the 
most difficult issues he confronted in writing an Old Testament theology.37  He does not 
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want to deny that speech in the Old Testament has no concern with being and yet he is 
aware that the intellectual tradition of the West has placed primary emphasis on 
metaphysics and has considered rhetoric as far less significant.  He argues that while 
Israel makes some assumptions about what is real, it is not willing to protect those 
assumptions by silencing competing claims.  In addition, Brueggemann desires to 
emphasize the vital role of speech in the Old Testament in relation to God’s presence.  
Brueggemann argues that it is through Israel’s speech that God’s presence in and with 
Israel continues.  He writes,  
I shall argue, nonetheless, that practically and concretely, the very 
character of God in the Old Testament depends on the courage and 
imagination of those who speak about God, and who in speaking make 
available to Israel (and belatedly to the church) not only God, but a 
specific God of a very odd and unprecedented kind.38 
 
 Brueggemann’s interpretive method gives primary attention to the role of rhetoric 
and therefore emphasizes rhetorical criticism.39  He states that in rhetorical criticism 
attention is paid not only to what is said but also to the way it is said.40  Brueggemann 
contends that Old Testament rhetoric is pluralistic, not given in one unified voice but in 
competing claims.  It is only through attention to the voices of these competing claims 
that the reality of God is spoken.41   
  Brueggemann’s emphasis on rhetoric and speech leading reality is the reason the 
metaphor and imagery of a courtroom is used to organize his book, Theology of the Old 
Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy.
 42
  In a courtroom there are competing 
versions of reality and the testimony of witnesses is used to arrive at truth.  There is a 
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common thread in the testimony witnesses give in a courtroom because the witnesses are 
describing either the same incident or the same person.  Nevertheless, it is recognized that 
different people see the same situation or understand the character of the same person 
from differing points of view.  Truth is determined by review and acceptance or rejection 
of a witness’s testimony.   
 The metaphor of the courtroom used by Brueggemann emphasizes the role of 
rhetoric, pluralism and the tentativeness of faith claims in the Old Testament.  
Brueggemann contends that Old Testament claims for God are not based on history “in a 
positivistic sense” or on ontology.  Rather, theological claims are expressed rhetorically, 
advocated amid counterclaims and are open to review and dispute.  Brueggemann states 
that recognizing this disputatious process in the text and in the interpretive community is 
essential for understanding the “unsettling settlements” that become the theological truth-
claims of Israel.43   
Brueggemann’s emphasis on this disputatious process highlights the dialectical 
nature of the biblical text.  One way in which the imagery of the courtroom fails for 
Brueggemann’s theological project is that in a courtroom, it is generally assumed that 
some of the testimony is inaccurate, misleading or deceitful.  Dispute leads to truth only 
through elimination of false and inaccurate versions of either the event or character in 
question.  In using the metaphor and language of the courtroom for biblical theology, 
however, Brueggemann is not claiming that in the competing testimonies of the biblical 
text, one claim is true and another false.  Rather, there is truth in each of the competing 
testimonies and it is only through dialectical engagement of these competing claims that 
the God of Israel emerges.  Brueggemann contends that the dialectical nature of the text 
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and interpretive community is not randomly chosen but is an essential component of the 
process of seeking to know and live with Yahweh.44   
Brueggemann argues that the narrative framework of scripture enhances the 
dialogue between the text and the lived experiences of the people of Israel.  Scripture 
testifies to unfolding events in Israel’s history that are possible only because of God’s 
intervention.45  Israel articulated these events in a narrative framework and celebrated 
those events in their traditions.  The stories of God’s intervention in Israel’s history 
formed the narrative of the Old Testament and fed the imaginations of the people of 
Israel who celebrated those stories through tradition.  Through narrative, a dialogue is 
created between tradition, scripture and the lived experience of Israel.  The dialogue 
between tradition, scripture and the lived experience of Israel involves tension between 
traditions celebrating God’s intervention in past historical events and the questions that 
arise about God and are directed to God concerning new events.  Brueggemann points out 
that it is the tension between the constant and dynamic that has led many to conclude that 
Old Testament theology is an oxymoron.46  This tension exists because the Old 
Testament is not interested in ontological claims but in religious questions that arise from 
life circumstances.   
In an article, “Biblical Theology Appropriately Postmodern,” Brueggemann 
points to three major dialectical rubrics that illustrate the tension between the constant 
and the dynamic as an essential aspect of the Old Testament text.  The three dialectical 
rubrics he describes are: covenant and exile, hymn and lament, and presence and 
                                                 
44 Ibid. 
45 Ibid., 69-71. 
46 Ibid., 40. 
 27 
theodicy.47  Each of these pairs has a stabilizing and destabilizing element.  In the first 
pair for example, Brueggemann notes that the covenants with Abraham, Noah and Moses 
which were both demanding and reassuring provided structure and stability for the people 
of Israel.  The experience of exile however destabilizes the assurance of the covenants.  
The exile plays a prominent role in both the formation and writing of the Old Testament 
text and so there is a dialectical interplay between covenant and exile throughout the Old 
Testament.48 
In each of the pairs that Brueggemann describes there is a tension.  On one side of 
the tension are traditions that celebrate positive experiences of Gods’ presence and 
activity that give constancy to Israel’s faith.  On the other side are traditions that testify to 
the often painful experience of life in the world and therefore question the certainty of 
Israel’s truth-claims.  Brueggemann argues that the Old Testament text refuses the 
certainty of either side of the tension.  It resists silencing the questions raised by exile, 
lament or theodicy in order to protect the certainty of covenant, hymn or presence; but it 
also resists accepting destabilization as a new form of certainty.  It is insistent upon the 
truth-claims of covenant, hymn and presence in the face of counter claims.  Furthermore, 
the insistence upon covenant, hymn and presence forms and creates a counter reality for 
the people of Israel that often deepens their faith in the midst of chaotic, painful and 
turbulent events.49   
Brueggemann notes that Israel’s dialectical testimony to God is a challenge for 
Christian interpretation.  He writes, “Christian interpretation has a deep propensity to 
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give closure, to end the dialectic, to halt deconstruction, and to arrive as quickly as 
possible at affirmation.”50  He gives two examples of affirmations of Christian faith that 
are often used to resolve the dialectic present in the Old Testament text.  The first is that 
because God is gracious all will be well, an affirmation Brueggemann argues is readily 
accepted by our therapeutic culture.51  The second is Christological.  Jesus is the 
fulfillment of all Old Testament claims and therefore the dialectical nature of the Old 
Testament is resolved through Christ.52  Brueggemann argues that both the biblical text 
and life itself testify to the inadequacy of these two affirmations.53  He claims that the 
need to maintain dialectical theology in interpreting the Old Testament is similar to the 
need to maintain the dialectic between cross and resurrection in Christian theology.54  
Both the dialectical theology of the Old Testament and the dialectic of cross/resurrection 
in the New Testament are necessary because testimony is formed, influenced and shaped 
by life experience and life experience is formed, influenced and shaped by testimony.  
This interplay of testimony and life experience is not only a vital element in the 
formation of the biblical text but is also an important factor for interpreting communities.  
 Brueggemann points to Hans Urs von Balthazar’s observation of three distinct 
periods in Jesus’ life in order to contextualize the interpreting community.  According to 
Balthazar’s observation, Friday, Jesus went to the cross.  Saturday, Jesus went to the 
dead.  Sunday, Jesus went to the Father.55  Friday is a day of suffering, aloneness and 
unutterable waste.  Sunday is a day of liberation and rebirth.  Saturday is the journey in 
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between these two days.56  Saturday is marked by waiting for liberation while aware of 
and actively engaged in relieving the magnitude of suffering in the world.  Brueggemann 
argues that Christian work in the world is Saturday work and therefore Christian 
interpretation of Scripture is Saturday interpretation.57  It is interpretation that seeks 
certainty in a truth free from the conditions of the world while also entertaining questions 
arising from engagement in, with and through the ambiguity of life in the world.58 
Brueggemann’s Interpretive Model 
 Brueggemann’s interpretive model emphasizes the role of rhetoric in shaping Old 
Testament’s theology of God.  The dialectical tension between testimony and 
countertestimony that he maintains in this book, TOT, is a development of a model he 
first articulated in two articles published in 1985: “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, 
I: Structure Legitimation,” and “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of 
Pain.”59  In the first of these two articles, Brueggemann draws attention to the fact that 
the organization of the Old Testament material has a vital influence on the theology the 
interpreter draws from the Old Testament.60  He points out that there has been a 
movement from organizing the material of the Old Testament according to one 
centralized theme to organizing that material according to a bi-polar scheme.  The 
following are a few examples of the bi-polar schemes Brueggemann uses to illustrate this 
movement in interpretation. Claus Westermann uses the poles of blessing and deliverance 
to organize the Old Testament material.  Samuel Terrien organizes the material into the 
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two categories of aesthetic and ethical.  Paul Hansen uses the categories of cosmic and 
teleological.61  These bi-polar schemes recognize the complexity of the Old Testament 
material and seek to maintain the tension of the dialectical theology that is central to the 
Old Testament.  
 In the two articles discussed above, Brueggemann begins to articulate his own bi-
polar scheme.  He proposes to organize the material of the Old Testament into two 
categories that he labels “structure legitimation” or “the majority voice” and “the 
embrace of pain” or the “minority voice.”62  Dividing the Old Testament into “voices” 
draws attention to the role of rhetoric in shaping Old Testament theology.  His bi-polar 
scheme is centered on competing rhetorical theological claims.  Organizing the material 
of the Old Testament into two competing rhetorical claims places emphasis on the 
polemical, open, provisional, and dialogical nature of Old Testament theology.63  
 Brueggemann states that the majority voice embraces a “common theology.” In 
using the term “common theology,” Brueggemann is harkening back to an article written 
by Morton Smith in 1952.64  In this article, Smith proposes that Israel’s understanding of 
God emerged from and was influenced by a common theology, which permeated the 
Middle East during the time of Israel’s formation.  Brueggemann agrees with Smith’s 
observation arguing that some of the central theological insights of Old Testament 
theology are given shape by this “common theology.”  The central theological insights in 
the Old Testament that partake of this “common theology” include the following points. 
First, the theological insight that life is created, ordered and governed by God.  Second, 
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the order of the world and God’s providence over the world are beyond historical 
circumstances.  Third, God’s ordering and governing of creation is foundational for the 
ordered structure of society and gives the ordered structure of society legitimacy.  Fourth, 
God’s relationship with ordered society is a contractual arrangement in which those who 
maintain the order of society and therefore live according to God’s commands are 
rewarded while those who detract from that order are punished.65  
 Brueggemann argues that while the insights of Israel share elements with the 
“common theology” of the Mid-East, the theology of Israel is at the same time radically 
different from the surrounding cultures.  This difference arises from the remarkable move 
made in the Old Testament to include not only the theological insights of the majority 
voice but a challenge to those insights as well.  That challenge comes in the form of the 
minority voice that testifies to a crisis for the theological claims of the majority voice.  
The crisis arises from experiences of pain that move beyond a rational explanation and 
cannot be fit into the contractual theology articulated by the majority voice of Israel.  
Brueggemann refers to this crisis as the embrace of pain and defines that embrace as 
follows.   
By embrace of pain is meant the full acknowledgment of and experience 
of pain, and the capacity and willingness to make that pain a substantive 
part of Israel’s faith-conversation with its God.  Such an act of embrace 
means to articulate the pain fully, to insist on God’s reception of the 
speech and the pain, and to wait hopefully for God’s resolution.66    
  
 Brueggemann argues that the inclusion of this voice is remarkable because even 
though this voice challenges the speech about God of the majority voice and therefore 
challenges the traditions and structures of Israel, it is not silenced but is included in the 
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Old Testament text.67  The testimony of the minority voice is not given by those outside 
of Israel or by later detractors of Israel’s faith.  Rather, this voice arises in the midst of 
Israel.  It is a faithful voice that is foundational for Israel’s understanding of God.  
Furthermore, Brueggemann contends that while this voice is the minority voice in Israel, 
it has disproportionate importance because it is through this voice that Israel’s faith 
remains open to hearing God.  He writes, 
Faith is against voicelessness, against a society in which speech about 
power and powerlessness is banished and in which social power is so 
concentrated that it need no longer listen and is no longer capable of 
hearing…The primary critical function of the Bible is to keep the voice of 
hurt present in the public process.  That voice, so cherished and honored in 
the Bible, is the voice of the marginal, whose testimony is oddly 
transmitted to us in the canonical process, as the voice of God. 68  
 
 In TOT, Brueggemann takes the model he has proposed in these two articles and 
uses it to organize the material of the Old Testament.  Using the guiding metaphor of a 
courtroom, the material he categorizes as the “majority voice” in these articles becomes 
“testimony” in his book.  Likewise, the term “minority voice” becomes 
“countertestimony.”  He divides the book into four sections entitled: “Israel’s Core 
Testimony,” “Israel’s Countertestimony,” “Israel’s unsolicited Testimony,” and “Israel’s 
Embodied Testimony.”  While dividing the material into these four sections gives 
structure to the book, there is not a strict adherence to these categories. This is 
particularly true of the material Brueggemann includes under the category 
“countertestimony.”  Countertestimony is not limited to the section of the book under that 
title.  Instead, countertestimony exerts influence throughout the entire book.  Just as 
Brueggemann argues that the countertestimony of Israel exerts a disproportionate 
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influence on the Old Testament text, countertestimony likewise exerts a disproportionate 
influence on the theology Brueggemann draws from the Old Testament material.69   
 Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology is more attentive to points of disruption, 
incongruity, and inconsistency in the text than to the constancy of major theological 
themes in the Old Testament.  This is due to the fact that Brueggemann contends that 
uncertainty has a greater influence than certainty in generating and shaping the Old 
Testament text and therefore it is the minority voice or the countertestimony that drives 
the drama in the Old Testament.70  That the drama of the Old Testament is driven by 
uncertainty rather than certainty is visible through attention to two themes that are of 
major importance in Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology: exile and theodicy. 
Central Themes in Brueggemann’s Interpretation of the Old Testament 
 Brueggemann states that the majority of contemporary Old Testament scholars 
operate from the premise that the texts of the Old Testament do not receive their final 
form before the sixth century BCE or thereafter.71  This means that the Old Testament is 
in large part a product of and a response to the Babylonian Exile.  The significance of this 
fact lies in the recognition that the exile was a time of profound crises for Israel.  The 
Babylonian Exile marked the failure of Israel’s sociopolitical structures and called into 
question the theological certitude of Israel’s faith.72  In fact, according to Brueggemann, 
these failures and the questions these failures left in their wake became the motivating 
driving force that energized the production of the literature written at this time. 73 
Furthermore, not only did the exile leave its mark by inspiring the theologians of Israel to 
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answer questions emerging from the failure of all of Israel’s institutions, but it also 
became, as Brueggemann asserts, the matrix for understanding their faith.  The literature 
that arose as a response to exile was also shaped by the exile.  It was shaped both by the 
vulnerability and risk that became, during and after the exile, a characteristic feature of 
Israel’s self-identity and by the fact that the articulation of faith in response to exile is an 
act of daring imaginative counter reality.74  
 Brueggemann writes, “following the disruption of 587 BCE, under Babylonian or 
Persian aegis, Jews understood themselves to be exposed, vulnerable, and at risk without 
the visible supports of a stable homeland.”75  Brueggemann claims that this self-
understanding is formative for the text of the Old Testament.  As an illustration, he points 
to the fact that the Torah ends with Moses and the people of Israel standing before the 
Promised Land and yet not in possession of it.76  This points to a self-identity rooted in 
exile with all of its risks and fragility but nonetheless living courageously with a belief in 
homecoming and the fulfillment of all God’s promises.  Israel’s self-identity as a 
homeless people becomes then not a description of an historical past but a paradigm for 
understanding faith in Israel at all times.  According to Brueggemann, that faith is a 
practice of counter-reality.  Israel envisions the world in the way of Yahweh when the 
circumstances they live in do not match the vision.  The faith of Israel is characterized by 
vulnerability, risk, and fragility, a faith that must survive in a world characterized by 
instability and yet Israel increasingly looks to the text for its stability. 
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Brueggemann argues that the texts of the Old Testament claim a daring, 
imaginative counter- reality.  The exiles relied on re-use of older material and interpreted 
that material in imaginative ways in the face of their current circumstances.  
Brueggemann asserts that this daring interpretation is an artistic rendering of reality that 
challenges the reader to move beyond historic circumstances and forge forward in 
resilient hope.77  Brueggemann points to the Deuteronomic texts, Job, the texts of the 
Exilic Isaiah, and the texts concerning Priestly presence as examples of daring 
imaginative formulations.  They are daring and imaginative because they cannot base 
their claims on data pulled from historical lived experience.   For example, according to 
Brueggemann, the priestly sections of Torah dare to claim that sacrifice and temple are 
central and significant at a time when the temple has been destroyed.  Exilic Isaiah makes 
its claims for homecoming with only an anticipation of international upheaval and the 
writers of the Deuteronomic texts and Job only imagine that torah righteousness is a 
useful subject for reflection during a time of extreme national or personal crises.78   
This articulation of counter-reality has two important functions.  First, it 
articulates fully the pain of the situation of exile. Second, it dares to hope for 
transformation of those circumstances.  Brueggemann writes, “And so, taken in large, 
these materials are to be understood as an act of unrestrained grief, which denied nothing, 
and as a counter-act of defiant hope, which refused to give into circumstance.”79   
According to Brueggemann the theme of exile, and the metaphor of exile and 
homecoming are formative for both Israel’s faith and the Old Testament text that is 
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shaped by that faith.  The exile is a “paradigmatic event” for Israel.80  This means that the 
exile does not remain in the past as a remembered event but becomes an interpretive lens 
for understanding all life experiences that call into question God’s sovereignty and 
fidelity.81  For this reason, the fact that Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology begins 
by stating that the text of the Old Testament is situated in the matrix of exile is significant 
for understanding the role of Israel’s countertestimony in Brueggemann’s Old Testament 
theology.  The fact that the claims of the Old Testament are recorded during a time of 
profound crises and as an act of interpretation of that crises results in the inclusion of a 
variety of voices, a rich tapestry of understanding. This rich tapestry is forged in the risk 
and vulnerability that becomes, according to Brueggemann, characteristic of the self-
identity of Israel.   
The same risk and vulnerability that becomes characteristic of Israel’s self-
identity also becomes characteristic of Israel’s practice of faith so that theological claims 
are made with awareness that life can and does often contradict those claims. Questions, 
therefore, are not only tolerated but are cherished as necessary conditions for faithful 
living.  The questions of Israel revolve around the theme of theodicy.  Brueggemann 
insists however, that the theme of theodicy is expressed differently in the Old Testament 
than it is in philosophical reflection on theodicy beginning with Gottfried Wilhelm 
Leibniz.82  In philosophical reflection, theodicy takes the form of “justifying the ways of 
God to man.”83  In the Old Testament, however, the theodicy question is a challenge to 
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God that takes the form of protest and refuses to concede to rational explanation.84 
Silencing the questions would be an act of denial, a means of closing God off from the 
most painful and sometimes most profound aspects of life.  Most importantly, the core 
claims of Israel’s testimony are made from within the crises of those core claims and so 
testimony gets its structure and form from countertestimony right from the start.  The two 
are fundamentally interwoven.  
Strengths and Weaknesses of Brueggemann’s Methodology  
 Brueggemann’s methodology for Old Testament theology is criticized for 
numerous reasons.  He is criticized for his lack of attention to history, his neglect of the 
subject of inspiration, and his inattentiveness to the canon, Christian tradition or other 
interpretations of scripture.85  While these critiques focus on different areas that lack 
attention in Brueggemann’s interpretation of the Old Testament, they also share common 
ground.  They all claim that Brueggemann’s lack of attention to history, divine 
inspiration, canon, or tradition is the result of his dismissal of “behind the text” issues.  
For example, in a review article, Paul D. Hanson writes, “For Brueggemann, history is 
irrelevant to this subject.  He doesn’t care what really happened; he doesn’t think it 
profitable to explore the real-life context in which the Israelite God was revealed.  His 
approach is ahistorical.”86   
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 Gowan critiques Brueggemann’s lack of attention to the subject of divine 
inspiration and states that his lack of attention to the topic of inspiration combined with 
his lack of attention to the “word behind the text” results in viewing the biblical text as “a 
purely human product, Israel’s testimony to Yahweh.”87  Despite this strong statement 
pointing to what he considers a major weakness in Brueggemann’s approach to the Old 
Testament, Gowan begins his article with praise of Brueggemann’s work.  Gowan 
compares the arrival of Brueggemann’s TOT with the appearance of Gerhard von Rad’s 
theology of the Old Testament stating that like von Rad’s theology, Brueggemann has 
taken an original approach that stands out from other Old Testament theologies and 
perhaps points toward the future direction of biblical interpretation.88 
 It is Brueggemann’s original approach to the Old Testament that calls forth such 
strong critique of his work.  What gives his theology both strength and weakness is his 
emphasis on rhetoric.  Brueggemann acknowledges the Western intellectual tradition has 
been ill at ease with the lack of certainty in rhetoric and has much preferred metaphysics 
to rhetoric.89  Adding to the intensity of the critiques of Brueggemann’s methodological 
focus on rhetoric is Brueggemann’s own use of rhetoric in his book.  Gowan argues that 
he indulges in phrases that are difficult to understand and describes his choice of 
vocabulary as “free-wheeling.”90  Gowan uses as examples titles of sections in 
Brueggemann’s book such as, “The Density of Nouns of Sustenance,” and “Contradiction 
Concerning Exclusionary Rules.”91   
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 Robert K. Gnuse also makes note of Brueggemann’s excessive use of rhetoric.  
Gnuse claims that while Brueggemann’s rhetoric gives the impression that he opposes 
historical critical methodology, in fact the book he has produced would not be possible 
“without the heritage of several centuries of historical critical scholarly groundwork.”92  
Gnuse writes, “I believe that Brueggemann, like all of us at times, got carried away with 
his rhetoric in this volume and did not really mean to leave the impression that he is so 
totally opposed to the traditional critical methods of textual analysis.”93 
  Brueggemann’s rhetoric does imply a split with historical criticism that is more 
profound in expression than it is in reality.  An exploration of Brueggemann’s 
publications over several decades reveals his great familiarity and ability to use the tools 
of Critical analysis.  Even in TOT, it is historical criticism that allows him to understand 
the role of rhetoric in the Old Testament text.  For example, when Brueggemann 
discusses the influence of the exile on the production and writing of the Old Testament 
text and on the self-identity of the people of Israel he is using historical critical 
methodology both for the dating of texts and for analysis of the traditioning process that 
he claims contributed to the texts final form.94  
 While Gnuse acknowledges that Brueggemann’s lack of attention to critical issues 
and his original form of organization of texts and concepts is frustrating for critical 
scholars, he argues that Brueggemann’s work “provides a religious intellectual with a 
sensitive feeling for what is being said in the First Testament in existential terms rather 
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than exegetical or historical categories.”95  Gnuse points in this quote to the strength of 
Brueggemann’s work.  That strength lies in his attention to issues that have been ignored 
by historical critical methodology.  His focus on rhetoric does draw attention to the text 
itself rather than to what lies behind the text but in doing this Brueggemann does not 
claim that there is no reality behind the text or that the Bible is merely a human product.  
Rather, his claim is that the reality behind the text cannot be fully known and what can be 
known is known through rhetoric.96  His use of rhetoric draws attention to faith and the 
role of the texts in generating, maintaining, and encouraging the faith of the people of 
Israel as well as the faithful of generations of believers, both Jewish and Christian, who 
have relied on the biblical text for both identity and stability.  The certainty that 
Brueggemann points to is not the certainty of history or the certainty of metaphysics.  It is 
the certainty that God is involved in, with and under all the existential conditions of 
human life.  God is revealed in the midst of these conditions and can only be testified to 
in and through these conditions.   
 Brueggemann’s methodology produces a compelling Old Testament theology.  
His rhetorical methodology is strengthened and dependent upon his vast and profound 
knowledge of the biblical text, a knowledge acquired through years of writing and 
teaching, which is then combined with his immense interest and knowledge of a wide 
range of theological issues.  The result is an approach that is fresh and at the same time 
grounded in critical scholarship.  The claims of Hanson and Gowan that Brueggemann 
ignores reality and history, and that he understands the Old Testament as merely a human 
product are short sighted.  These criticisms arise because Brueggemann’ methodology, 
                                                 
95 Gnuse, 91. 
96 Brueggemann, 53-71. 
 41 
focused on rhetoric, engages aspects of the Old Testament that challenge the rational 
categories used by scholarly critical analysis.   
 The strength of Brueggemann’s theology lies in his ability to move beyond 
scholarly critical analysis and engage the existential theological issues provoked in and 
through the text.  By emphasizing rhetoric, he draws attention to both God’s engagement 
with human beings in and through the ambiguities of lived experience and the role and 
responsibility of human beings for engagement with God.  Brueggemann’s theology 
recognizes that the biblical text is open, provisional and has been shaped by a traditioning 
process.  That process involves imaginative re-use of biblical traditions as Israel 
encounters new and often painful experiences that call into question their understanding 
of God.  Brueggemann’s theological method uses the traditioning process that is 
operating in the formation of the biblical text as a foundation for his Old Testament 
theology.  His Old Testament theology therefore attends to the disruptions and 
incongruities in the text because he recognizes these disruptions and incongruities to be 
the source for deeper theological insight.  His approach recognizes that the dialectical 
tension between the constant and dynamic is an essential component of the revelation of 
God in the text.  Israel’s faith is influenced by tradition but questions that arise from new 
experiences are vital because it is through these questions that Israel’s faith remains 
deeply connected to life in the world.  Brueggemann’s theology recognizes that it is the 
questions of the minority voice that most often lead to new theological insights and that 
keep Israel’s faith open to hearing the voice of God. 
 Brueggemann’s theological sensitivity to the voiceless and oppressed, a 
sensitivity that runs through all of his publications, influences the theology he draws from 
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the Old Testament.  Because of this sensitivity, Brueggemann emphasizes the Psalms and 
the Prophets as sources for theological reflection.97  While his sensitivity shapes his 
choice of material, thereby limiting it, at the same time it gives strength to his 
interpretation because this sensitivity is a vital component of both the Old Testament text 
and the faith of Israel.  Gowan writes, “If his prose is more reminiscent of Greek than 
Hebrew, his spirit is distinctly Hebrew (a complement, when it comes from another 
student of the Old Testament).”98    
 In addition, Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology embraces the diversity of the 
Old Testament.  Through this embrace of diversity, Brueggemann allows both God’s 
passionate involvement in the ambiguities of Israel’s lived experience and the questions 
that the ambiguities of lived experience evoke for understanding God to emerge from the 
text and lead theological inquiry. Gowan writes,  
 One of the great contributions of the book is its success in showing 
that the diversity in the Old Testament can (and should) be taken not as an 
embarrassment to be ignored, a problem to be solved, or a fault making it 
useless, but as an accurate reflection of what life in this world is really like 
and a reflection of a God who is both daunting and intensely fascinating- 
such that the reflection (if not the God who has really produced it) ought 
to be taken with the utmost seriousness for its potentially transforming 
power.99 
 
 Brueggemann’s methodology, emphasizing aspects of the Old Testament text that 
have been overlooked by historical critical analysis, leads to an Old Testament theology 
that is sensitive to the voiceless and oppressed, recognizes the role and importance of the 
theodicy question and exile for shaping the text and seeks to allow the dialectical tension 
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of the text to lead to deeper theological insights.  These same themes are essential in 
interpretations of the cross.   
The interpretations of the cross of Moltmann and Sobrino emphasize God’s 
revelation in the midst of the voiceless and oppressed, recognize the role and importance 
of the theodicy question, which suffering poses, and attend to Jesus’ experience of 
abandonment for shaping Christian theology.   Their interpretations of the cross also seek 
to allow the dialectical tension between cross and resurrection to lead their readers to 
deeper theological insights.  For this reason, Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology is 
an excellent source for conversation with the theologies of the cross of Moltmann and 
Sobrino. Before moving to analysis of the work of Moltmann and Sobrino, it is important 
to conduct a thorough study of the role of countertestimony in Brueggemann’s Old 
Testament theology.  Because Brueggemann’s theology recognizes that it is the questions 
of the minority voice in the Bible that most often lead to new theological insights and that 
keep Israel’s faith open to hearing the voice of God, a careful analysis of the minority 
voice is essential. 
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Chapter Two 
The Embrace of Pain: “Countertestimony” in Brueggemann’s Old Testament 
Theology  
 
  “Testimony” is the keyword in Walter Brueggemann’s major tome, The Theology 
of the Old Testament.
1  Not only because the book’s subtitle, “Testimony, Dispute, 
Advocacy” draws attention to it, but also because testimony is the beginning point for his 
reflection on the God of Israel.  Brueggemann explains what he means by “testimony” in 
the context of a “lawcourt,” which serves as his dominant metaphor. The dynamics of 
adjudicating a case based on testimony provides him with the structure for The Theology 
of the Old Testament.  It is through the word testimony, and its role in arguing competing 
truth claims in a court of law, that the major themes of Brueggemann’s Old Testament 
theology are explicated.  Those themes include: the essential role of speech in Israel’s 
understanding of God, the relationship between speech and reality, the importance of 
competing versions of reality in Israel’s theological claims, the role of speech in shaping 
reality, the contingency of God on Israel’s speech, and the observation that Israel’s 
speech about God is through the fabric of lived experience so that all knowledge of God 
is provisional, open ended, and dialogical. These major themes are important throughout 
Brueggemann’s The Theology of the Old Testament, which is divided into four parts each 
representing the forms of testimony: core testimony, countertestimony, unsolicited 
testimony, and embodied testimony.   
 A discussion of Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology concentrating on the 
countertestimony of Israel will be the major topic of this chapter.  The role and function 
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of the countertestimony, the dominant themes of the countertestimony, and the 
importance of these themes for Old Testament theology and the notion of God will be the 
focus.  Brueggemann’s analysis of the role of lament as a public voicing of pain, grief, 
and sorrow in the unfolding drama between God and Israel will also be given substantial 
attention. 
Definition, Function, and Form of Countertestimony 
Of the four types of testimony treated by Brueggemann in Theology of the Old 
Testament, countertestimony is the most important for this study.  “Countertestimony” 
represents what Brueggemann refers to in other writings as the “minority voice” of Israel, 
the voice that expresses both Israel and God’s “embrace of pain.”2  According to 
Brueggemann, although the number of texts that express Israel’s embrace of pain are few 
in number, these texts carry a disproportional importance because of the crucial role and 
function of the countertestimony in the Old Testament.3   Countertestimony, therefore, is 
vital in shaping Brueggemann’s TOT, and his Old Testament theology as a whole, 
including his understanding of the theology of God and his articulation of the unfolding 
drama between God and Israel.  
 It is important to note Brueggemann’s insistence that countertestimony arises in 
the Old Testament in the face of the claims of the core testimony, provided by the 
majority voice.  Biblical faith consists of a tension between the majority voice of Israel 
with its claims for God as an active, powerful agent who creates, promises, delivers, 
commands, and leads, and the minority voice that questions the certainty of those claims 
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through open, honest testimony about the lived experience of pain.4    Both the core 
claims of the testimony and the challenge of the countertestimony are essential in the 
articulation of Israel’s faith.  In keeping with the lawcourt metaphor that provides the 
structure for TOT, Brueggemann compares countertestimony to cross-examination.  After 
the testimony, after the witness articulates his or her version of reality, the cross-
examination challenges that account of reality, questions it, and searches it for truth and 
reliability.5   
For Brueggemann, it is important that this cross-examination not be done by 
detractors of the faith, by those outside of Israel, or after the text is formed.  Rather, this 
cross-examination emerges from within the text, is found throughout the text, is part of 
the formation of the text, and is in fact characteristic of the text. Brueggemann therefore 
asserts that the countertestimony does not rise from a lack of faith but is rather a 
characteristic feature of Israel’s faith.  Brueggemann describes the faith of Israel as a 
disputatious, questioning faith that attends to disruptions and incongruities and will not 
close itself to the realities of lived experience in order to support a closed determined 
system or to legitimate existing structures.6    
 According to Brueggemann, the core and counter testimonies of Israel belong 
together.  The counter testimony of Israel is not voiced in one large and sweeping claim 
but emerges slowly and painfully as the nation of Israel and individual members of Israel 
live their lives in the midst of the unresolved conditions of the world, waiting and hoping 
for the God of the core testimony to intervene on their behalf.  It is when life becomes 
unbearable, when the intervention of God is not on the horizon, that Israel’s 
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countertestimony, Israel’s cross-examination of God, finds voice.7   Israel dares to 
complain to God and to question God.  Israel’s complaint and questioning of God is both 
honesty about its pain, and a means to mobilize God to be faithful to the claims of the 
core testimony.  According to Brueggemann, Israel challenges God, “to be Yahweh’s 
best, true self.”8   
The questions Israel asks: How long? Why? Where? Is the Lord among us or not? 
are questions that arise from the pain of their experience.  The people of Israel have faith 
in the God of the core testimony and yet experience the pain of abandonment.  Therefore, 
questions emerge concerning on the one hand God’s reliability and fidelity, and on the 
other God’s sovereignty and power.  Two basic questions emerge: 1) If Israel is 
abandoned is God reliable?  2) If God is reliable and yet Israel is abandoned is God 
sovereign?  Both questions are forged in the furnace of painful life experience that is 
incongruous with the version of reality proclaimed in the core testimony.9  
 In his article, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” 
Brueggemann defines pain as “any dysfunction in the relationship with God, and any 
derivative dysfunction in the disorder of creation or society.”10  Two trajectories of pain 
are noted here.  The first is a vertical trajectory of pain involving disruption in the 
relationship between God and human beings.  The second is a horizontal trajectory of 
pain involving relationships between and among human beings as well as disruption 
between human beings and the created world.  Brueggemann insists that there is a 
connection between notions of God and the structures and power relationships among 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 319. 
8 Ibid., 321. 
9 Ibid., 319-325. 
10 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II,” 398. 
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human beings.  The voice of pain, particularly the voice of the oppressed (the widow, the 
orphan, the alien), challenges both the notions of God and the legitimacy of the structures 
and power relationships of society.11   
In the same article, Brueggemann asserts that in the Old Testament this pain is 
fully “embraced” by both Yahweh and Israel.  He writes, “Such an act of embrace means 
to articulate the pain fully, to insist on God’s reception of the speech and the pain, and to 
wait hopefully for God’s resolution.”12  This statement points to another important 
dimension of the function of the minority voice in Brueggemann’s Old Testament 
theology.  Fully embraced pain involves both the articulation of that pain by the speaker 
and the reception of that pain by God who has the power to change the situation.  The 
speaking of this pain is not simply therapeutic, a release of pent up feelings, but is rather 
received and heard by God who will respond to what has been spoken.  So this speech is 
dynamic.  It changes the situation, shapes the relationship, and drives the drama.  It has 
the powerful potential to evoke a response and that potential is what gives the minority 
voice its disproportionate importance in the Old Testament. 
What is hinted at in these statements from Brueggemann’s article, “A Shape for 
Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” is the crucial function of the minority 
voice in Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology.  It is this voice that Brueggemann 
claims challenges all settled notions of God and challenges the legitimacy of structures 
based upon these settled notions of God.  Brueggemann insists that the powerful of 
society, the ones who oversee its structures, have a profound interest in maintaining the 
status quo.  In order to maintain the status quo, the voice of pain must be ignored.  The 
                                                 
11 Ibid., 399, 414-415. 
12 Ibid., 398. Emphases in direct quotes will be maintained throughout this paper.   
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surprising fact is that this voice of pain is not ignored in the Old Testament.  God is not 
immune from the questions raised from pain.  This minority voice opens the future for 
both God and Israel by challenging and insisting on a response from God.  According to 
Brueggemann, not only does God hear and accept this painful speech, but also God and 
the drama between God and Israel are changed by this speech.  In discussing the Psalms 
of lament in his book, Finally Comes the Poet, Brueggemann writes,  
 The alienation and the rage have long festered in the 
silence…. Finally comes the poet to speak the rage and resentment that 
will tolerate no prosaic utterance.  The indignation is not resigned.  It is an 
act of insistence and of hope.  Indignant hope is sounded because the 
speaker believes there is still this one to whom speech may be effectively 
addressed.  There still is a serious conversation partner.  In the very act of 
this speech, the world is already reshaped.  It is reshaped with a chance of 
community and communion.  It is reshaped with a possibility for dignity 
and self-respect.  There is speaking and a passionate conviction that there 
is listening.13 
 
This text points to the power of speech to reshape reality.  Buried in the belief that 
speech has this transforming power is a conviction that God is open to hearing this 
speech, that God has the power to change the situation, and that God’s hearing will evoke 
a response.   Brueggemann writes, “There are, however, ample Biblical texts to suggest 
that it is the voice of human hurt and hope that evokes the presence and response of 
God.”14  According to Brueggemann, it is the countertestimony, the minority voice of 
Israel, which drives and shapes the drama between God and Israel. 
Moving to a more specific analysis of Brueggemann’s articulation of the 
countertestimony in his Old Testament theology can only proceed through observation of 
the fact that this countertestimony plays a primary role throughout Brueggemann’s Old 
                                                 
13 Walter Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet: Daring Speech for Proclamation, (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000), 53. 
14 Ibid., 55. 
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Testament theology and is therefore not easily isolated.  At first glance it would appear 
that the dominant themes of the countertestimony are in fact isolated in the Part II of 
Brueggemann’s TOT.  In that section, entitled, “Israel’s Countertestimony,” 
Brueggemann discusses three themes of the countertestimony: God’s hiddenness, 
ambiguity, and negativity.  The fact is, however, that countertestimony is not limited 
either in this book or in his other writings to these three themes.  Rather, the 
countertestimony of Israel has a pervasive influence on all sections of Brueggemann’s 
book and therefore all forms of testimony discussed in the book. Countertestimony arises 
from the start with Brueggemann’s assertion that Israel’s faith is “situated in the matrix of 
the exile.”15  Throughout his discussion of the core testimony there are hints of the 
countertestimony hidden within.  In the section of his book addressing Israel’s unsolicited 
testimony, countertestimony has a decisive role in the drama of relationships 
Brueggemann discusses.  Finally, in the fourth section entitled, “Israel’s Embodied 
Testimony,” countertestimony is influential in all forms of the mediation of Yahweh in 
Israel that he addresses.   
The Countertestimony within the Testimony 
 The interweaving of testimony and countertestimony begins with the fact that 
Israel’s testimony about God is given in the context of relationship with God.  Israel does 
not speak of God’s characteristics separately from God’s relatedness to Israel.  
Brueggemann states that Israel’s characteristic speech about God is articulated in full 
verbal sentences.  This fact, he claims, is evidence that Israel’s foundation for speech 
                                                 
15 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 77. 
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about God is interwoven with their relationship to God.16  These sentences involve God 
as a subject of an active verb followed by Israel as the direct object, the recipient of 
God’s actions.  God as subject of the sentence has the power to act and transform but 
those actions are tied to Israel as the recipient of those actions.   
Brueggemann points out that Israel’s testimony is characteristically concerned 
with specific actions of God.17  These specific actions of God are summarized by 
Brueggemann through the verbs create, promise, deliver, command, and lead.18 In the 
section of TOT entitled, “Testimony in Verbal Sentences,” God’s power to transform is 
emphasized.  Brueggemann writes, “It is evident from the outset, in Israel’s most 
characteristic testimony, that right speech about Yahweh concerns Yahweh’s power to 
transform, to create, and to engender.”19  While the emphasis is on God’s power to 
transform, Brueggemann insists throughout this discussion that God’s power has a direct 
object, Israel, and so God’s actions are bound to the situation of the people of Israel.  In 
fact, these full verbal sentences are given in the context of narrative, given in the midst of 
stories describing the sociopolitical and theological circumstances of the people of Israel.   
The articulation of testimony in full verbal sentences from within the context of 
narrative shapes Israel’s testimony to the actions of God.20  As discussed previously, 
these narrative accounts of Israel situated in the matrix of exile tell the story of a people 
at risk, vulnerable, and fragile.  So while Brueggemann’s section dealing with active 
verbs emphasizes God’s active, powerful presence, within this section is the recognition 
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that God’s active, powerful presence is articulated from within situations in which that 
presence is not evident.  
For example, in Brueggemann’s discussion of Israel’s testimony of God 
organized around creation verbs, he writes, “In the Old Testament, creation faith receives 
its fullest articulation in Isaiah of the exile.”21  The Babylonian Exile was a time of chaos 
and anxiety for the people of Israel who were vulnerable enough to believe that the power 
of Babylon and the power of the Babylonian gods had forever overwhelmed Israel and 
had defeated and were more powerful than Yahweh.  According to Brueggemann, the 
creation texts of Isaiah, Jeremiah, and Genesis acted as subversive literature and provided 
Israel with a vision in contrast with the reality of their circumstance, a resilient hope in 
God’s power, and an affirmation of Israel’s status before God.22  These texts allowed 
Israel to reenact liturgically a counter reality and through that reenactment restore 
confidence in Yahweh and a derivative confidence in their own ability to act responsibly 
in freedom despite the power of Babylon.23   
A second example of the role of exile in shaping the core claims of Israel’s faith is 
given in Brueggemann’s discussion of God as the subject of the verb to promise.24  
Brueggemann points to two Hebrew verbs that are used in the Old Testament to supply 
the substance of God’s promises. Those verbs are “to give” (ntn) and “to bless” (brk).25  
The verb to give (ntn) is associated with God’s promise of the gift of land to Israel.  
Brueggemann indicates that this association links God’s promises to concrete material 
                                                 
21 Ibid., 149. 
22 The texts Brueggemann discusses are Isaiah 45:12-13; 40: 28-31; 43:1-44:2; Jer 10:1-16; Amos 4:13; 
Gen 1:1-2:4; Ibid., 150-154. 
23 Ibid., 151. 
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existence in the world.26  Brueggemann defines the verb to bless (brk) as, “a bestowal of 
life-force, related to the generativity, birth, and reproduction, which the powerful giver 
entrusts to the recipient.”27 With this verb, Brueggemann recognizes that God’s promise 
to bless Israel is life giving.  The significance of the linkage of God’s promises to 
concrete, material existence and the recognition of the life-giving force of Yahweh’s 
blessing in Israel’s testimony is shaped however by the exilic situation in which the texts 
are formed.  Israel, living in a situation in which it is obvious that God’s promises have 
not been fulfilled, waits.  The testimony of Israel is shaped by waiting.28  That waiting is 
formative for Israel’s understanding of God’s promises.  Israel does not simply remember 
the promises of God.  Rather, the promises are reflected upon in new circumstances 
where more is demanded and are therefore broken open so that waiting becomes the 
ground for deeper intimacy with God that opens the future for newness between God and 
Israel.29  
Brueggemann notes that Israel makes no concession to the exile.30  Rather, 
through the exile new claims of God’s promises exceed the old.  Exilic claims of promise 
reveal two important features of Israel’s notion of God.  The first is that according to 
Israel’s testimony, God intends to enter into exile with Israel.31  Exilic promises of deeper 
intimacy with God indicate God’s determination to enter into risky solidarity with Israel.  
The second feature of Israel’s notion of God is that God’s presence is life giving and 
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transformative.  God’s new more intimate relationship with Israel will transform the exile 
from a place of death to one of life.32  
Finally, Brueggemann discusses several other verbs in the section of his book 
called, “Testimony in Verbal Sentences.” The verbs discussed are verbs of deliverance, 
command, and leading.  In each case, the narrative structure of Israel’s testimony shaped 
by the paradigmatic role of the exile is given primary emphasis.  For this reason, in 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology, all of Israel’s claims given in its core testimony 
hide within them a form of countertestimony.  Within the order given in creation, hides 
the unresolved tension of chaos. Within claims of God’s promises, hides waiting in the 
midst of lives that contradict those promises.  Within the claims of God’s deliverance is 
the reality of lives characterized by subjugation to oppressive powers, etc.33   
Therefore, in Brueggemann’s discussion of the core testimony of Israel given in 
full verbal sentences, several important themes of countertestimony emerge.  First, 
Israel’s testimony is a practice of counter-reality so the awareness of the incongruity of 
life with the claims of the testimony is a foundational element of Israel’s faith and 
Israel’s testimony.  Second, the actions of God are always tied to Israel’s concrete 
material existence in the world and so the fragility and vulnerability of Israel’s existence 
also characterizes God’s presence in and for Israel.  God’s relationship with Israel 
involves risky solidarity for God.  Finally, the faith of Israel is characterized by waiting 
and that waiting provides the fertile ground for new hope and transformation.  These 
three themes filtering through the core claims of Israel’s testimony given in full verbal 
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sentences results in an unresolved openness to Israel’s faith and that unresolved openness 
is written into Israel’s testimony about God.34  
Brueggemann states that the verbs of God (creation, promise, deliverance, 
command, and lead) form the main themes of Israel’s faith and are articulated within the 
context of the narrative of the Pentateuch which ends in Deuteronomy 34 with Moses 
able to see and yet not enter the Promised Land.  He refers to these themes as “recitals of 
waiting.”35  Brueggemann insists that this waiting is not a theological problem but a 
theological datum.  He writes,  
The wonder of this faith is that the circumstance faced did not discredit the 
testimony of the verbal sentence; nor does the testimony lead to denial 
about the circumstance.  Rather the literature is put together in order to 
exhibit and to explore the tension between verbal testimony and 
circumstance, with the clear “canonical” insistence that the testimony will 
prevail over every circumstance.”36   
 
Unresolved open tension between circumstances and core testimony is, according to 
Brueggemann, characteristic of the Old Testament and therefore is an important theme in 
Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology.  
 Brueggemann’s analysis of the core claims of Israel’s faith concludes with an 
exploration of Israel’s use of adjectives and nouns.  Brueggemann asserts that in order to 
move from specific actions of God to more general claims, Israel makes a rhetorical 
maneuver from describing God in full verbal sentences to using adjectives and then 
nouns.37  With this rhetorical move comes a more stable understanding of God articulated 
in creedal statements and noun metaphors.  Countertestimony surfaces in this section of 
TOT in several important ways. 
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 The guiding text for the section of TOT, entitled, “Adjectives: Yahweh with 
Characteristic Markings,” is the creedal statement of Ex 34:6-7:  
The Lord, the Lord, 
a God merciful and gracious, 
slow to anger,  
and abounding in steadfast love and faithfulness, 
keeping steadfast love for the thousandth generation, 
forgiving iniquity and transgression and sin,  
yet by no means clearing the guilty, 
but visiting the iniquity of the parents 
upon the children 
and the children’s children, 
to the third and the fourth generation.38  
 
Brueggemann claims that the intense scholarly attention focused on this text is the result 
of the recognition that this text is “an exceedingly important, stylized, quite self-
conscious characterization of Yahweh.”39  God is described in this statement with a 
profound collection of adjectives: merciful (rhm), gracious (hnn), slow to anger (’rk 
’ppym), steadfast love (hsd), and faithful (’emeth).40  Brueggemann states that this 
collection of adjectives has a cumulative effect indicating “Yahweh’s intense solidarity 
with and commitment to those to whom Yahweh is bound.”41  
Yet despite its exceedingly positive claim, countertestimony is hidden within this 
“creedal statement” of Exodus.  That countertestimony is present in two ways.  First, it is 
present through the context of the narrative in which this statement occurs.  The 
statement is made at the end of a dramatic interaction between Israel and God mediated 
through Moses.  Because of the Golden calf incident, Israel’s entire future with God is in 
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a situation of extreme risk.  Through Moses’ intercession on Israel’s behalf, a situation 
that might have led to the death of Israel instead becomes the place of renewed 
relationship with Yahweh based in Yahweh’s intense solidarity with and for Israel.42    
The second way that countertestimony is present in the creedal statement of Ex 
34:6-7 is within the text itself.  Verses 6 and 7a speak of a merciful and gracious God 
bestowing favor, while verse 7b speaks of God’s punishment.  Brueggemann sees a 
profound tension between these verses. Brueggemann recognizes two common arguments 
that are used to relieve this tension.  First, it can be argued that God’s actions in the 
second half of the verse are necessary in order for God’s mercy, kindness, etc. to be 
carried out to those harmed by wickedness.  Second, it can be argued that the 
disproportionate granting of God’s mercy, grace, steadfast love, and faithfulness (granted 
to the thousandth generation) to God’s punishment (granted to only four generations) 
renders the second half of v. 7 a way to further emphasize the extent of God’s fidelity and 
mercy.  Ultimately, however, Brueggemann asserts that the two halves of the verse 
contradict each other.  There is a profound tension between the two statements that 
cannot be reconciled and that according to Brueggemann is a theological disclosure 
indicating a tension or contradiction “in the very life and character of Yahweh.”43  
Problematic Interpretive Issues in Brueggemann’s Theology of God   
This tension or contradiction “in the very life and character of Yahweh” is a very 
significant theme in Brueggemann’s theology of God.  The tension or contradiction in 
God is rooted in the unresolved open tension between circumstance and core testimony 
that Brueggemann finds characteristic of the Old Testament.  In a footnote to his article, 
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“Costly Loss of Lament,” Brueggemann writes, “In two recent articles I have suggested 
that the tension between God’s omnipotence and God’s pathos may be the shaping 
problem for doing Old Testament theology.”44  Brueggemann refers to this tension in 
several different ways in the articles and books leading up to the publication of TOT.   
In the two articles referred to by Brueggemann in the above quote, “A Shape for 
Old Testament Theology, I: Structure Legitimation,” and “A Shape for Old Testament 
Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” he refers to the tension or contradiction in God as; “God 
above the fray” and “God in the fray.”45  “God above the fray” is the God of the majority 
voice, a God who legitimates structure, and is free from the ambiguities of social 
processes.46  While “God in the fray,” is the God of the minority voice, the God who 
embraces pain and therefore opens the possibility for new forms of structure in society.   
In these same articles, Brueggemann detects two movements in God.  The first 
movement Brueggemann detects is that Israel’s sin and disobedience leads to an 
intensification of Yahweh’s anger and impatience.  This same sin and disobedience of 
Israel, however, leads to a second movement in God.  That movement is described by 
Brueggemann, as a movement in the heart of God, a patience, a holding onto promises 
despite disobedience and a yearning for relationship with Israel.47   
While it is not explicitly stated in these articles, it is clear that Brueggemann 
associates “God above the fray” with God’s omnipotence, anger, and impatience and 
“God in the fray” with God’s pathos, patience, forgiveness, and yearning for relationship.  
                                                 
44 Walter Brueggemann, “The Costly Loss of Lament,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 36, 
(1986):  footnote 32, 70. 
45 Walter Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology I: Structure Legitimation,” The Catholic 
Biblical Quarterly 47, no. 3 (July 1985): 30-31; idem, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology II,” 396-397. 
46 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology I,” 31. 
47 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology II,” 397. 
 59 
While “God above the fray” is supposedly the God who is free from the ambiguities of 
social processes, nevertheless, the “God above the fray” described by Brueggemann is 
conditioned by Israel’s behavior.  At the same time, Brueggemann seems to operate from 
a preconceived understanding of power that shapes his interpretation of the texts (more 
will be said about this in what follows).  Brueggemann’s discussion of the contradiction 
in God in these two articles begins a trajectory in his work.  That trajectory is an 
increasingly defined understanding of God’s omnipotence, freedom, and sovereignty 
associated with an intensification of God’s anger leading toward abandonment and a 
corresponding association of God’s fidelity and reliability with compassion to the point 
of pathos.48   
In TOT, Brueggemann uses the terms unlimited sovereignty and risky solidarity to 
speak of the tension or contradiction in the life and character of God.  He writes, 
My thesis for thematization of Israel’s testimony concerning 
Yahweh is this: Yahweh is a Character and Agent who is evidenced in the 
life of Israel as an Actor marked by unlimited sovereignty and risky 
solidarity, in whom this sovereignty and solidarity often converge, but for 
whom, on occasion, sovereignty and solidarity are shown to be in an 
unsettled tension or in an acute imbalance.  The substance of Israel’s 
testimony concerning Yahweh, I propose, yields a Character who has a 
profound disjunction at the core of the Subject’s life.
49  
 
Brueggemann acknowledges that sovereignty and solidarity converge in Israel’s 
testimony.  When Israel appeals to God for solidarity that appeal is made on the basis of 
God’s sovereignty and likewise when Israel praises God for God’s incomparability it is 
often God’s fidelity and faithfulness that is articulated.50  Nevertheless, Brueggemann 
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insists that often in the testimony of Israel, God’s sovereignty and solidarity do not 
converge and in fact the testimony of Israel consists of contradictory notions of God.51   
Throughout TOT, Brueggemann refers to God’s sovereignty as Yahweh’s self-
regard.  He never overtly defines what he means by self-regard but the term is used in 
reference either to certain qualities of Yahweh (undomesticated, free, transcendent) or to 
refer to certain actions that stem from “unfettered sovereignty” such as severity beyond 
reasoned response, violence, wild capriciousness, or sovereignty without principled 
loyalty.52  The best description of Brueggemann’s understanding of Yahweh’s self- 
regard is “Yahweh’s determination to be taken seriously on Yahweh’s own terms.”53 
Brueggemann’s interpretation of God’s sovereignty and his notion of a profound 
disjunction at the core of God’s life are considered problematic in several critiques of his 
work.54  Terence Fretheim in the article, “Some Reflections on Brueggemann’s God,” 
argues that the theme of God’s will is neglected in Brueggemann’s Old Testament 
theology.55  Fretheim claims that there is a difference between a circumstantial will of 
God and an absolute will of God.56  There are certain decisions made by God that will 
never be revoked or rethought.57  Therefore certain decisions or actions of God, such as 
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God’s anger and actions resulting from that anger are necessary reactions to 
circumstances but are not a reflection of the absolute will of God.  Rather these actions 
resulting from God’s circumstantial will are in relationship to the actions of Israel and in 
service to the absolute will of God.   
Fretheim states that Brueggemann’s neglect of the theme of the will of God 
results in problematic interpretations of texts in the Old Testament.  Fretheim uses 
Brueggemann’s assessment of the incongruity of Exodus 34:6-7 as an example.  While 
Brueggemann sees the punishment of violators as incongruous with God’s mercy and 
graciousness, Fretheim disagrees.  Fretheim writes,  
Why should love be inconsistent with “just judgment”? Why is divine 
judgment an act of unfaithfulness?  Why cannot judgment be in the service 
of graciousness?  Why is a word or act “against Israel” by Yahweh 
incongruous with God’s will “for Israel”?  I would claim that divine 
judgment is always in the service of God’s loving and saving purposes, 
and their juxtaposition in Ex 34:6-7 says precisely this.58 
 
 While Fretheim argues that the lack of stability in Brueggemann’s understanding 
of God might be corrected by appealing to a more developed theological understanding 
of God’s will, Brevard Child’s thinks Brueggemann’s understanding of God is inadequate 
because Brueggemann does not pay adequate attention to the canonical witness of the 
Old Testament. Childs writes, “When Brueggemann assigns an independent role to such 
traditions as countertestimony, he is running in the very face of Israel’s canonical 
witness.”59  Childs claims that Brueggemann sets up an endless task for the interpreter of 
negotiating between competing claims for God with the result that Brueggemann 
ultimately loses the stability of the God of Israel.60   
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A third interpreter, Paul Hanson, is also concerned with the lack of stability in 
Brueggemann’s God and attributes it to  Brueggemann’s rhetorical focus and lack of 
attention to history with the result that Brueggemann finally articulates a “flawed 
understanding of Israel’s God.”61  These three significant voices of Old Testament 
scholarship reject Brueggemann’s understanding of God because of the instability of that 
God.  Each suggests a different way to stabilize Brueggemann’s understanding of God.   
The concerns about Brueggemann’s notion of God expressed by Fretheim, Childs, 
and Hanson are valid and significant.  There are several problematic interpretation issues 
that affect Brueggemann’s notion of God in TOT.  First, when Brueggemann refers to 
God’s sovereignty as self-regard, he interprets that sovereignty in a way that moves 
beyond the testimony of Israel.  Second, Brueggemann overstates the case for the 
instability of God in TOT.  Third, he organizes the material of TOT in a way that both 
emphasizes the instability of God and supports a description of God’s sovereignty as self-
regard.  Before discussing these problematic issues and their affect on Brueggemann’s 
notion of God in TOT however, attention will first be given to the fact that 
Brueggemann’s notion of God in TOT, has its foundations in the theological concerns 
that are prevalent throughout Brueggemann’s writing.  
In a personal interview, Brueggemann indicated that during the writing of his 
book, Finally Comes the Poet: Daring Speech for Proclamation, it became apparent to 
him what themes and direction his writing needed to take in the future.62  In that book, 
Brueggemann addresses several problems of contemporary faith that he believes are the 
result of tendencies toward closure and reductionism in theological interpretations of the 
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Old Testament.  These concerns include the reduction of the drama of guilt and 
forgiveness to a mechanical rational system, the silencing of the poetic language of the 
Bible through rational theological analysis, and the silencing of voices of pain.63   
Brueggemann further notes that the silencing of the voices of pain is not disinterested but 
arises from investment in the status quo.  Protecting the security given by trimumphalist 
faith claims (theologia gloriae) requires the silencing of challenges to those claims.64  
Those challenges come with the voicing of pain.  He therefore links the role and function 
of the voicing of pain to the theology of the cross.65   
Finally, Brueggemann believes that it is the notion of God in the Old Testament 
given through the practice of speech that finally is the force of destabilization and is 
therefore resisted.  He writes,  
We are always shocked that the massive sovereignty of God yields before 
us, and the suffering love of God demands so much.  We can hardly 
endure the strange juxtaposition of sovereignty and grace: the sovereign 
one who is shockingly gracious, the gracious one who is stunningly 
sovereign.  The shock of such a partner destabilizes us too much.  The risk 
is too great, the discomfort so demanding.  We much prefer to settle for a 
less demanding, less overwhelming meeting.  Yet we are haunted by the 
awareness that only this overwhelming meeting gives life.66 
 
A survey of Brueggemann’s writing since the publication of Finally Comes the 
Poet reveals a consistent concern with certain Christian theological issues that he believes 
are both prevalent and destructive.  Those issues include an enlightenment mentality that 
he claims does not acknowledge the irrationality of the human process and an inability to 
speak or think of God as a party at risk.  Brueggemann asserts that the denial of the 
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irrationality of the human process as well as denial of God as a party at risk results in the 
silencing and denial of expressions of rage and pain, conversion of feelings of rage and 
pain into guilt, and a spirituality that is weighted toward submission, humility, and 
obedience and assumes that God is always in the right.67   These theological concerns 
form the foundation for Brueggemann’s reading of the Old Testament that leads to his 
theology of God. 
Brueggemann does not deny that his understanding of God is unstable but he 
asserts that this understanding of God is faithful to Israel’s testimony.68  The appeals to 
God’s will, canon, and history made by Fretheim, Childs, and Hanson as ways to stabilize 
the understanding of God in the Old Testament would be seen by Brueggemann as ways 
of reducing God to a settled, less demanding, less overwhelming presence.  He would 
further assert that these ways of reducing God at the same time silence the voice of pain 
in the Old Testament.  Brueggemann strives to allow that voice to speak and to follow the 
testimony of that voice despite the risk such a journey might present.69   
The fact that Brueggemann’s notion of God is rooted in his theological concerns 
however does not negate the difficulties in his interpretation.  One problematic issue 
affecting Brueggemann’s notion of God in TOT, is his interpretation of God’s 
sovereignty as self-regard.  The characterization of God’s sovereignty as self-regard 
implies a motivation that is not necessarily supported by the testimony of Israel.  
Brueggemann begins his discussion of “Yahweh’s uncompromising, unaccommodating 
sovereignty” by noting three terms used by Israel to describe that sovereignty:  glory, 
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holiness, and jealousy.70  These three terms are Old Testament biblical words.  By 
contrast, Fretheim lists some descriptive words Brueggemann uses in TOT, to describe 
God’s “unsettled and unsettling” sovereignty: “savage, odd, abusive, mean-spirited, wild, 
self-indulgent, unreliable, unstable, capricious, irascible, irrational, sulky, and more.”  
Fretheim notes that “none of them are biblical words.”71  What accounts for the 
movement in Brueggemann’s work from biblical words describing sovereignty to the 
harsh interpretive non-biblical words he chooses to describe that sovereignty?  
In Hopeful Imagination: Prophetic Voices in Exile, Brueggemann discusses 
Ezekiel’s understanding of God.  Brueggemann writes,  
The key to Ezekiel’s proclamation of God is this: God will not be 
mocked.  God will not be presumed upon, trivialized, taken for granted, or 
drawn too close.  God takes being God with utmost seriousness and will 
not be caught in any partisan alliance or any efforts at use.  God will not 
be pressed into the service of any other cause, no matter how noble or 
compelling.72 
 
In this book, Brueggemann contrasts Ezekiel’s understanding of God with Jeremiah’s 
noting that Jeremiah’s God is “one with whom one can engage and struggle” while 
Ezekiel’s God “stands and watches at a distance.”73  While Brueggemann’s exploration 
of competing notions of God in the texts of Jeremiah and Ezekiel illustrates the tension in 
God between sovereignty and solidarity, the language of Hopeful Imagination does not 
resort to the harsh rhetoric found in TOT. 
 In TOT, Brueggemann also anchors his discussion of God’s holiness in the book 
of Ezekiel.  His discussion in TOT however moves from a description of Ezekiel’s 
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understanding of God as one who will not be impinged upon to a description of God’s 
motivation, God’s reasons for God’s holiness.  Brueggemann writes, 
In the end, the notion of Yahweh’s holiness suggests that Yahweh cares 
most about Yahweh’s own name, reputation, and character – even more 
than Yahweh cares for Israel.  Yahweh does indeed penultimately care 
about Israel, and so the Holy One comes to save Israel.  Some texts - the 
more decisive tests, I believe, related to this notion of holiness – make 
clear that finally Yahweh cares most about Yahweh’s own self.74 
 
Brueggemann supports his assertion with texts from Ezekiel: 39:7, 36:22-32, and 
39:25-27.  These texts do express God’s concern for “My holy name” and even suggest 
that God’s motivation for saving Israel is concern for that name.  But there is also 
recognition of Israel’s sin.  Israel has profaned God’s name among the nations and there 
is concern expressed for the nations: “and the nations shall know that I am the Lord, says 
the Lord God, when through you I display my holiness before their eyes (Ezek 39:23).”  
Furthermore, God’s intent is to correct the situation, a situation that according to the book 
of Ezekiel has come about as a result of Israel’s sin, by saving Israel.  Therefore, it is 
difficult to support Brueggemann’s assertion that Yahweh cares more about Yahweh’s 
own self than Israel.75  
Brueggemann’s interpretation of God’s sovereignty as self-regard and the 
heightened rhetoric centered around the issue of sovereignty in TOT, is the culmination of 
the trajectory discussed previously that begins in Brueggemann’s articles, “A Shape for 
Old Testament Theology, I: Structure Legitimation,” and “A Shape for Old Testament 
Theology, II: Embrace of Pain.”  The trajectory toward an increasingly defined 
understanding of God’s omnipotence, freedom, and sovereignty associated with an 
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intensification of God’s anger leading toward abandonment and a corresponding 
association of God’s fidelity and reliability with compassion to the point of pathos begins 
with Brueggemann’s use of the terms, “God above the fray” and “God in the fray.” 
Fretheim claims that these terms are problematic.  He writes,   
The biblical God is transcendent within relationship (never “above” it); the 
God active “in the fray” and “embracing pain” is so engaged as the 
immanent and transcendent one.  The godness of God is revealed precisely 
in that God wills-once and for all- to enter into the fray and by the way in 
which God embraces the pain: steadfast in love, faithful to promises, and 
unwaveringly willing the salvation of Israel and the world.76 
 
Fretheim argues that Brueggemann has separated transcendence and immanence by 
associating immanence with the relational qualities of God and transcendence with the 
non-relational qualities of God.77  This is not completely accurate, however.  Despite 
Brueggemann’s use of the terms, “God above the fray” and “God in the fray,” he does not 
actually associate transcendence with the non-relational aspects of God.  Rather, he 
divides God’s relational qualities into two movements: 1) an intensification of anger and 
2) a yearning for relationship (pathos). The problem in Brueggemann’s notion of God 
that eventually cumulates in his description of God’s sovereignty as self-regard is this 
division of the relational qualities of God. 
 Brueggemann’s description of God’s sovereignty as self-regard contributes to the 
emphasis on the instability of God in TOT.  When addressing the issue of God’s 
abandonment of Israel during the exile, Brueggemann writes, 
 This abandonment, moreover, is not harshness in the service of any 
rehabilitation.  It is simply a departure from solidarity for the sake of self-
regard.  To the extent that the witnesses have seen rightly, this testimony 
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places at the center of Israel’s life a massive Holy Problem.  Israel must 
learn to live with the problematic character of Yahweh.78   
 
This quote reveals that Brueggemann’s inclination to understand God’s sovereignty as 
self-regard leads to the conclusion that God is the problem for Israel.  Is this really an 
accurate assessment of the testimony of the Old Testament?  It seems a much stronger 
case could be made that the testimony of Israel regards Israel’s sinfulness as a problem 
for God.  Brueggemann addresses as remarkable the fact that Israel keeps alive the 
cherished voice of the minority, of the oppressed, of those in pain.79  He does not address 
as remarkable however the fact that Israel testifies to Israel’s own sinfulness and 
disobedience. Brueggemann writes of Israel’s exilic self identity as people who are 
vulnerable, at risk, fragile.  He does not address, however, Israel’s understanding of 
themselves as sinful.  In a critique of Brueggemann’s work, Donald Gowan writes, 
The human predicament as described by Brueggemann is life in crises, 
with consideration of the literature of complaint, petition, and 
thanksgiving.  Here one realizes that in spite of the thoroughness of 
Brueggemann’s treatment of the Old Testament there is something 
missing.  Earlier he described Israel’s disobedience, but in this chapter on 
the individual he has little to say about sin.  The crises he takes up are 
largely attributed to the behavior of others or to Yahweh, rather than to 
wrong choices.  There is nothing in the book quite comparable to 
Eichrodt’s full discussion of sin and forgiveness.80   
  
 This missing component leads Brueggemann to attribute the contrast between 
God’s anger and mercy to instability in God.  Rather than seeing anger as a reasonable 
and necessary response to Israel’s behavior, Brueggemann isolates that anger and makes 
it part of the problematic character of God.  Brueggemann’s association of anger with 
“God above the fray” and the isolation of that anger from the behavior of Israel, 
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contributes to the emphasis on the instability of God in TOT.  When the relationship 
between God’s anger and the behavior of Israel is clearly reflected upon however, a 
different understanding of God’s otherness, holiness, and sovereignty emerges.   
An example of this can be seen by examining Gowan’s discussion of Ezekiel’s 
understanding of God’s sovereignty in the book, Theology of the Prophetic Books: The 
Death and Resurrection of Israel. In that discussion, Gowan explores the same passage 
from Ezekiel that Brueggemann uses in discussing God’s sovereignty in TOT  (Ezek 
36:22-32) but draws attention to the predicament of God caused by God’s relationship to 
sinful Israel.  A key phrase in Ezekiel is “for the sake of my holy name.”  Gowan like 
Brueggemann asserts that divine freedom is affirmed by this phrase.  Yet Gowan adds 
that this phrase is held in tension with another. “Profane my holy name,” a phrase used to 
describe the result of Israel’s sin.  Gowan writes, 
How could anything a human being did “profane” God’s name-
understanding “name,” as it is used in the Old Testament, to mean one’s 
character, one’s essential nature (e.g., Pss. 9:10: 109:21).  It seems to be 
possible because God in his freedom has chosen to make himself 
intimately associated with a group of people who bear his name, who may 
take his name in vain, who may bring shame on his name by their 
behavior.81   
 
Gowan continues his discussion by emphasizing the fact that God’s actions 
concern God’s reputation in the world.  God’s sovereignty matters for Israel and for the 
nations.  Therefore, Israel’s sin matters for Israel and for the nations because at stake is 
“knowledge of the true character of the one called Yahweh.”82   So while Gowan’s 
discussion of Yahweh’s sovereignty is similar to Brueggemann’s in its focus on divine 
freedom, a conclusion that God’s sovereignty could be described as self-regard is negated 
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through attention to the limits placed on God’s sovereignty through God’s covenant with 
Israel and a concern for knowledge of God in Israel and among the nations. 
Contributing to the difficulties in Brueggemann’s notion of God are 
presuppositions concerning God’s power that affect Brueggemann’s interpretation of the 
Old Testament text.  In a critique of Brueggemann’s work, Dennis T. Olson points out 
that while Brueggemann is very critical of reductionism in Old Testament theology, he 
has largely understated his own reductionism.83  One important aspect of Brueggemann’s 
notion of God that suffers from reductionism is his interpretation of God’s power.   
In the beginning of Brueggemann’s discussion of the countertestimony of Israel 
he writes, “I regard hiddenness (especially in the wisdom traditions) as countertestimony 
only because Israel’s core testimony regarded Yahweh’s ‘action in the world’ as highly 
visible, evoking terror in the enemy and praise in the beneficiaries of that ‘action.’”84  
Likewise, Brueggemann gives active, transformative verbs primacy over other forms of 
testimony.85  Brueggemann approaches his interpretation of the Old Testament with the 
presupposition that God’s power is as an active, transformative force operating upon 
Israel from without.  This presupposition results in an implicit exclusion of either God’s 
solidarity with Israel or a notion of God working from “within” Israel as forms of God’s 
power. 
A good example of this presupposition influencing Brueggemann’s interpretation 
of the Old Testament can be seen in his discussion of God’s announcement to save Israel 
from slavery in Egypt (Exod 3:7-10).  Brueggemann discusses this passage in a section of 
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the book entitled, “Does Yahweh Contradict?”86  Brueggemann defines what he means 
by contradiction.  He writes, 
But by contradiction and inconsistency, I mean not an acknowledged 
change, but a powerful insistence, assertion, or decision that flies in the 
face of a previous insistence, assertion, or decision, without any 
acknowledgment of a reversal.
87   
 
Brueggemann asserts that when God informs Moses that he has observed the plight of the 
people of Israel and intends to save them, God uses first person pronouns indicating his 
direct action on Israel’s behalf.  Brueggemann sees as a “contradiction” the fact that 
God’s actions are mediated through Moses and are therefore less direct than originally 
announced.  While Brueggemann acknowledges that the statement in verse 12, “I will be 
with you,” is an indicator of Yahweh’s presence in full power.  He nevertheless 
concludes, “For our purposes, the point to be noticed is that Yahweh, in spite of 
determined intention, undertakes Israel’s emancipation much less directly than Yahweh 
had announced.”88 
  Brueggemann’s understanding of God’s actions through Moses as not only 
indirect but even evidence of God’s inconsistency indicates that Brueggemann’s concept 
of God’s power is limited to external transformative actions.  By contrast, Gowan 
discuses the significance of the phrase, “I will be with you,” for Israel in his book, 
Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a Commentary. Gowan explores 
the numerous uses of the phrases “I will be with you,” or “God be with you,” in the Old 
Testament and concludes, “We are beginning to see that in Israel no stronger promise of 
God’s help could be offered than the one typically associated with his presence with a 
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great man who had been called to carry out his work against all odds: ‘Fear not; I am with 
you.’”89  In Gowan’s interpretation, solidarity is a form of God’s power.  God’s presence 
with Moses is God’s way of direct intervention for Israel.  If solidarity is a form of God’s 
power, there is no contradiction and therefore this passage of scripture cannot be used to 
support an understanding of instability in God.   
 Further evidence of Brueggemann’s reduced notion of God’s power can be seen 
in his inclusion of all wisdom material under the rubric of the countertestimony of Israel.  
Brueggemann’s reason for this inclusion begins with an assumption that Israel’s core 
testimony emphasizes the actions of God.  Recognizing that a great deal of the time, 
God’s active, visible presence was not evident to Israel, Brueggemann asserts that Israel 
resorted to a second way of testifying to Yahweh (wisdom literature), a way that 
contemplated God’s “hidden” actions in the context of the ordinary living out of life.90 
 Childs, however objects to Brueggemann’s inclusion of all wisdom literature 
under the rubric of countertestimony.  He writes,  
Then again, to include wisdom theology under the category of 
countertestimony is largely artificial since, as we now recognize, wisdom 
functioned throughout the entire spectrum of Israel’s witness ---narrative, 
law, hymnody---and as a positive formulation of the core testimony of its 
faith.91 
 
Brueggemann’s inclusion of wisdom literature under the rubric of countertestimony has 
its foundation in his reduced understanding of God’s power.  If in wisdom literature, 
Israel contemplates God working from “within” Israel in hidden ways; one could 
conclude that God’s power is a transformative power working with and through human 
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beings.  Brueggemann reading through his own presuppositions of God’s power, 
however, sees instead a “countertestimony” that arises despite the waning of God’s 
active, transformative presence. 
 Like Brueggemann’s description of God’s sovereignty as self-regard, 
Brueggemann’s presuppositions limiting his understanding of God’s power to external 
transformative actions contribute to the emphasis in TOT on God’s instability.  Fretheim 
writes that Brueggemann’s emphasis on the instability of God is “a postmodern 
restatement of sovereignty.”92  This statement is true if the focus is on Brueggemann’s 
attempt to hear a plurality of theologies of God in the Old Testament Text.  
Brueggemann, however, does not allow his understanding of God’s power, which is 
clearly influenced by classical Protestant notions, be challenged by the text.  Rather his 
presuppositions provide the framework for the arrangement of material and the 
subsequent interpretation. 
 Brueggemann’s description of God’s sovereignty as self-regard, and his reduced 
notion of God’s power affect the arrangement of material in TOT.  In articles leading up 
to the publication of TOT, Brueggemann consistently refers to the minority voice in Israel 
as the voice of pain.93  He introduces the section of his book called, “Israel’s 
Countertestimony,” by addressing the themes that are prominent in the minority voice of 
Israel: the incongruity of lived experience with the claims of the core testimony, God as a 
party at risk, the open expression of rage and pain, and the role of complaint in 
mobilizing God to act on behalf of Israel.94  However, Brueggemann’s exploration of the 
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countertestimony of Israel in TOT lacks the drama of relationship with Israel that is so 
central to his exploration of the minority voice in other publications.95  In TOT, 
Brueggemann does not discuss the relationship between God and Israel under the rubric 
of countertestimony but holds that discussion for subsequent sections of the book called, 
“Israel’s Unsolicited Testimony,” and “Israel’s Embodied Testimony.”96  Yet, the drama 
of the relationship is a central component for understanding the essential role played by 
the minority voice in the testimony of Israel.  In Brueggemann’s other publications, it is 
the drama of this relationship that expresses the important theme of God as a party at risk 
and focuses on the tension between God’s sovereignty and fidelity.  By holding 
discussion of the drama of relationship between God and Israel to a different section of 
the book and therefore removing countertestimony from its narrative context, the 
emphasis in the section of the book focused on countertestimony shifts from the voice of 
pain and the new relationship between God and Israel forged by this voice of pain to the 
instability of God and the “problem” of God’s sovereignty. 
 Having made the case that Brueggemann’s notion of God in TOT has overstated 
the instability of God in the Old Testament, it is important to note the important function 
the instability of God plays in Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology.  It has been 
previously noted that Brueggemann finds problematic for Old Testament theology two 
forms of denial.  The first is an inability to speak or think of God as a party at risk.  The 
second is a denial of the irrationality of the human process.  Brueggemann’s notion of 
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God, while at times problematic is open and unresolved allowing exploration of the text 
of the Old Testament in a way that seeks to overcome these long held forms of denial.  
Overcoming this denial leads to new insights, new possibilities, new ways of speaking 
about God and for understanding the relationship between God and Israel. 
God as a Party at Risk 
 In Finally Comes the Poet, Brueggemann discusses two “dangerous reductions” 
of the drama of guilt and forgiveness in the relationship between God and Israel.  One 
dangerous reduction of that drama is the notion of strict retribution.  In a system of strict 
retribution, everyone gets what they deserve.  People who follow the commandments and 
live in a way pleasing to God are blessed.  Those who do not are cursed.  A second 
reduction of the drama of guilt and forgiveness is the notion of easy grace.  Easy grace 
speaks of guilt too readily written off by God.  God wipes away guilt, “by the blood” and 
everything is easily restored.97  Brueggemann argues however that the drama of guilt and 
forgiveness is much more complex, involves much more anguish for both parties of the 
drama than either of these reductions articulate.  Brueggemann writes, “The drama of 
guilt and grace does not happen in some automatic or mechanical way.  It happens only 
through the fabric of care and suffering whereby God enters into every cubit of the 
process.”98  Because God enters into every cubit of the process, God is a party at risk.  
 Brueggemann argues that the exile as paradigmatic event in Israel’s memory and 
in Israel’s faith is a crises not only for Israel but in the very life of God.99  This assertion 
relies on two arguments.  The first is that the speech of the Old Testament is realistic 
                                                 
97 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 14-15. 
98 Ibid., 15.                                                                                                                                                                                         
99 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 440-442; idem, “A Shattered Transcendence,” 172. 
 76 
speech about God.  Brueggemann writes, “Biblical theology, unlike historical criticism, 
requires us to approach the text more ‘realistically,’ as though this were indeed a word 
about God and about God’s life, very often a word from God about God’s life.”100  The 
second is that a glimpse into the person of God is available to Israel through the metaphor 
of personhood as a governing image in the Old Testament text.101  Relying on these two 
arguments, Brueggemann asserts that the exile is a significant crisis in God’s own life.  
 The tension between God’s sovereignty and fidelity is a central feature of the 
crisis in God’s own life.  The crisis in God’s own life begins in the crisis in the 
relationship brought about by Israel’s disobedience to the covenantal demands of 
Yahweh.  Brueggemann refers to a “two-stage sequence” of God’s response to Israel.  
The first stage reflects God’s concern with the moral failure of Israel that results in 
punishment and judgment.  This is the movement toward exile.  The second stage reflects 
God’s fidelity and intention to restore the relationship between Israel and God, a 
movement toward homecoming.102  Brueggemann states that the overarching question 
throughout the crisis of exile and homecoming is the question of continuity.  
Brueggemann writes, “The theme of continuity asks whether the character of Yahweh 
continues to be the same character in, through, and beyond the exile.”103     
 In order to explore the question of continuity, Brueggemann turns to three texts 
that he claims “represent theological reflection evoked by the exile” (Deut 4:23-31, Isa 
54: 7-10, and Jer 31:35-37).104  These texts contain within them a disjuncture that in the 
theological reflection of Israel is a disjuncture in the very life of God.  The two stage 
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sequence of God’s response to Israel is evident as each of these texts speaks of 
destruction or abandonment of Israel by God. Yet also evident is God’s movement 
toward restoration and the accompanying movement toward God’s compassion.  
Brueggemann asserts that ultimately the theological reflection upon exile leads to a 
recognition of the vulnerability of God to the realities of Israel’s life.  The testimony of 
Israel is that Israel’s disobedience puts the relationship in jeopardy, but the extent or 
depth of that jeopardy cannot be determined.  Furthermore in Israel’s testimony, God is 
depicted as suffering in solidarity with Israel and struggling for continuity in the midst of 
the brokenness.105 
 The exploration of these exilic texts emphasizing the theme of God as a party at 
risk yields two important insights for the theology of God drawn from Brueggemann’s 
Old Testament theology.  The first is that God is a God who not only takes suffering 
seriously but that God is affected in God’s very life by suffering.  Brueggemann writes,  
Israel sees through this crisis of God how real suffering is, how seriously 
suffering is taken, and how suffering impinges even upon the life of God, 
both to shatter something old in God’s own life, and to evoke something 
utterly new in God’s life.106 
 
The second insight is that this suffering evokes new depths of compassion in God.  
Brueggemann writes, 
Indeed, God’s compassion seems to be the primary and powerful 
theological emergent of the exile.  The exile evokes new measures and 
fresh depths of compassion in the character of God….Taken theologically; 
the Exile evokes in God a new resolve for fidelity, a resolve that was not 
operative prior to the hurt and dread of the Exile.107 
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 Brueggemann sees in these two insights the beginning of a trajectory toward the 
theology of the cross, toward a “Cruciform claim for God.”108  Brueggemann asserts that 
the dialectic of cross and resurrection is anticipated in the dialectic of exile and 
homecoming.109 He argues that God is impinged upon by history and therefore the God 
that emerges from the exile is different than the God who abandoned.  Brueggemann 
suggests that this theological insight of Israel resulting from the Exilic experience is 
formative for theological reflection on the crisis for God in the event of the abandonment 
and resurrection of Jesus.110  Both crises are forged by the drama of reconciliation that 
refuses reduction to a mechanical system and involves the suffering and compassion of 
God in “every cubit of the process.”111 
 Denial of God as a party at risk is one way of reducing the complexity of the 
drama of guilt and forgiveness in the Old Testament.  A second factor that contributes to 
the reduction of this complexity is the notion of strict retribution, the clear cut either or 
categories of deeds/consequences.  Brueggemann argues that while the majority voice of 
Israel testifies to a moral coherence in the world that is given shape and ordered by God, 
there are also literary-rhetorical strategies used in the Old Testament that call any 
simplified understanding of this coherence into question.112  In the article, “The Shrill 
voice of the Wounded Party,” Brueggemann addresses four texts that provide examples 
of alternative literary-rhetorical strategies: the Exodus narrative (Exod 1-15), the second 
creation account (Gen 2-3), Psalm 7, his chosen representative of the complaint Psalms, 
and Job.  The study of these texts yields the insight that the drama of guilt and 
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forgiveness cannot be reduced to a simple two party interaction with Israel as the guilty 
party and God as the forgiving party.  Rather, the text of the Old Testament points to 
other factors in the drama including: the presence of enemies of God and of Israel (e.g., 
the Pharaoh), the understanding of sin that points to something that is there before human 
choice (the snake in Genesis 3, the adversary in Job), and “the voice of the wounded and 
weak crying out in need and pain.”113  Brueggemann asserts that these factors are often 
neglected by Western spirituality with its “inordinate accent on guilt.”114  Moreover, the 
“enlightenment mentality,” which denies the irrationality of the human process, often 
eliminates the “cry of the wounded and weak” from the realm of worship contributing to 
an increased accent on guilt.115  The denial of God as a party at risk and the neglect of the 
cry of innocent suffering results in a warped view of the relationship between human 
beings and God.  Both of these important neglected themes are central to Brueggemann’s 
theology of God and are prominent in his study of the role of lament in Old Testament 
theology. 
The Role of Lament 
 Brueggemann’s work on the role of lament is indebted to the work of Claus 
Westermann.116  In an article, “The Role of the Lament in the Theology of the Old 
Testament,” Westermann asserts that the place of the lament in Old Testament theology 
is in relation to the saving acts of God.117 Westermann points out that the lament was a 
natural, expected, and respected form of worship in Israel and with this form of worship 
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came the recognition of both the finite and transitory existence of human beings and the 
openness of God to hearing and responding to their cries.118   
Westermann notes that the tradition of lament has been widely neglected in 
Christian traditions.  Evidence of this neglect can be seen, he argues, in the lack of 
recognition of two distinctive forms of lament: the lament of the dead, and the lament of 
affliction.  In the Hebrew language, two different words distinguish these two kinds of 
lament.  More importantly, according to Westermann, only the lament of affliction is 
addressed to God.  The lament of the dead is secular.  The reason for this is that while the 
lament of the dead looks backward, the lament of affliction reaches forward and asks God 
to relieve the suffering, to bring life out of a situation of crisis.  The lament of affliction 
cries out for salvation.  Westermann asserts that the distinction between these two forms 
of lament is lost because through neglect of the lament tradition, all lamenting is 
observed only through its outward manifestation, that of weeping.119   
Furthermore, with the neglect of the lament tradition, there is an accompanying 
loss of attention to suffering and a shift in the understanding of salvation.  The shift in the 
understanding of salvation is a shift that moves from salvation of the innocent sufferer to 
salvation of the guilty through the forgiveness of sins.  Westermann writes,   
But the lament is not a constituent part of Christian prayer, and we can say 
that in a certain sense the confession of sin has become the Christianized 
form of the lament: “Mea culpa, mea culpa, mea maxima culpa!”  the 
result of this is that both in Christian dogmatics and in Christian worship 
suffering as opposed to sin has receded far into the background: Jesus 
Christ’s work of salvation has to do with the forgiveness of sins and with 
eternal life; it does not deal however with ending human suffering.120 
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In this shift, salvation in the Christian tradition narrows its focus concentrating on death 
as the cessation of life and neglects the power of death that is present in all forms of 
suffering.121   
 Brueggemann agrees with Westermann that the neglect of the lament tradition has 
had a negative impact on Christian theology.  Brueggemann writes, “One obvious 
implication is that the loss of the lament psalms in the worship life of the church is 
essentially the loss of a theology of the cross.”122  Without attention to lament, 
Brueggemann argues, the drama of guilt and forgiveness is reduced to a system and the 
disorder at the margins of life, disorders that ill fit with a neat ethical system focused on 
sin and guilt are denied and covered up.123   
In fact, Brueggemann asserts that without the lament tradition the understanding 
of sin suffers from reductionism.  Brueggemann points out that both Westermann and 
Lindstrom in their extensive studies of the lament psalms point to the presence of three 
parties in the drama.  There is the speaker of the psalm, God, and the enemy and all play 
a dominant role.  Often the enemy is depicted as having power over the innocent sufferer 
of the Psalm, power that is too difficult for the speaker to resist.  This three party system 
prevents simplification of the drama between God and human beings and suggests that 
“sin is a power, which takes the forms of death, chaos, illness, disorder, and oppression.”   
Reducing sin to ethical categories and shifting all forms of alienation to guilt has 
severe consequences for the community that comes to worship.  Brueggemann argues 
that elimination of speech about chaos, illness, disorder, and oppression results in 
reduced forms of communion with God.  People who live in the real world and know first 
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hand the power of chaos, disorder, illness, and oppression in their own lives find no place 
in the relationship between God and human beings to express the anguish these powers 
create.  Brueggemann argues that there are two identifiable postures that result from the 
denial of these feelings.  The first is that persons immersed in these problems and having 
no way to direct their feelings to God withdraw from the relationship and are left with 
only their own judgment in trying to deal with these forces in their lives.  This posture 
leads to loneliness and anxiety.124  
 In the second posture, rather than withdrawing from the relationship, total 
sovereignty is given to God. Classical notions of God’s omnipotence, omniscience, and 
omnipresence are upheld and persons experiencing the effects of chaos in their lives 
convert their negative feelings into guilt.  The reasoning behind conversion of negative 
feelings into guilt is that if God is omnipotent, omniscient, and omnipresent then the 
negativity in peoples’ lives is their own fault.  People operating with this view of the 
relationship between God and human beings are left with confession of sin and 
repentance as the only means for dealing with the overwhelming and complex feelings 
created by the powerful forces of chaos, illness, disorder, and oppression.  This posture 
leads to disregard for a person’s own judgment and a yielding of responsibility to God.  
Brueggemann argues that ultimately such denial leads to internalized rage that is directed 
either destructively toward the self or moves outward toward the oppressors.125  
The denial of the expression of negative feelings generated by the forces of chaos, 
illness, disorder, and oppression results in a reduced faith.  Brueggemann writes, “Such a 
reductionist faith can scarcely help people who have a discerning sense of the brokenness 
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in the world or in our lives.”126  Brueggemann argues therefore that recovery of the 
lament tradition is essential in order to combat this form of denial that results in a 
reduction of the complexity of the drama of reconciliation, in a stifling of the theodicy 
question, and in limiting the “grid of interactionism” between God and human beings.127 
Brueggemann’s extensive study of the lament tradition in Israel leads him to 
claim that central to Israel’s faith is a “grid of interactionism.”  Brueggemann writes,  
This claim that dialogue is essential in Old Testament faith cannot 
be overstated.  The core claim of the lament psalms, I suggest, is that in 
these poems, Israel holds up its side of the conversation, which is 
necessary if God is to be know by the Israelites.128 
 
Brueggemann sees the lament tradition as the essential element of this dialogue.   
Without the lament tradition Israel’s speech to God becomes dishonest.  This 
dishonesty results in a reduced understanding of God.  God is either excluded from 
painful situations in life and therefore a practical atheism results, or human responsibility 
is yielded over to God with the result that dialogue between human beings and God 
instead becomes a monologue; God is praised but not honestly engaged.  Moreover, these 
two different postures operating from the denial of the irrationality in human life also 
deny that God is a party at risk.  Brueggemann asserts that the lament tradition takes 
seriously the claim that God is a party at risk and engages God in a way that impinges 
upon the life of God.   
In several of his publications, Brueggemann notes an observation made by Hans 
Urs von Balthasar that in 1918 four scholars independently of one another wrote on “the 
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dialogical principle of reality.”129  These scholars began to articulate a relational 
understanding of personhood.  Human personhood does not exist in isolation but is 
formed and lived always in relationship.  Brueggemann uses the term “interactionism” to 
describe this dialogical principle of reality.  He agrees with the analysis of Martin Buber 
that the identity of the I of the human person is dependent on the Thou of God, but 
believes it necessary to push beyond the dependence of human identity on the identity of 
God to articulate the understanding that God is also dependent on human beings for 
God’s God-ness.130  This, he claims, is an insight of the lament psalms.  He writes,  
One of the enduring questions of the lament psalms is this: How seriously 
should we take their daring affirmation that God somehow depends upon 
Israel for God’s God-ness? My impression is that Israel pushes this 
symmetry very far.  It is that pushing that makes the lament psalms so 
poignant and so problematic and that evokes in Israel a very different 
sense of faith and a very different notion of what it means to be a healthy 
self.131 
 
Brueggemann claims that Israel’s “different sense of faith and very different 
notion of what it means to be a healthy self” are rooted in the genuine interactionism that 
is at the heart of the testimony of the lament tradition.  He argues that the availability of 
the lament as a social construction of reality in Israel provided Israel with a means for 
redistributing the power between the two parties in the interaction, God and Israel.  When 
Israel cried out from the pit, when the pain of Israel became speech, when Israel dared to 
ask God: How long? Why? Where? Is the Lord among us or not, Israel through this 
speech brought God into the pain of their experience and mobilized God to respond.132  
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In Brueggemann’s discussion of the redistribution of power between God and 
Israel, he appeals to the work of pediatrician, Donald Woods Winnicott.  Winnicott 
conducted a study of mothers with babies and came to the conclusion that a “good 
enough” mother was a mother who encouraged the emergence of the baby’s genuine self 
through the practice of allowing that child to have periodic omnipotence over her.  The 
mother yields to and delights in the baby’s I and through encouragement the baby comes 
to understand that the mother has love for the baby’s genuine self.  Without this “primal 
experience of omnipotence,” the baby quickly learns to cover his or her real needs and 
appeal to the mother through a false self.133 
Brueggemann uses this “psychological analogue” for understanding the 
redistribution of power that occurs through the lament tradition.  The lament gives Israel 
the freedom to assert omnipotence over God and therefore encourages the emergence of 
genuine responsible faith.  Genuine responsible faith operates from genuine engagement 
of whole responsible selves with God, does not resort to denial, and therefore does not 
result in hidden or false selves in relationship to God.134   
Brueggemann appeals to “root persons” in Israel’s narrative as exemplars of 
genuine interaction between God and Israel: Abraham and Moses.135  Brueggemann notes 
that Abraham as the “father of faith” is known for his obedience and Moses as the 
“lawgiver par excellence” is known for bringing the commandments.136  Yet, both 
Abraham and Moses are daring in their speech to God.  They are not afraid to enter into 
risky dialogue with God, dialogue that challenges, even taunts God to act in the best God-
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like way possible toward Israel.  Abraham dares to ask, “Shall not the judge of all the 
earth do right? (Gen 18:25).”  Moses insists that God relent from God’s decision to 
“consume” Israel because of the sin of the golden calf incident (Ex 32:11-13).  So the 
faith and obedience modeled by Abraham and Moses includes within it speech to God 
that is honest about experience in the world, that takes God on and questions God’s 
actions in response to the pain and injustice of the world. 
The genuine interaction between Abraham and Moses displays a necessary re-
distribution of power in the relationship between God and Israel.  Brueggemann asserts 
that Abraham’s question, “Shall not the judge of all the earth do right?” is a question that 
God “broods” over.  The initial response of God to Abraham’s questioning is silence, but 
God’s brooding over the question results, by the time of Hosea, in God’s embrace of 
compassion and resolve not to abandon Israel.137  In Abraham’s dialogue with God then, 
power is re-distributed.  Abraham’s question yields a new response from God. 
    The bold prayers of Moses take place in the context of God’s salvation of Israel 
from slavery in Egypt.  Israel has left the harsh silence of oppression under Pharaoh to 
live in the freedom of Yahweh.  Power has been re-distributed from Pharaoh to God.  
Moses brought the commandments to Israel and yet, according to Brueggemann, his 
prayers indicate that Moses has learned that coerced silence results in slavery.138  
Obedience to Yahweh is not coercive.  The relationship between Israel and Yahweh is 
markedly different than the relationship between Israel and Pharaoh.  Israel’s obedience 
to Yahweh is freely given obedience and honest speech is essential for freedom.  Moses’ 
honest speech opens up new possibilities of freedom and obedience between God and 
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Israel and results in the continuation of God’s transformative presence with the people of 
Israel.   
That God’s transformative presence is a response to the cry of lament indicates 
the primary importance of the lament tradition in Israel.  The public voicing of pain leads 
to God’s salvation.  In fact, Brueggemann claims that the interaction between the public 
voicing of pain in Israel and God’s response to that public voicing is at the heart of the 
Exodus narrative.139  God’s intention to save Israel from slavery in Egypt is mobilized by 
Israel’s lament. 
And the people of Israel groaned under their bondage, and cried out for 
help, and their cry under bondage came up to God.  And God heard their 
groaning, and God remembered his covenant with Abraham, with Isaac, 
and with Jacob.  And God saw the people of Israel, and God knew their 
condition (Exod 2:23-25). 
 
Through lament, God’s transformative presence is evoked.  Brueggemann writes,  
The sequence of lament-response from God evidences that the sovereign 
presence of Yahweh would be neither visible nor effective unless Israel 
sounded its voice of protest and hurt.  If Israel had remained mute in 
submission and passive in pain, then Yahweh’s sovereignty would not be 
enacted.140 
 
Brueggemann argues that while the linking of the lament tradition with the 
salvation of God is of primary significance, it is not, however, God’s only response to 
lament.141  A different form of response is seen in God’s response to the lament of Job.  
Brueggemann states that the poem of Job is the “extreme articulation of lament in ancient 
Israel, in which the weak and wounded find voice against their suffering.”142  Job accuses 
God of being unreliable and dishonest (Job 9:20-22).  God’s response to Job does not 
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answer Job’s charge but instead emphasizes the freedom and sovereignty of God.  What 
is interesting, however, is that despite the fact that God’s response is incongruous with 
his petition, Job is moved nevertheless to yield to God in faith.  Moreover, while God’s 
answer to Job asserts God’s free sovereignty, Job’s speech is also praised.  God praises 
Job for having spoken what is right (Job 42:7-8).  Brueggemann argues that this praise of 
Job indicates God’s preference for honest speech.  Brueggemann’s paraphrase of this 
verse reads, “Tell your three friends to clam up because they are so boring I am not going 
to listen to them anymore.  But to you, Job, if you speak for them, I will listen, because 
you’re my kind of guy.”143  
God’s response to Job indicates that while God values honest speech, God is not 
bound by that speech.  God can hear dissent, respond, and maintain sovereign freedom.  
Yet even though Job’s lament does not impinge upon God, does not result in God’s 
embrace of compassion as Abraham’s speech did, Job is not diminished by this speech 
nor does it cause distance between Job and God.  Rather, Job draws nearer to God.   
Discussing the whirlwind speeches in the book of Job (Job 38-41), Brueggemann writes, 
The outcome of this strange doxological and self-congratulatory 
response of Yahweh is not that Job is crushed and reduced to silence.  
Instead, the magisterial speech of Yahweh leads to an appropriate yielding 
(42:1-6).  Job gains enough insight and reassurance to continue as a person 
of faith in a world that continues to be unjust.  Faith, if it is to survive 
knowingly and honestly, must live in an unjust world.  Theodicy is 
overridden by doxology.144 
 
Thus the laments of Israel result not only in God’s embrace of compassion and in 
mobilizing God’s saving presence, the lament tradition testifies to the fact that genuine 
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honest dialogue with God leads to deeper contemplative knowledge of God, even if that 
knowledge is hidden in darkness.145 
 Another important role of the lament tradition is that it provides a form for the 
voicing of the theodicy question in Israel.  Brueggemann argues that questions about 
justice rather than questions about God are central in Israel’s testimony.  The question of 
theodicy in Israel is not concerned with ontological evil.  Rather it is a question about 
justice issues involving the distribution of goods and the distribution of power.  The 
lament provides the normal mode for asking these justice questions in Israel.  According 
to Brueggemann, an analysis of the complaint psalms reveals four important points made 
by the psalmist. 
1. Things are not right in the present arrangement. 
2. They need not stay this way but can be changed. 
3. The speaker will not accept them in this way, for it is intolerable. 
4. It is God’s obligation to change things.146 
 
These complaints are directed toward God.  Either the complaint is directed to 
God against neighbor or the complaint is directed to God against God.  Both forms of 
complaint are essential in the question of justice.  When things are not right in the social 
arrangement the question of justice has to be directed in both directions toward neighbor 
and toward God.147  Recognizing two directions of complaint in the lament tradition 
indicates the interconnection between social arrangements and an understanding of God.  
Brueggemann maintains that the stifling of the theodicy question leads to legitimizing 
unjust social arrangements.  Loss of the lament tradition results in coercive silence that 
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yields power to an illegitimate system and to a limited understanding of God that is used 
to give legitimacy to that system.  Brueggemann writes,  
A community of faith which negates laments soon concludes that the hard 
issues of justice are improper questions to pose at the throne because the 
throne seems to be only a place of praise.  I believe it thus follows that if 
justice questions are improper questions at the throne, they soon appear to 
be improper questions in public places, in schools, in hospitals, with the 
government, and eventually even in the courts….The order of the day 
comes to seem absolute, beyond question, and we are left with only grim 
obedience and eventually despair.  The point of access for serious change 
has been forfeited when the propriety of this speech form is denied.148  
 
The centrality of the justice question in the lament tradition can be seen in the fact 
that all the examples discussed in the grid of interactionism above revolved around issues 
of justice.  Abraham’s dialogue with God in Genesis concerning the destruction of the 
innocent along with the guilty was a justice question.  The Exodus narrative begins with a 
cry of lament concerning the injustice of Israel’s slavery in Egypt.  Finally, Brueggemann 
notes that “it is widely agreed that the Book of Job is Israel’s most ambitious 
countertestimony concerning the crisis of theodicy.”149   Israel’s lament to God from 
slavery is a complaint to God about neighbor.  Abraham and Job complain to God against 
God. 
This analysis of various responses of God to lament indicates the importance of 
the “grid of interactionism” for speech about God in the Old Testament.  The various 
responses of God to the laments of individuals and Israel indicate that the dialogue is 
genuine.  The freedom of both parties in the dialogue is maintained.  God is free to 
embrace compassion, or to emphasize transcendence and sovereignty.  Human beings are 
free to give voice to the injustice they experience in the world, either to God against 
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neighbor, or even to God against God.  The lament tradition reveals the essential role the 
human partner has in the interaction between God and human beings.  Brueggemann 
writes, “It is Israel’s ‘cry of absence’ that makes God’s speech of presence possible.”150 
Conclusion 
The role of the minority voice, the voice of pain, the countertestimony of Israel is 
crucial and determinative in shaping Brueggemann’s theology of God. For Brueggemann, 
attention to the voices of pain necessitates openness to the text that risks assurance and 
certainty, even risks the stability of God.  At the heart of Brueggemann’s notion of God is 
a tension between God’s sovereignty and fidelity.  Brueggemann insists that while this 
tension results in an unstable notion of God, that unstable notion is faithful to the witness 
of Israel in the Old Testament.  The instability of God is largely the result of the drama of 
reconciliation in the Old Testament that refuses reduction to any clear system.  
Brueggemann’s attention to the minority voice of Israel results in a theology of God that 
emphasizes the openness of God to history, and the vulnerability of God to the suffering 
of Israel.   
Essential to Brueggemann’s theology of God, is the notion of God as a party at 
risk.  This means that God is affected by the events of history, particularly events that are 
shaped by the drama of guilt and reconciliation.  God emerges from the drama changed.  
The exile is the paradigmatic event of guilt and reconciliation in the Old Testament.  
According to Brueggemann, the exile is not only determinative for Israel’s identity but 
also asserts influence on God’s life.  God is not only aware of Israel’s suffering but God 
enters into it, suffers with Israel, and struggles for continuity in the midst of 
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brokenness.151  God emerges from this suffering with new depths of compassion and a 
new resolve for fidelity.  
 Brueggemann’s attention to the minority voice of Israel results in emphasis of 
theological themes that have been neglected by western Christianity.  Brueggemann’s 
attention to the lament tradition expands the focus of the drama of reconciliation from 
guilt and forgiveness to include issues of innocent suffering, the power of evil, and the 
presence of enemies in the drama.  The acknowledgment of these other factors leads to an 
accompanying expansion of the role of human beings in the drama.  Human beings are 
called to a genuine interaction with God that includes both the confidence to yield to God 
and the courage to take initiative and adopt a posture of assertion directed toward God.  
The role of human beings in the interaction is emphasized, and this role depends upon 
both the relational identity of human personhood and God’s involvement in genuine 
dialogue.  For genuine dialogue to occur, speech must be honest, the possibility of the 
redistribution of power must be present, and the freedom of both partners in the dialogue 
is essential. This dialogue includes going to God against neighbor but also the possibility 
of going to God against God.   
According to Brueggemann, the practice of genuine dialogue is grounded in faith.  
This faith, however, is not certitude.  Brueggemann points to Elie Wiesel as an example 
of faith without certitude.  He writes,  
I heard Elie Wiesel once asked whether he believed in God.  He said, 
“No.”  He could not believe in god after the holocaust.  “But,” he said, 
“Yes, I’m a Jew, I must believe in God, so what I do is believe against 
God.”152 
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This faith will not deny the reality of the lived experience of pain in order to uphold a 
settled understanding of God.  Nor will it allow the lived experience of pain to become a 
new form of certitude.  Rather, Biblical faith is a faith of tensions between assertion of 
the core claims of Israel’s faith and questions that are directed against those core claims 
from the human experience of pain.  Faith in Israel is therefore “interpersonal, dynamic, 
and an ongoing process that is endlessly negotiated and never settled.”153  Brueggemann 
writes, “Biblical faith is not and never intends to be a statement of outcomes.  It is, rather, 
a dip into the drama of life and death that continues to be underway.”154  
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Chapter Three 
The Theology of the Cross in the Works of Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino 
 
The interpretations of the cross in the works of Moltmann and Sobrino recognize 
that the cross of Jesus Christ evokes a crisis for theology based in the discontinuity 
between the questions raised from the depths of suffering and the promises and purpose 
of God.  Moltmann and Sobrino concentrate on God’s entry into the world through the 
incarnation, life, death, and resurrection of Jesus.  They emphasize the particularity of 
Jesus’ history and the scandal of the cross. They work to articulate an understanding of 
God drawn from hiddenness, absence, silence, and suffering.  Each recognizes that God’s 
life giving and transforming power is not extrinsic to but is revealed in the midst of the 
unresolved conditions of life in the world.  This insight leads them to insist that the 
essence of Christian faith emerges not through freedom from conflict but through 
entering into the midst of conflict with hope.  
 The purpose of this chapter is to interpret the theologies of the cross of Christ 
developed by Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino.  A summary and analysis that takes into 
account the background, influences and context of each theologian will be provided.  The 
strengths, weaknesses, and contributions of each theologian will be accessed. 
 The tradition of the theology of the cross is rooted in the New Testament.  As 
early as 56 C.E. when Paul wrote a letter to the Christian community in Corinth the 
tendency to allow the resurrection and continuing presence of Christ to overshadow 
Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the cross has been a temptation.1  In his book, Theology in 
Exodus: Biblical Theology in the form of a Commentary, Donald Gowan notes the 
implications of this tendency for Christian theology.  He writes,    
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The triumph of the resurrection of Christ and the continuing experience of 
his risen presence in the midst of the early Christian communities meant 
the language of forsakenness had no natural place in the New Testament… 
It seems fair to say that for the writers of the New Testament, all the 
feelings of godforsakenness expressed by the writers of the Old Testament 
have been absorbed by Jesus on the cross.2  
 
 Nevertheless, beginning with Paul a “thin tradition” threaded its way through the history 
of Christian thought and practice, a tradition that looked to the cross not from the 
standpoint of having been overcome but as the permanent question and crisis in all 
theology.3  From this perspective the cross is not the means for rising above the 
conditions of life and attaining access to the power and glory of God but is the challenge 
to enter into the midst of peril, suffering, and death with hope.  Theology with a focus on 
the cross does not discern the presence of God in success or power but finds God in the 
places of abandonment, and in the midst of all that seems to contradict God.  
 The theology of the cross is a spirit and method for doing theology.4  This spirit 
and method recognizes that the crisis of the cross, as Moltmann describes in the title of 
his book, The Crucified God, is the foundation and criticism of all Christian theology.  It 
is always polemical, always arising in opposition to the prevailing theology of glory.  The 
cross raises epistemological questions about how to know and recognize God and makes 
visible the openness of the history of God for the history of the world. 
 In contemplating the cross of Jesus Christ and its meaning, Martin Luther was the 
first theologian to use the phrase “the Crucified God.”5  His use of the phrase indicated 
not only an epistemological contention that knowledge of God from the cross opposes the 
                                                 
2 Donald Gowan, Theology in Exodus: Biblical Theology in the Form of a Commentary (Louisville: 
Westminster John Knox Press, 1994), 16. 
3 Douglas John Hall, Lighten Our Darkness: Towards an Indigenous Theology of the Cross (Lima, OH: 
Academic Renewal Press, revised edition 2001), 104. 
4 Ibid.,111. 
5 Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 47. 
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knowledge of God through works, but also that in the cross God’s visible being toward 
the world is revealed in what seems to oppose God.  In an article entitled “Jürgen 
Moltmann’s Theology as a Theology of the Cross,” Don Schweitzer notes that in a study 
of Luther’s theology, Walther von Loewenich points to two significant changes in 
Christian theology brought about by Luther’s methodology.  The first is that the theology 
of the cross becomes a guiding principle for understanding Christian theology rather than 
one topic among many.  The second is that a minority tradition is established in Christian 
theology that emphasizes the discontinuity between the gospel of Jesus Christ and human 
wisdom.6 
Background and Influences on Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology 
Moltmann follows Luther in understanding the cross as a guiding principle for 
Christian theology.  He writes,  
The death of Jesus on the cross is the centre of all Christian theology.  It is 
not the only theme of theology, but it is in effect the entry to its problems 
and answers on earth.  All Christian statements about God, about creation, 
about sin and death have their focal point in the crucified Christ.7 
 
In addition, like Luther, Moltmann sees a discontinuity between the gospel of 
Jesus Christ and human wisdom.  In exploring the cause and extent of that discontinuity 
and its implications for understanding God, however, Luther and Moltmann are quite 
distinct.  Both Luther and Moltmann look to the cross as the focal point for understanding 
the relationship between God and human beings, but the questions they ask of that 
relationship differ. Because their questions are shaped by their experiences and their 
cultural contexts, they arrive at different theological insights.  Luther’s understanding of 
                                                 
6 Don Schweitzer, “Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology as a Theology of the Cross,” Studies in Religion 24, no. 1 
(1995): 95. 
7 Moltmann, 204. 
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the relationship between God and human beings is formed in the context of the problems 
he identifies in the triumphal church of his day and his protest against it.  For Luther the 
relationship between God and human beings is characterized and determined by sin. The 
inability of human beings to understand God and their tendency toward self-deification 
are the result.  The cross reveals the true relationship between human beings and God.  
For Luther that relationship revolves around an understanding that human beings are the 
guilty party in the relationship and through the cross God is revealed as their savior.  
According to Luther, this understanding of the relationship between God and human 
beings is the determining shape of all Christian theology.8   
Moltmann’s context for understanding the relationship between human beings and 
God is the apathy and despair of post World War II Germany.  His context is marked by 
the failure of all German institutions, political, economic, religious and social, the 
atrocities represented by the name Auschwitz, and the guilt caused not only by the failure 
of Christian churches to resist Nazism but the actual complicity of these Christian 
churches in the hegemony of the Nazi government before and during the war.9  
Moltmann understands sin to play a role in the discontinuity between the gospel of Jesus 
Christ and human wisdom, but sin for him is not his central focus. His focus widens to 
include the problem of innocent suffering and shifts to explore the meaning of God’s 
revelation on the cross of Jesus Christ through the questions raised from the midst of 
suffering humanity.  For Moltmann, the questions about God spring not from a church 
that claims too much power but from a church that is struggling with both identity and 
                                                 
8 Schweitzer, 96 -97. 
9 Robert T. Cornelison  “The Development and Influence of Moltmann’s Theology,” The Asbury 
Theological Journal 55, no. 1 (Spring 2000): 15-16. 
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relevancy.10  The questions Moltmann addresses move him beyond Luther as he allows 
the theology of the cross to more thoroughly question and re-shape traditional doctrines 
of God.11   
In an article entitled “Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology as a Theology of the Cross,” 
Don Schweitzer argues that Moltmann’s theology of the cross is distinctive because of 
the particular way Moltmann understands the relationship between cross and resurrection 
and his interpretation of the resurrection in light of Old Testament promises.12  
Schweitzer notes that in Moltmann’s early seminal work, Theology of Hope, he recovers 
eschatology as a major but neglected theme of biblical theology.13  In this recovery, 
Moltmann emphasizes the historical and dialectical nature of the eschatological promises 
of God in the Old Testament.  Historical, because history is the mediator of God’s 
revelation and God’s revelation concerns the temporal and material.  Dialectical, because 
God’s promises were spoken to and take form in the midst of life experiences that 
contradict those very promises.  God’s promises are dialectically related to present 
circumstances.  Those promises point to a future that will be achieved only through 
overcoming the evil and contradiction of that present circumstance.  Moreover, the 
eschatological promises spoken through the prophets were not merely a way of 
understanding history but a means for transforming history.14   
According to Schweitzer, this way of understanding promise in the Old Testament 
provides the foundation for Moltmann’s understanding of the relationship of cross and 
                                                 
10 Moltmann, 7-28. 
11 Schweitzer, 104-107. 
12 Ibid., 102-103. 
13 Ibid., 97. 
14 Ibid., 97-103. 
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resurrection in the New Testament.15  Resurrection hope does not merely triumph over 
the cross.  Rather, the cross and resurrection are related both historically and dialectically.  
The cross of Jesus Christ is historical.  It is the temporal and material revelation of God in 
the midst of all that contradicts and opposes God.  The resurrection reveals God’s 
promise to overcome this evil and contradiction but it does not merely point to the 
understanding that God opposes sin, suffering, death, and humiliation. It reveals the 
means for transforming that evil and contradiction.  Therefore, the cross is the key to 
interpreting the nature and extent of resurrection hope in Moltmann’s work and in 
addition, this resurrection hope is related to the eschatological promises of the Old 
Testament.16 
Moltmann’s distinctive understanding of the relationship between cross, 
resurrection, and Old Testament promises is the result of a broader theological 
methodology. Schweitzer analyzes Moltmann’s methodology in “The Consistency of 
Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology.”17  In this article, Schweitzer argues that Moltmann’s 
understanding of biblical theology is the basis for his overarching theological method.  
Schweitzer once again points to Moltmann’s analysis of the biblical traditions in the 
book, Theology of Hope.  Schweitzer states that in this book, Moltmann recognizes a 
dialectical pattern in Israel’s theological tradition.  That dialectical pattern emerges from 
the recognition that struggle was a foundational part of Israel’s theology.  While Israel 
relied on originating event/experiences, i.e. the exodus from Egypt, the theological 
insights from those experiences were not locked into the past but were reopened when 
                                                 
15 Ibid., 98. 
16 Ibid., 97-103. 
17 Don Schweitzer, “The Consistency of Jürgen Moltmann's Theology,” Studies in Religion 22, no. 2 
(1993): 197-208. 
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new experiences challenged those insights.  Traditional theological understandings were 
read in light of new experiences that often resulted in a struggle for new understandings 
of these traditions.  Often, as a result of this struggle there was a reformulation of Israel’s 
theological traditions.18  Schweitzer argues that not only does Moltmann recognize this 
pattern in biblical theology but Moltmann’s theology consistently displays this same 
methodology.  Schweitzer writes,  
As in Theology of Hope, Moltmann again develops his thought 
according to the dialectical pattern of development found in the biblical 
traditions.  First comes the discussion of the new context which reveals the 
inadequacy of previous doctrinal formulations.  Then comes a rereading of 
the tradition’s originating event/experiences in light of the concerns and 
insights arising from these new experiences.  Finally comes the attempt to 
relate the Christian theological tradition to these new experiences by 
reformulating traditional doctrines in terms of the rereadings.19    
 
Schweitzer notes that Moltmann’s theological approach combines Paul Tillich’s 
emphasis on the need for Christian theology to be relevant to contemporary culture with 
the concern for the distinctiveness of Christian revelation in the work of Karl Barth.20  He 
writes, 
There is something inherently revolutionary about the way 
Moltmann holds present experience and the biblical witness together in a 
productive tension.  By dialectically relating the biblical witness of 
eschatological hope and present experience, Moltmann’s theology 
continually works towards new understandings of God and the world 
which both relate to and transcend present experience.21 
 
Because the foundation of Moltmann’s theological approach rests upon the 
rereading of tradition in light of contemporary questions and struggles, his theology is 
influenced by a broad range of philosophical and theological sources as well as his own 
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20 Ibid., 206. 
21 Ibid., 207. 
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experience.  The questions forged in suffering that lie at the heart of Moltmann’s 
theological project began in his own personal experiences during World War II.  Drafted 
into the war at the age of eighteen he experienced the violence of battle.  He writes,  
But then, miraculously and with great difficulty, I survived the firestorm 
of the RAF-Operation “Gomorrah” which destroyed my hometown of 
Hamburg in July 1943; 40,000 were killed in the last night of the raid, 
including my friend, Gerhard Schopper, who was blown up right before 
my eyes.  It was during that night that I first called out to God - “Where is 
God?” and “Why am I not also dead?” - questions that have not left me to 
this day.22 
 
Moltmann was captured and spent three years as a prisoner of war in Belgium, 
Scotland, and England.  In the isolation of imprisonment in a foreign country, he read 
scripture and found that it fed his imagination and emotional need.  He experienced 
despair but also a powerful encounter with God that renewed his hope.  God became for 
him a God who can be found behind barbed wire and is present with the broken hearted.  
This experience left him with the insight that suffering and hope reinforce one another.  
The mystery of God and the mystery of suffering are contemplated together.  In 
contemplating suffering, God can be found; and contemplation of God leads one to 
become sensitive to questions of suffering.23 
 In addition to Moltmann’s experience as a political prisoner, he witnessed the 
destruction of his own country’s institutions and the atrocities of genocide committed 
under the Nazi regime.  This led Moltmann to explore the implications of the meaning of 
the cross not only in light of personal suffering but also in light of world history and 
politics.  In an article, “The Development and Influence of Moltmann’s Theology,” 
Robert T. Cornelison notes that while the sociopolitical framework is important in any 
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23 Ibid, 9-11. 
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serious study of a theologian’s work, it is of vital importance for understanding 
Moltmann.  Cornelison points out that not only is Moltmann’s theology clearly 
influenced by the social and political events of post World War II Germany, but through 
these events Moltmann is led to a realization that all theology is political, that all 
theological discourse will either promote or hinder liberation. As a result, his theology is 
firmly political in character.24 
 Following his release from captivity after the war, Moltmann began his 
theological studies at Göttingen.  It was there that Moltmann was introduced to the 
theology of Karl Barth.  He was especially impressed by Barth’s early recognition that 
the church in Germany had become so aligned with the culture that it had become 
ineffective.25  This recognition had led Barth to a shift in theological method.  While his 
theological teachers had focused on the subjectivity of the human person as the recipient 
of revelation, Barth’s focus was on the transcendent, wholly other God as the source of 
revelation.26   
Barth, like Moltmann, was influenced by Luther in adopting the cross as the 
critical revelation of God.  Barth, however, moved beyond Luther by more fully and 
consistently working out the implications of God’s suffering on the cross giving kenosis 
(Phil 2:17) a primary place in his understanding of God’s relationship with humanity.  
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Barth argues that God, who loves in freedom and is not limited by suffering, nevertheless 
through self emptying love takes suffering upon Godself for the salvation of the world.27 
 Barth’s biblically oriented, christocentric, trinitarian theology clearly influences 
the theology of Moltmann. 28  In an autobiographical article, Moltmann discusses the 
esteem with which he had held Barth during the dissertation phase of his doctoral studies.  
He writes, “Like others who said after Hegel philosophy was impossible, I saw no further 
possibilities for theology beyond Barth: He said it all.”29  In the same article, however, 
Moltmann discusses that his movement beyond Barth began when he heard lectures by 
theologian Arnold van Ruler discussing his “Theology of the Apostolate” and his 
“Kingdom of God Theology.”30  While Barth had made eschatology a central theme of 
his writing, it is in understanding the implications of eschatology that Moltmann finds 
Barth’s theology inadequate.  Moltmann finds that because Barth places so strong an 
emphasis on the transcendence of God, on God’s otherness, he fails to address the 
transformation of the world.  In Barth’s theology, the Trinity remains a revelation of the 
changeless eternity of God, and is therefore the same in the past, the present, and the 
future.  From this perspective, the cross is viewed as the place of eschatological 
fulfillment of God’s purposes for the world.  The futuristic elements of eschatology are 
ignored.  Eschatology is understood as “realized eschatology,” the revelation of God on 
the cross is seen largely as an indictment of human history and the relevance of the 
Christian message for the transformation of society is neglected.31  
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Moltmann’s recognition of this weakness in Barth became clarified for him when 
we was introduced to Ernst Bloch and began to study Bloch’s philosophy.  Discussing 
Bloch’s influence on his thought, Moltmann writes,  
All at once the loose threads of a biblical theology, of the theology of the 
apostolate and the kingdom of God and of philosophy, merged into a 
pattern for a tapestry in which everything matched.32 
 
According to Cornelison, in Bloch’s three volume philosophy, Principle of Hope, he 
“rediscovers” the role of eschatology in the messianic impulses of Jewish and Christian 
scriptures. This rediscovery challenges Bloch to rethink the understanding of history that 
dominated philosophy in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.  Those centuries had 
understood history in a teleological sense so that the past was studied for the impulses 
that had led to the present and then the future.  Bloch, examining the messianic impulses 
of Jewish and Christian scriptures, saw that it was the hope for the fulfillment of God’s 
promises that gave meaning to the past and to the present.  As Cornelison notes, while 
Bloch was an atheist in a “Feuerbachian sense,” and therefore understood eschatology 
differently than the Jewish and Christian scriptures did, he nevertheless saw the 
prominent role eschatology played in the historical process.  In Bloch’s thought, the 
future is not the place of the fulfillment of God’s promises but a vacuum into which 
human beings project their hopes and wishes.  These projected hopes and wishes give 
meaning to the past and the present.33  Hope, therefore has a prominent role in the 
historical process and history is viewed as a transcendent horizon.  Cornelison writes,  
In Bloch’s view, then, the present is filled with possibilities and an 
openness because what is ultimately possible is not determined by the 
past, but by the anticipated future.  The present is not filled with accretions 
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from the past, but with the potentialities of the promised future; in a word, 
history becomes filled with HOPE.34   
 
Bloch’s recognition of the role of hope in the historical process and his vision of 
history as a transcendent, open horizon influenced Moltmann’s theology.  For Moltmann, 
however, the future is not a vacuum into which the hopes and desires of human beings 
are projected.  Rather, the future has content.  It is filled with the resurrection promise of 
the kingdom of God.  Human beings cannot perceive this future and yet it is guaranteed.  
The present then is the interim period between promise and fulfillment, a time filled with 
potential, anticipation, and meaning.  Cornelison describing Moltmann’s understanding 
of the role of resurrection hope in history writes, “The completion of fragmentary 
existence, the fulfillment of human hopes, the peace and joy of the kingdom can be 
anticipated proleptically in the present.”35 
The centrality and meaning of eschatology in Moltmann’s work is shaped by 
Bloch’s philosophy but Moltmann’s understanding of the relationship of God to that 
eschatological history is influenced by the philosophy of G.W.F. Hegel.  In an article, 
“The Hegelian Element in Von Balthasar’s and Moltmann’s Understanding of the 
Suffering of God,” Brian J. Spence writes,  
The systematic heart of the theologies of Jürgen Moltmann and Hans Urs 
von Balthasar involves an insight which is drawn from Hegel’s philosophy 
of religion: the notion that the Incarnation has implications both for human 
history and the inner life of God, and that it expresses the relationship 
between these two.36 
 
According to Spence, Hegel understood the incarnation as the point of 
reconciliation of the contradiction between God and the otherness of creation that has its 
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culmination in the contradiction between nature and spirit in human beings.  The cross is 
the focal point of the reconciliation.  Through the cross the negative and painful 
experiences of finitude, even death, are taken up by God who in the incarnation is both 
God and a human being.  These negative experiences are not simply overcome as 
atonement theology suggests but are taken into the inner life of God.  Hegel’s trinitarian 
perception of God and God’s relationship to human history becomes for Moltmann a 
source for understanding God’s relationship to suffering.37    
The thought of Bloch and Hegel provide Moltmann with contemporary 
philosophical reflections on the relationship between history, eschatology, and the 
Trinity.  Moltmann’s use of these themes is deepened through his reading of Pietist 
authors.  In “The Role of Pietism in the Theology of Jürgen Moltmann,” J. Steven 
O’Malley notes that Moltmann makes reference either directly or through allusion to 
many German Pietist authors as well as their sources for thought.38  One of the influential 
sources that definitively shaped Moltmann’s theology was Joachim de Fiore (1131-1202).  
O’Malley reports that when directly asked about the influence of Joachim de Fiore on his 
work, Moltmann replied, “tersely and in a softened voice” that he was the “last 
surviving” Joachite.39  O’Malley indicates that Joachim’s symbolic and prophetic 
interpretation of scripture and its relationship to history as well as the impact Joachim’s 
work had on Western Christianity interested Moltmann and became influential for 
Moltmann’s understanding of the relationship between history, eschatology, and the 
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Trinity.  Joachim’s work inspired his followers to view Christianity as a compelling force 
for liberty in both church and society.  Moltmann writes,  
If we want to overcome the monotheistic interpretation of the lordship of 
God by the trinitarian understanding of the kingdom, then we must go 
back to Joachim of Fiore, and rediscover the truth of his trinitarian view of 
history.  Joachim counted as an “Enthusiast” and outsider.  But in fact, 
ever since the middle ages, there is hardly anyone who has influenced 
European movements for liberty in church, state and culture more 
profoundly that this twelfth-century Cistercian abbot from Calabria, who 
believed that in his visions he had penetrated the concordance of the Old 
and New Testaments, and the mystery of the book of Revelation.40 
 
Finally, the work of Rabbi Abraham Heschel had a profound influence on 
Moltmann’s theology.  Heschel’s theology with its central pillar, the pathos of God, is a 
key influence in Moltmann’s understanding of God’s freedom, suffering, and 
involvement in history.41  Moltmann credits Heschel with overcoming the apathetic 
axiom that had developed in the Jewish faith in a parallel fashion to the same axiom in 
the Christian faith.  This apathetic axiom centers on a presupposition that God does not 
suffer and reached its highpoint during scholasticism in the middle Ages.42   
Moltmann notes that in the book, The Prophets, Heschel claims the theology in 
the Hebrew Bible does not propose an “idea” of God but rather expresses the experience 
of people living in the “situation of God.”43  Countering Jewish philosophers of religion, 
such as Jehuda Halevi, Maimonides, and Spinoza who claim that God is free of passion, 
Heschel claims that the Hebrew Bible reveals a God who is passionately involved with 
human beings.  According to Heschel, God’s passion is not like the passion of irrational 
human emotions with its source in the limitations of finitude.  Rather, God’s passion is 
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grounded in love from the fullness of God’s being for the people with whom God freely, 
by means of the covenant, enters into relationship.44  Heschel claims that the heart of 
prophetic proclamation lies in the belief that God is interested in God’s people to the 
point of God’s willingness to suffer on their behalf.45  Furthermore, the prophet filled 
with the spirit of God, is open in sympathy to feel the feelings of God and therefore bring 
God’s presence to the people opening history to God’s action and hope.46 
Moltmann describes Heschel’s theology as a bipolar theology.  In this bipolar 
theology, God is free and transcendent and yet at the same time open to the actions and 
suffering of God’s people.47  For Moltmann, Heschel’s insights about God’s suffering for 
God’s people and his bipolar theology is deepened through studying the theology of the 
rabbis’, particularly Shekinah theology, God’s indwelling with the people of Israel.48   
Referring to the work of P. Kuhn, Moltmann asserts that Shekinah theology discusses a 
two-fold presence of God.  God is in heaven, yet he is also with the low ones and with the 
humble.  God is God of the gods, but also brings about justice for the widow and orphan 
and like a servant carries a torch in front of the people of Israel.  God’s presence in this 
two-fold way opens up history because God’s accommodation to the limitations of 
human beings is also the anticipation of his future indwelling in all of creation.49 
 Heschel uses the term pathos to describe God’s openness to the suffering of 
human beings.  In describing the pathos of God, Heschel speaks of God’s wrath as 
grounded in the love of God.  God’s anger and suffering over the disobedience of the 
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people of Israel is not an anthropomorphic projection of irrational human emotions but 
rather wounded love.50  For Heschel the suffering of God is grounded in the love of God.  
It is the signpost of the life giving relationship of God toward human beings.  While 
Moltmann recognizes that Christian theology with Christ as mediator is inherently 
trinitarian and therefore differs from the bipolar theology proposed by Heschel, he 
nevertheless recognizes in Heschel’s work the presupposition for understanding the 
passion of God in the New Testament and the open vulnerable love at the heart of 
Christian existence. 
Moltmann’s Theology of the Cross 
While all of Moltmann’s theology is influenced by the theology of the cross, he 
most fully develops the implications of the cross for Christian theology in the book, The 
Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation for Christian Theology.  In the 
introduction to that book, Moltmann writes,  
In front of me hangs Marc Chagall’s picture “Crucifixion in Yellow”.  It 
shows the figure of the crucified Christ in an apocalyptic situation: People 
sinking into the sea, people homeless and in flight, and yellow fire blazing 
in the background.  And with the crucified Christ there appears the angel 
with the trumpet and the open roll of the book of life.51  
 
The painting illustrates so many of the themes Moltmann develops in the book, The 
Crucified God.  It offers the reader the dialectical image of the crucified Christ standing 
in the midst of death yet with the open book of life.  It highlights the solidarity offered by 
Christ, who with wounds reminiscent of his own suffering stands in the midst of 
suffering. It gives the image of Christ in the context of an apocalyptic situation, which 
points to the destruction of the suffering in this world and to the beginning of a new 
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creation.  Moltmann claims that his book, The Crucified God, is not meant to be a 
dogmatic conclusion, but an invitation to rethink the meaning of the cross, a meaning that 
for Moltmann can only be glimpsed through the issue of theodicy.  He writes, “The 
universal significance of the crucified Christ on Golgotha is only really comprehended 
through the theodicy question.”52 
 Although the question of theodicy lies at the heart of Moltmann’s entire 
theological project, he is opposed to any explanation of suffering.  He writes, 
The desire to explain suffering is already highly questionable in itself.  
Does an explanation not lead us to justify suffering and give it 
permanence?  Does it not lead the suffering person to come to terms with 
his suffering, and to declare himself in agreement with it?  And does this 
not mean that he give up hope of overcoming suffering?53 
 
Moltmann’s exploration of the meaning of the cross therefore is not to provide an answer, 
an explanation of suffering in light of God, or an explanation of God’s righteousness in 
the face of suffering.  Rather, Moltmann seeks to allow the questions raised in or by 
suffering to provide the framework for theological exploration.   
The questions that form the framework for his exploration of the meaning of the 
cross are questions that are sensitive to the particular issues of theodicy in the twentieth 
century.  In an article, “Theodicy from Ivan Karamazov to Moltmann,” Richard 
Bauckham notes that Moltmann’s exploration of the meaning of the cross through the 
lens of theodicy is strengthened by its attentiveness to the particular shape of the theodicy 
issue in contemporary culture.54  Bauckham examines the themes of modern theodicy 
through analysis of the writings of Dostoevsky, Camus, and Wiesel.  The themes that 
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Bauckham discusses – dissatisfaction with theism, the advent and eventual inadequacy of 
protest atheism, and the loss of humanity in the face of the loss if God – are themes 
addressed by Moltmann in The Crucified God.   
For Moltmann the issue of theodicy is personal and political rather than 
cosmological.55  He notes that modern protest atheism arose because of the inadequacy of 
theistic concepts of God in the face of innocent suffering.56  Moltmann describes theism 
as religion or philosophy that starts with the question of finitude in the world and seeks 
an answer in God.  Theistic theology and philosophy looks for God in the gaps.  
Beginning with what is decaying, transitory and mortal; it seeks an answer in a God that 
is indivisible, unchangeable and eternal.  If change, mortality, and corruption are 
experienced as disaster and misery, then salvation is the opposite of those things.  
Moltmann contends that in antiquity, people looked to God for the answer to the problem 
of finitude that dominated their lives.  Their lives were marked by a prevalence of death, 
unjust social structures and the unpredictability of nature.  Metaphysics was an assumed 
part of their reality.  There was a presumption that divine powers were real and present 
and this transcendent reality was both attractive and terrifying.  Their questions did not 
have to do with the existence of God.  Their questions were about how the history of 
humanity, swamped in ignorance, impermanence, and death could participate in eternal, 
divine being.  Knowledge, immortality and union with God were sought out as the 
answer to death and impermanence.  Christianity’s message was that the God they were 
seeking as an answer to ignorance, impermanence, and death had become incarnate in 
Christ for their salvation.  In Christ, God had become as they were, swamped in 
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ignorance, impermanence, and death so that they could participate in eternal, divine 
being.57 
 Moltmann argues that the mystery of the relationship between transitory humanity 
and the all powerful, perfect, and infinite Being became the mystery of how this Being 
became incarnate and suffered and died in Jesus of Nazareth.  Moltmann lists the 
questions that dominated early, developing Christology: “How can the intransitory God 
be in a transitory human being?  How can the universal God be in an individual?  How 
can the unchangeable God “become” flesh?  How can the immortal God suffer and die on 
a cross?”58  The answers given to these questions presupposed the God of theism, a God 
who does not change or suffer, and the Christian thinkers of antiquity did not allow the 
suffering and death of the eternal Son of God to alter or challenge those presuppositions.  
Consequently the history of Jesus of Nazareth and his experience of abandonment on the 
cross was not the focus of theology.  Instead, theology focused on the pattern of 
incarnation and resurrection, humiliation and exaltation, asserting that the God of theism 
descended in the incarnation to save humanity from finitude and the God of theism was 
resurrected so that humanity could participate in eternity.59  Moltmann points out that 
though we call this Christology from “above” it really has its origins “below” in the 
questions about finitude.60  
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 For Moltmann, recognizing the dominance of a theistic understanding of God in 
Christian theology is significant because it was this dominance that led to the advent of 
protest atheism.  He argues that atheism begins with the same questions as theism, 
questions springing from the experience of finitude, impermanence, and death.  Atheism 
however draws a very different conclusion.  Atheism dose not find an answer to the 
brokenness of the world in the wisdom and goodness of God, but rather sees the 
brokenness of the world as absurdity.  There is nothing else, there is no ultimate 
meaning.61  Moltmann claims however that atheism is subject to and cannot escape the 
very same concept of God that theism holds.  The God theism presupposes, the God who 
does not suffer, does not change, is omnipotent, and eternal is the very God atheism 
rejects.62    
 Moltmann appeals to Ivan Karamazov’s iconic speech in The Brothers 
Karamazov by Fyodor Dostoevsky as representative of this form of protest.  Ivan’s 
argument is directed specifically against an eschatological theodicy that explains or 
justifies suffering as a means to achieve some eschatological purpose of God.  For Ivan, 
God cannot be used to silence the protest against the suffering of even one innocent 
victim.  Ivan ends this speech by stating, “I accept God, understand that, but I cannot 
accept the world that he has made.”63  Ivan’s problem is the absurdity of innocent 
suffering in the world and in the face of that suffering; he cannot accept the God of 
theism. 
Moltmann also notes however that when the God of theism was rejected by the 
advocates of protest atheism the power once given to God was now handed over to 
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human beings.  When the answer to humanity’s finitude was no longer the God of theism, 
human beings were looked to as the source for overcoming the problem of suffering and 
finitude.  Moltmann argues that ultimately the political movements of Nazism and 
Stalinism showed that protest atheism was an inadequate response to suffering.  These 
movements began in protest against the acceptance of human suffering because of a 
theistic concept of God and yet they resulted in the suffering and massacre of innocent 
human beings on an unprecedented scale.  These movements showed that with the loss of 
God came an accompanying loss of humanity.64  Moltmann points out that in the book, 
L’homme revolte,  Albert Camus highlights the fact that atheism is not a solution to the 
problem of theodicy because it only shifts from justifying suffering on account of an 
eschatological purpose of God to justifying suffering in order to bring about a society 
designed by human beings.  God is replaced by human beings who allow innocent 
suffering in order to bring about a new world of human justice.65 
In The Crucified God, Moltmann describes theism and atheism as “brothers” 
because both draw conclusions about divine being from the world and both understand 
God and suffering to be in contradiction to one another.  Moltmann credits Camus with 
the insight that classical protest atheism does arise against a concept of God inferred from 
Greek tragedies but from a biblical notion of a personal God.66  The key issue for protest 
atheism is not the question of the existence of God but the question of God’s 
righteousness in the world.  Theistic explanations of suffering that continue to hold God 
and suffering in contradiction to one another only exacerbate the problem of God’s 
righteousness in the world.  
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Moltmann denies that a theistic concept of God is applicable to Christian belief in 
the crucified God.67  He claims that a theology of the cross moves “beyond theism and 
atheism.”68  Moltmann’s response to the theodicy problem begins with Jesus’ cry from 
the cross “My God, my God, why have you abandoned me? (Mark 15:34).”  For 
Moltmann, this question cried out by Christ in his suffering on the cross is evidence that 
the question of God and the question of suffering belong together.  “Suffering,” he says, 
“reaches as far as love itself.”69  Moltmann sees suffering as a signpost of vitality and 
life.  He writes,  
But the more one loves, the more one is open and becomes receptive to 
happiness and sorrow.  This may be called the dialectic of human life: we 
live because and in so far as we love – and we suffer and die because and 
in so far as we love.  In this way we experience life and death in love.70 
 
For this reason, Moltmann claims, “the God of theism is poor.  He cannot love nor 
can he suffer.”71  By contrast, Moltmann asserts that what distinguishes the Christian 
concept of God is open, vulnerable love.  The open, vulnerable love of God is concerned 
and involved with the condition of people living in the world.  Theodicy therefore is not a 
question at all it is the “open wound of life in this world.”72  For Moltmann, it is by 
recognizing God’s participation in the “open wound of life” that the meaning of the cross 
can be spoken, a meaning that leads to a “revolution in the concept of God.”73 
Moltmann claims that Christian theology starts in a revolt in the concept of God 
that begins in Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the cross.  That Jesus died a “blasphemer” 
according to Jewish law and a “rebel” according to the Romans is significant, but 
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surpassing that significance and of central importance in understanding the meaning of 
his death is the fact that Jesus died abandoned and rejected by God.74  The implications of 
Jesus’ abandonment and rejection by God are only understood in light of the doctrine of 
the Trinity and according to Moltmann the doctrine of the Trinity has its basis in the 
event of the cross.  Moltmann quotes B. Steffen,  
It is not the bare trinitarian formulas of the New Testament, but the 
constant testimony of the cross which provides the basis for Christian faith 
in the Trinity.  The most concise expression of the Trinity is God’s action 
on the cross, in which God allowed the Son to sacrifice himself through 
the Spirit.75 
 
Moltmann states that the theology of the early church made the starting point for 
discussing the Trinity the generation of the Son by the Father.76  Moltmann argues that 
the starting point for discussing the trinity is not the generation of the Son by the Father, 
but rather the Crucified One.  He states, 
Thus one starts with the history of God at the cross and searches 
backwards into the condition of the possibility of this history in God, and 
one arrives from the dereliction of Jesus, which has happened, to the 
eternal generation of the Son.77 
 
From this perspective, Moltmann argues, one does not arrive at an invisible being of God 
behind history but rather in the visible God who is open to world history.78 
 Moltmann claims that the cross makes visible the openness of the history of God 
for the history of the world.  If the history of God is open to the history of the world God 
is not unmarked by this history.  Moltmann therefore claims that the cross interprets the 
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resurrection and not vice-versa.79  On the cross, God meets death with his own eternal 
life.80  God takes nothingness and all that is contrary to God into God’s being.  The 
resurrection is not a miracle that transforms the Crucified One into a glorified risen being 
but rather the beginning of the eschatological transformation of the world by its Creator 
who takes the history of the world’s suffering into himself and redeems it by giving that 
suffering and death his eternal life.  Christ’s death is the eschatological ground of the new 
creation.81  Moltmann writes, “The new and scandalous element in the Christian message 
of Easter was not that some man or other was raised before anyone else, but that the one 
who was raised was the condemned, executed, and forsaken man.”82 
 Moltmann claims that the epistemological principle of the theology of the cross is 
a dialectical principle.  On the cross, the deity of God is revealed in paradox.83  
Moltmann writes, 
When the crucified Jesus is called the ‘image of the invisible God’, the 
meaning is that this is God, and God is like this.  God is not greater than 
he is in this humiliation.  God is not more glorious than he is in this 
helplessness.  God is not more divine than he is in this humanity.84 
  
According to Moltmann, the cross resists interpretation because its theology 
begins with contradiction and cannot be built upon premature correspondences.85  
Moltmann claims that the cross brings something new to the metaphysical world.  The 
rejected, suffering, and dying of the Son of God calls for a fundamental change in the 
order of being of metaphysical thought.86  It no longer begins with the limitation of 
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finitude and seeks the solution in God but rather, it begins in the observation that God 
and suffering are no longer contradictory.   
In The Crucified God, Moltmann addresses the implications that the recognition 
that God and suffering are no longer contradictory has for the relevance and identity of 
Christianity in the world.  The first implication is that because Christ has suffered, human 
beings are no longer alone in their suffering.  Moltmann observes that for the poor of 
Latin America and other groups of people whose faith is forged in misery, the focus of 
their faith is not in the joyful feasts of Christmas and Easter but in the solemn 
remembrance of Holy Week.  The Christ upon whom their devotion rests is the crucified 
Christ.  In gazing upon the crucified Christ they do not see simply another human being 
suffering as they do, but rather they see the suffering pain of God’s love for them, 
solidarity with their brother Christ and an implicit protest against the suffering they 
themselves experience.87   
Moltmann states that the transformation of the poor through the “mysticism of the 
cross” comes not because Christ in his sufferings is like them but rather because Christ 
represents for them active suffering on their behalf.  The suffering of Christ is not the 
result of passive acceptance of fate or failure.  The suffering of Christ is the result of his 
actively claiming the righteousness of God for the rejected, of his claiming to be the 
friend of sinners, and of his proclamation that God is on the side of the godless.88 
The Christian message is not simply that God became a human being, or that God 
took on the condition and limitations of humanity.  The Christian message is that God 
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became the kind of human being no one wants to be, God became God-forsaken, God 
became the rejected one.  Moltmann writes, 
To suffer and to be rejected are not identical.  Suffering can be celebrated 
and admired.  It can arouse compassion.  But to be rejected takes away the 
dignity from suffering and makes it dishonorable suffering.  To suffer and 
be rejected signify the cross.  To die on the cross means to suffer and to 
die as one who is an outcast and rejected.89 
 
Christ’s cry from the cross, “My God, My God why have you abandoned me?” is the cry 
of the outcast and the rejected one.  It is a cry that indicates not only God’s participation 
in suffering, but also God’s protest against suffering.90 
Recognizing that the cross reveals both the mystery of God and the mystery of 
suffering has a second implication.  That is that if the crucified Christ is the central 
revelation of God for Christians then this revelation is the foundation for both serving 
God and for experiencing God in the world.  Moltmann claims that all Christians must 
answer the question, “Which God motivates my faith: the crucified God or the gods of 
religion, race, and class?”91  He argues that philosophical notions of God, notions that 
ascribe to God unity, indivisibility, lack of beginning and end, immortality, and 
immutability, have dominated Christian faith in the past and continue to strongly 
influence Christian faith in the present.  This has encouraged Christians to see in God the 
answer to their finite and transitory existences.  God is viewed as the highest authority 
figure and takes on the image of Caesar.  The ideal relationship of Christians to God 
therefore is depicted as one of obedience and reverence.  Moltmann argues that this 
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understanding of God keeps human beings children, removes them from their humanity, 
and alienates them from their freedom and joy.92   
The revolution in the concept of God that Moltmann articulates throughout The 
Crucified God is a notion that liberates human beings from a theistic or philosophical 
understanding of God and therefore views Christian practice as a                                                                          
liberating practice.  Moltmann writes,  
The important thing, therefore, is to think of the God of the cross quite 
consistently not only in the sphere of theology but also in the sphere of 
social life and the personality of man, in the realm of society, politics, and 
finally even that of cosmology.93  
 
Furthermore, if the Crucified Christ is the focus of faith, God’s presence will be found 
not in power, wealth, and success, but in the lowly, in the suffering, in the rejected and 
dying.  Moltmann writes, “The person who believes that God is to be found in the God-
forsakenness of the crucified Jesus believes that he sees God everywhere, in all things.”94 
The third implication for Christian practice revealed by recognizing God on the 
cross is grounded in Moltmann’s emphasis on eschatology and trinity.  Moltmann speaks 
of the cross as a “trinitarian event.”  In that event the Father and Son are separated 
through forsakenness and yet together in their mutual surrender to the event.  This event 
affects God and through this event, the spirit proceeds.  Moltmann writes, 
What proceeds from the event between Father and Son is the Spirit which 
justifies the godless, fills the forsaken with love and even brings the dead 
alive, since even the fact that they are dead cannot exclude them from this 
event of the cross; the death in God also includes them.95 
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 In the event of the cross, God has taken the history of suffering and the limitation 
of finitude into God’s self, into the Trinity.  Moltmann’s panentheistic concept of God 
claims that God is not in history but history is taken up into God, into the Trinity, and is 
being integrated into the “history of God.”96  Moltmann claims this understanding of God 
moves beyond theism and atheism and into new creation and theopoiesis.97   
The implications of this for Christian practice are two-fold.  First, human beings 
are called to participation with God in facing suffering and death with hope and love; and 
second, they are called to communion with God by living into the new creation through 
liberating praxis.  For further reflection, Moltmann offers a picture of the Trinity as an 
open circle.  He argues that the early church envisions the Trinity as a closed circle of 
perfect being.  Barth, he claims, follows the early church in picturing the trinity as a 
closed circle.  In Moltmann’s vision, the Trinity begins in the dialectical event of the 
cross and continues as eschatologically open history.98  Moltmann returns here to his key 
focus on open vulnerable love.  The Spirit, as open vulnerable love, is open to the future 
history of humanity.  That history contains the whole of forsaken humanity but also 
offers the future of God’s new creation.  As Christians participate in this open Trinity, 
they participate in the suffering of God but also in the joy, hope, and love of God.  The 
crucified Christ is the transition, is the ground for redeemed existence leading to an 
eschatological future in which, “God may be all in all (1 Cor 15: 28).”99 
                                                 
96 Ibid., 277. 
97 Ibid., 277. 
98 Ibid., 255. 
99 Ibid., 255-266. 
 122 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Moltmann’s Theology of the Cross 
 Critiques of Moltmann’s theology of the cross largely pivot around various 
aspects of the relationship between God and suffering that Moltmann articulates.  There 
are charges that Moltmann does not respond adequately to the theodicy issue.100 There 
are claims that his notion of God, attributing suffering and change to God, makes God 
unstable.101 Finally, some argue that by attributing redemptive power to God’s suffering, 
Moltmann’s theology of the cross both sanctions suffering and contributes to oppression 
rather than to liberation.102  While there are valid points in each of these charges, many 
critiques of his work have misrepresented Moltmann’s theology by not adequately 
addressing the major themes of his work.  The center of Moltmann’s theology of the 
cross is a rethinking of the meaning of the cross in light of suffering, a rethinking that 
involves a new understanding of the relationship between God and suffering, a 
redefinition of God’s power,  and a recognition that God’s power and life operates within 
history rather than operating upon the world from outside history.103   
 Because Moltmann claims that his book, The Crucified God, is an exploration of 
the meaning of the cross through the lens of theodicy, he is open to claims that his work 
does not provide an adequate answer to the issue of theodicy.  Moltmann clearly 
articulates, however, that his theology is not an answer and does not intend to provide an 
answer to the theodicy issue.104  For Moltmann, choosing the lens of theodicy to explore 
the meaning of the cross is not one option among many equal options but rather the only 
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valid option because the mystery of suffering is an inescapable reality of life in the world 
and it is from this reality that questions about God both arise and are addressed to God.105  
Despite the fact, however, that Moltmann is not claiming to answer the issue of 
theodicy there are aspects of human suffering that are largely ignored in his work.  When 
Moltmann’s writes, “suffering reaches as far as love itself,”106 or “this may be called the 
dialectic of human life: we live because and in so far as we love – and we suffer and die 
because and in so far as we love.  In this way we experience life and death in love,”107 he 
implies a connection between suffering, love, and hope. There are forms of suffering that 
reinforce love, that intensify hope, suffering that leads to growth in love and in 
relationship to God.  These forms of suffering are not chosen, but nevertheless, if 
embraced in faith provide a means of communion with God.  Moltmann’s statements 
about the connection between suffering, love, and hope are easily applied to these forms 
of suffering.   
These statements, however, are not appropriate in addressing all forms of 
suffering.  There is suffering in the world that is in no way redemptive.  Suffering that 
cannot be spoken of in the context of love.  Suffering, that kills both the body and soul of 
a person sometimes even before that person has the opportunity to be formed.  There is 
suffering that separates a person from God before that person has any concept of hope 
that would allow him or her to even imagine that he or she has been abandoned by God.  
Moltmann’s work does not address, nor can it address, the apparent meaninglessness of 
certain kinds of suffering in the world. 
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In “Jürgen Moltmann and the Problem of Evil,” John David Jaeger raises the 
question of whether Moltmann’s work adequately addresses either the magnitude of 
suffering in the world or the root causes of that suffering.108  Reflecting a similar theme, 
Bonino notes that Moltmann’s analysis of suffering that concentrates on psychological, 
cultural, and even ecological pain, reflects his European context and ignores the aspects 
of pain known in Latin America that are rooted in unjust economic and political 
structures.109  
Two methodological errors that are prevalent in Moltmann’s theology of the cross 
contribute to the shortcomings in Moltmann’s analysis of suffering.  The first is that 
Moltmann is very selective in his appropriation of New Testament texts and therefore 
one-sided in his exploration of the meaning of the cross.  The second is that Moltmann 
fails to make a distinction between sin and pain.  Moltmann’s theology of the cross 
therefore focuses on the rejected and the forsaken but fails to appropriately address evil 
and the causes of rejection and forsakenness.   
Wayne R. Herman in “Moltmann’s Christology,” points to Moltmann’s selective 
use of biblical texts.  Moltmann, he claims, seems to begin with presuppositions and then 
finds support for his argument in a selected text.110  One example Hermann provides in 
order to support his argument is Moltmann’s selection of texts concerning Jesus’ 
teaching.  Moltmann consistently chooses to focus on Jesus’ teaching of the graciousness 
of God as the exclusive and primary point of his teaching.  He even argues that the rift 
that came about between John the Baptist and Jesus centered on this key point of 
difference.  Herman points out that in Moltmann’s selection of texts to support his 
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argument he completely eliminates the element of judgment that is also part of Jesus’ 
teaching.111  
Herman’s second example is Moltmann’s use of Jesus’ cry of abandonment from 
the cross.  Herman points out that Moltmann chooses this cry as the summary of the 
meaning of Jesus’ death on the cross and eliminates the texts of Luke and John, sources 
for other interpretations of the meaning of Jesus’ death on the cross.112  In doing this, 
Herman claims that Moltmann “rejects other aspects of the passion narrative which do 
not fit with his interpretation and reads his interpretation into texts where it is not 
found.”113  Hermann points out that in Trinity and the Kingdom, when discussing Jesus’ 
appeal to his disciples to stay awake with him in Gethsemane, Moltmann writes, “for the 
first time he (Jesus) does not want to be alone with his God.  He is evidently afraid of 
him.  That is why he seeks the protection of his friends.”114   Hermann writes, 
Does not the fact that all three evangelists record Jesus’ prayer in 
Gethsemane as being addressed to “my Father” tell against such an 
interpretation?  Moltmann’s interpretation of Jesus’ experience in 
Gethsemane elucidates his own presuppositions about Jesus more than it 
elucidates Jesus’ sense of abandonment by God.115 
 
This example shows that Moltmann is so focused on the abandonment of Jesus by the 
Father that he completely ignores the abandonment of the disciples that is clearly 
described in all four gospels.  In Moltmann’s efforts to widen the understanding of the 
cross to include the problem of innocent suffering, he drops the dominant theological 
understanding of the cross as the place of God’s judgment and salvation from sin.  He 
makes a valuable contribution in widening the interpretation of the cross but by 
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neglecting the interpretation of the cross as judgment of and salvation from sin, an 
interpretation that has dominated Christian theology; he ignores the problem of evil and 
the causes of pain and suffering.  As a result, Moltmann’s theology of the cross neglects 
the role of human responsibility in the drama between God and human beings. 
 Douglas B. Farrow argues in an article entitled “In the End is the Beginning: a 
Review of Jürgen Moltmann’s Systematic Contributions” that one problematic feature of 
Moltmann’s theology is that Moltmann links suffering with creation and therefore when 
he discusses the cross as an event that involves overcoming suffering he does not 
distinguish suffering arising from pain that is the result of sin.116  Farrow points out that 
while Moltmann objects to an ontological opposition between God and creation, his 
description of creation as a kenotic act of God in fact maintains that ontological 
opposition.  Moltmann’s panentheistic theology of the cross merely transfers that 
opposition to a sphere within God.117  In Moltmann’s understanding of creation, God 
makes room in Godself for creation.  Creation is other and otherness involves 
contradiction.  Redemption, therefore must overcome all otherness and contradiction.  
Moltmann’s theology is clear that redemption involves God’s participation in overcoming 
otherness and contradiction and therefore God’s participation in pain, but otherness as the 
result of creation is not distinguished from the rift between human beings and God 
created by sin.  Farrow writes,  
Is it still necessary to ask why this is objectionable?  Where the divine 
love, secretly or openly, intentionally or unintentionally, is aimed at 
redeeming us from our otherness, gnosticism threatens….we should ask 
Moltmann whether it is right or wrong to accept the premise that the world 
qua world requires redemption, that creation requires the cross, love the 
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death of the lover.  Is it not the case that there is a tendency here – a very 
common tendency, to be sure, visible from the early fathers through to 
Barth – to run together the needs of the creature and the needs of the 
sinner in crypto-gnostic way?118   
 
Moltmann’s selective use of the New Testament and his blending of the “needs of 
the creature and the needs of the sinner” results in a neglect of the causes of rejection and 
forsakenness in his theology of the cross.  These problems in Moltmann’s theology lead 
Farrow to claim, “Theology cannot be done successfully from the standpoint of the 
victim, or from the victim’s friends either, as the book of Job makes clear.”119  Farrow 
claims that theodicy is a flawed method for theological inquiry.  Perhaps the flaws in 
Moltmann’s attempt could be corrected, however, by an appeal to a wider selection of 
texts not only within the New Testament but by also including Old Testament texts as 
well.  Theodicy as a means of theological inquiry has been an important part of Israel’s 
struggle to be in relationship to God from its earliest times.  Theodicy has roots that go 
back to Abraham’s question of God, “Will you sweep away the innocent with the 
guilty?”120  Moltmann’s attempt to explore the meaning of the cross through the lens of 
theodicy would be strengthened by widening his selection of texts beyond Jesus’ cry of 
abandonment on the cross.  
Moltmann’s selective use of biblical texts and his blending of pain with sin lead to 
problematic issues in his notion of God as well.  In an article, “The Theology of the Cross 
as Theology of the Trinity,” Dennis W. Jowers argues that Moltmann ignores important 
biblical themes such as: “the biblical testimony to man’s insignificance in the eyes of 
God (e.g. Is. 40:15, 17: Dn. 4:35), the sovereignty, omnipotence, and immutability of 
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God, and above all, the absolute and uncompromisable unity of God.”121  Jowers claims 
that Moltmann’s disregard for these themes is the result of approaching the Bible from 
the perspective of a single principle, the “mutuality between hope and suffering, which 
Moltmann sees epitomized in the dialectic between resurrection and cross.”122  Jowers 
argues that Moltmann’s recognition of the mutual interdependence of hope and suffering 
is an important psychological insight but not a theological insight and does not lead to an 
adequate understanding of God.  Jowers uses the example of a blind man.  God’s 
participation in the blind man’s pain may give psychological comfort but will not restore 
his sight. 123 According to Jowers, not only does Moltmann’s notion of God lack an 
adequate concept of God’s power but it also ignores the doctrine of impassibility.  
Claiming that if God is changeable then God is unreliable, Jowers argues that Moltmann 
has misunderstood the purpose of the doctrine of impassibility which is to maintain that 
God is pure act.124   
This critique by Jowers, however, misses some key themes in Moltmann’s notion 
of God.  First, Moltmann clearly states that God’s participation in suffering is not passive 
but active.125  Second, Moltmann would claim that God’s involvement and participation 
in suffering point to what is unchangeable about God, God’s love.  Moltmann is arguing 
for a new relationship between God’s power and love.  God’s power is operative in God’s 
love.  God’s transcendence is not distance from history but a transcendence that operates 
within history through transforming history.126  Furthermore, Jowers ignores the role of 
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eschatology in Moltmann’s understanding of God’s power.  An eschatological view of 
history does not simply point to a future hope, rather that hope is active in transforming 
the present.  Furthermore, the cross is not simply a step to redemption but “a mode of 
being of God.”  God’s being revealed in the event of the cross, however, is not a mode of 
being that operates upon the world from outside history, but one that is operating from 
within history and which is not visible except in faith.127   
In an article, “Reading Jürgen Moltmann from Latin America,” Jose Miguez 
Bonino claims that one strength of Moltmann’s eschatological understanding of history is 
its strong call for human praxis.  Moltmann’s notion of God that transposes God’s 
transcendence from outside to within the realm of history breaks through the apathy of 
human life calling for liberating praxis.  Yet, Moltmann’s insistence that knowledge of 
God comes from the cross prevents political movements from claiming “divine 
legitimation.”128  Moltmann’s call for human praxis might be further strengthened 
through a deeper appeal to the prophets of the Old Testament who, according to Heschel, 
open history to God’s action in the world through their “co-feeling” with God.129  
Despite some weaknesses, Moltmann’s theology of the cross makes some 
important contributions to theology.  His major contribution to theology is his insight into 
the passion of God.130  Moltmann makes a significant contribution to an interpretation of 
the cross by moving beyond a soteriological framework and focusing on the way in 
which God is affected by the event of the cross.  Moltmann’s insistence that the cross 
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interprets the resurrection, that it is not just any man, but the Crucified One who is 
resurrected, that the history of human suffering is taken up into the history of God, 
provides a theological vision that takes present evil and suffering seriously and yet 
encourages hope for eschatological redemption.  Moltmann’s vision calls Christians to 
oppose the apathy of contemporary life and to participate in the passion of Christ and the 
passion of God by standing in solidarity with those who are suffering while at the same 
time maintaining a protest against all form of suffering.131   
Background and Influences on Jon Sobrino’s Theology 
 Jon Sobrino was born into a Basque family in Barcelona Spain in 1938.  He 
joined the Jesuit order when he was eighteen years old and shortly after that, in 1958, 
traveled to El Salvador.  At the age of twenty-seven Sobrino studied theology in 
Frankfurt, Germany and is well grounded in 20th century European theology often 
referring in his works to the theologies of Karl Rahner, Hans Urs von Balthasar, Wolfhart 
Panneberg, and Jurgen Moltmann.132  Despite a thorough grounding in European 
Systematic theology, however, the two biggest influences on Sobrino’s theology are his 
close association with Archbishop Oscar Romero133 and his lived experience of ministry 
to the poor and oppressed people of El Salvador.  Sobrino is described as a liberation 
theologian but it would be a mistake to gather from this label that he first studied and 
assessed liberation theology and then began to articulate it.  Rather, reflection upon 
traditional theology in light of his experiences in El Salvador led him to insights that are 
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in close association with the method and content of liberation theology.  In an interview 
broadcast by the BBC, Sobrino states,   
In a refugee camp in El Salvador, several times I went to say Mass.  In the 
midst of so much tragedy, poverty and so on, all of a sudden I saw a 
peasant woman.  And I said to myself spontaneously, when I looked at her 
face: “I have seen God”.  The depth of reality became present in the face 
of that woman: her dignity, her commitment to be there, her hope that 
maybe life would be better for her and for others: an experience of God.  I 
think this is the origin of liberation theology.134 
 
 In this same interview, Sobrino asserts that upon returning to El Salvador after his 
theological studies in Frankfurt, Germany he began to hear a new way of discussing 
theology, “a different language” and that this new and different language resonated with 
his experiences of preaching the gospel of Jesus Christ in the midst of very poor, very 
oppressed people.135   
 Liberation theology is identified by particular methodological emphases.  In an 
article, “Theological Method: the Southern Exposure,” Alfred T. Hennelly, S.J. drawing 
from the work of Leonardo Boff, points to a cluster of five main methodological interests 
that characterize theologies of Latin American.  These interests are: an emphasis on 
anthropology over ecclesiology, a utopian perspective over a factual one, a critical 
approach to theology over a dogmatic approach, an emphasis on the social over the 
personal, and orthopraxis over orthodoxy.136  These five emphases are characteristic of 
Sobrino’s approach to Christology.   
 In Sobrino’s early work on Christology, Christology at the Crossroads, he clearly 
articulates his methodological approach.  He points to the New Testament as a model for 
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approaching Christology.  He claims that while the various writers of the gospels had 
faith resulting from the resurrection of Jesus, each writer recognized two important poles 
for discerning the meaning of that faith.  The first was the actual events and concrete 
existence of the historical Jesus.  The second was the particular historical and concrete 
situation of the community of faith that they were addressing.  Sobrino’s approach to 
Christology follows this New Testament model clearly emphasizing the events and 
concrete existence of the historical Jesus and approaching the meaning of those events 
and Jesus’ existence from the perspective of the poor in Latin America.137   
 Implicit in Sobrino’s methodological approach is the recognition that theology is 
never value neutral, the interest and cultural situation of the theologian shapes the 
resulting theological analysis and has both practical and ethical implications.138  The 
experiences leading to theological inquiry, the purpose of theology, and epistemological 
issues are all affected by the context in which theology is done.  Sobrino is intent on 
delineating the differences between a European approach to theology and the approach to 
theology of Latin America because of the very different historical situations.  
 According to Sobrino, the quest for meaning drives theology in Europe and 
therefore European theology explores questions of meaning and how to understand 
rationally the existence of God in a world of suffering.  European theology therefore 
relies on philosophy as a tool for the rational understanding of faith.  In Latin America, 
however, the context for theology is the experience of poverty, oppression, and wide 
spread suffering.  The questions asked are not about the meaning of life but how to find, 
protect and nurture life in the midst of a situation that leads to death.  The problem in 
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Latin America is not the atheist but the non-person.  Liberation theology does not seek so 
much to provide a rational basis for belief but to transform historical situation filled with 
human suffering.  Liberation theologians therefore appeal to the social sciences rather 
than philosophy as a tool for expressing a transforming faith.139   
 A second difference in the theological approaches of European and Latin 
American theologies lies in the relationship between theory and praxis.  In Europe 
theology is intent on promulgating a set of truths that can be understood and believed and 
then acted upon.  Ethical action follows correct belief.  Liberation theology, however, 
holds ethical action, liberating action on behalf of the oppressed as primary and believes 
that it is through this action that theological truth will be understood and then 
expressed.140 
 In liberation theology, theological truth comes through transforming action on 
behalf of the suffering and oppressed.  Therefore, the root of knowledge of God is not 
wonder leading to analogy rather the root of knowledge of God is suffering and 
knowledge of God is dialectical.  Knowledge of God springs from contradiction not 
similarity.  This epistemological break is rooted in Scripture’s testimony to a crucified 
God.141  The theology of the cross is foundational even in Sobrino’s earliest theology.  It 
becomes very personal for him, however, when six of his fellow priests, a cook and her 
daughter were murdered in his community at Central American University in 1989.  
Sobrino was attending a conference in Bangkok when the murders occurred.  In 
discussing the importance of speaking of the God of the crucified Jesus in light of the 
experience of the people who continue to be crucified today, Sobrino writes, 
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I think there is no substitute for calling this God “the crucified God.”  
Allow me to say this with a very personal experience.  On 16 November 
1989, when the Jesuits of the Central American University were murdered 
outside their house, the body of Juan Ramon Moreno was dragged inside 
the residence into one of the rooms, mine.  In the movement one book 
from the bookcase in the room fell on to the floor and became soaked in 
Juan Ramon’s book.  That book was The Crucified God.  It is a symbol, of 
course, but it expresses the themes of this chapter, God’s real participation 
in the passion of the world.142 
 
Sobrino’s Theology of the Cross 
 Sobrino opens his book, Jesus the Liberator, with a discussion of the choice of 
title for his book.  In that discussion, he points out that particularly in Latin America it is 
only through faith that one applies the title “liberator” to Jesus.  Historical reality points 
instead to Christ crucified.  This dialectical tension between faith and reality expresses 
the heart of Sobrino’s theology of the cross.143  This theology does not bypass reality but 
faces that reality with the hope that springs from the love of God revealed in the cross of 
the crucified Christ.     
 For Sobrino, Christology is the vital, essential center for understanding the love of 
God revealed in the cross of the crucified Christ.  While Sobrino’s approach to 
Christology is through the historical Jesus (Christology from below) he recognizes that in 
Jesus, God is revealed.  When speaking of the scandal of the cross, Sobrino writes, “And 
it is a scandal in the highest degree because the one who died on the cross was Jesus, the 
person who is recognized in faith as the Son of God and as God.”144  He points out that 
the New Testament makes an unprecedented claim that through the life and cross of 
Jesus, God’s saving love for human beings is expressed and becomes real.   Furthermore, 
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the change in the relationship between human beings and God that is rooted in the cross 
of the crucified Christ is a change that is initiated by God.  Sobrino writes, “Jesus did not 
make God change; Jesus is the historical sacrament in which God expresses his 
irrevocable saving change toward us.”145   
 The centrality of Christ for Sobrino is clearly seen in his discussion of the term 
“Christ” as a “limit-theme” around which everything vital about human existence 
revolves: “transcendence, liberation, love, truth, justice, the sinfulness of the world, and 
the meaning of history.”146  Sobrino points out that these concepts, transcendence, 
liberation, love, etc. are not known intuitively and therefore knowledge and 
understanding of these concepts cannot be isolated from the path one takes in seeking to 
understand them.147  It is for this reason that Sobrino expresses hesitancy about the 
impact that the conciliar dogmatic definitions of Christ, particularly that of Chalcedon, 
have had on Christology.  Sobrino recognizes that the Christological definition of 
Chalcedon should be highly valued because it “expresses the ultimate mystery of Christ 
and the ultimate structure of reality.”148   He writes,  
If Christ is like this, then reality too can be understood as the presence of 
transcendence in history, each with the proper identity and autonomy, 
without mixture or separation, by which I mean without the reductionisms 
that impoverish both, to which human beings are so prone.149 
 
He objects to the use of this dogmatic definition of Christ as a starting point for 
Christology however for several important reasons.  First, Christological dogmas are not 
the beginning of Christology but are the result of prior knowledge of Jesus Christ given 
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in scripture.  Second, the formula of Chalcedon is a limited expression because it is based 
in only one philosophical understanding of the world, a Greek understanding.  This 
limitation is seen in the fact that Jesus is identified with the logos rather than identified by 
his relationship to the Father which is the primary way he is identified in scripture.  
Finally, Chalcedon states that Jesus is of two natures, divine and human, but Sobrino 
argues that knowledge of divinity and humanity only comes through Christ.  The dogma 
presupposes that we can understand divinity and humanity without looking at Jesus.  
Sobrino argues that the use of this dogma as a starting point for Christology becomes 
dangerous when the concepts of divinity and humanity are universalized and separated 
from the historical reality of Jesus of Nazareth.  For Sobrino, the path to knowledge of 
these concepts must follow the path of the historical Jesus.  It is in following the path of 
Jesus that one comes to knowledge about the meaning of the love of God revealed on the 
cross of the crucified Christ.150   
 For that reason, Sobrino describes his path to understanding the meaning of the                               
cross in Jesus the Liberator as a “historical-theological reading of the Christ who is Jesus 
of Nazareth.”151  It is the totality of Jesus the Christ that provides the content and 
meaning of Christology.  In setting out the life of Jesus in three parts, his service to the 
kingdom, his relationship to God-the Father, and his death on the cross, Sobrino 
emphasizes Jesus’ relational identity.152 
 Sobrino asserts that in Greek philosophy the basic understanding of a person is 
that a person is a rational animal.  This understanding has survived and influenced 
modern philosophical understandings of subjectivity so that a person is defined by self-
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possession and a person’s identity can be ascertained through knowledge of what the 
person thinks of him or herself.  Sobrino points to a different understanding of human 
personhood rooted in trinitarian thinking and traceable to Augustine and Richard of St. 
Victor.  According to this view, a person is defined relationally and his or her identity can 
be ascertained by examining who the person surrenders to and how that person lives that 
surrender.153  Sobrino argues that a biblical view of the human person focuses not on self-
possession but on the faith relationship of the person to God and his/her actions in the 
world resulting from that faith relationship.154  In a biblical understanding of the human 
person, a person is determined not by self-possession but by self-surrender.  According to 
Sobrino, to know who Jesus is depends on exploring his relational identity, an identity 
that involves Jesus’ vertical relationship to God the Father and his horizontal relationship 
to the kingdom as he lives out his faith relationship to God the Father in obedience to his 
mission.155  
 Sobrino argues that the essence of Jesus’ person is constituted by his relationship 
to the Father.  That relationship is characterized by Jesus’ self-surrender to the Father in 
faith.156  Sobrino identifies faith not as possession of God and his kingdom but as the 
constant seeking after God and his kingdom in the midst of concrete historical 
situations.157  This definition of faith allows Sobrino to posit a dynamic, evolutionary 
view of Jesus’ Sonship.  He writes, “Thus we can claim that Jesus becomes the Son of 
God rather than that he simply is the Son of God.”158  Sobrino argues that temptation and 
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ignorance are an essential part of a faith journey and highlights the temptation and 
ignorance that is described in the Gospel accounts of Jesus’ life.  He asserts that what is 
unique about Jesus is his total trust and utter abandonment to the Father in the midst of 
temptation, ignorance, and concrete historical situations in which sin seemed to have 
more power than God.  Sobrino points out that the New Testament describes Jesus as the 
Son and he therefore argues that Jesus does not reveal the Father, but reveals the Son and 
the way of being the Son.159  Because Jesus’ relationship to his Father involves his 
obedience to his mission, understanding the relational identity of Jesus cannot be isolated 
from an exploration of his relationship to the kingdom of God. 
 According to Sobrino, the historical mission of Jesus is to work in service of the 
kingdom of God.  Sobrino points out several important considerations in regard to Jesus’ 
relationship to the kingdom.  First, Jesus did not preach about himself but about the 
kingdom.  Second, just as Jesus’ relationship to the Father is unique, his relation to the 
kingdom is as well.  Jesus is aware of the fact that in and through his own person the 
kingdom of God is drawing near and is bold enough to assert that ultimate salvation is 
determined by the stance a person adopts toward Jesus’ own person.  Finally, that stance 
involves obedience and discipleship to Jesus.160   
 Sobrino emphasizes the eschatological nature of the kingdom and points to crisis 
as a central component of eschatology.  Crisis as a central component of the 
eschatological nature of the kingdom involves a tension between the temporal and the 
transcendent dimensions of the kingdom.  Jesus works, and calls his disciples to work 
toward fashioning the kingdom but at the same time recognizes that the kingdom comes 
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about through grace, through God’s drawing near and is ultimately a mystery.  Sobrino 
claims that because the kingdom is eschatological and involves a crisis, discipleship 
involves conversion.  The disciples of Jesus are called to make a decision for Jesus, a 
decision that is not in continuity with life as they know it.  They leave behind life as they 
know it and live in a new way.  That way involves working toward liberation.161  
 Sobrino prefers the word liberation to salvation in describing the work of Jesus 
and the disciples that follow him.  Implicit in his use of the word liberation is an 
emphasis on transformation of the temporal world as an essential aspect of discipleship 
and a movement beyond an otherworldly individualistic piety that has at times been 
associated with the use of the word salvation.  Liberation, he argues is a word that is 
correlated to oppression.162  Sobrino’s use of the word liberation grows out of his 
understanding of sin.   
 Sobrino argues that Jesus understood sin as having both a personal and a social 
dimension.  Sin is rooted in the heart of the human person and results in securing oneself 
over against God.  This is the personal dimension of sin.  This personal dimension of sin, 
the sin of not yielding to God, results in misuse of power toward neighbor so sin has a 
collective and social nature that manifests itself in unjust structures.163  Sobrino describes 
sin as,  
the willingness to offer anything and everything to God (ritual services, 
tithes, ascetic practices, and so forth) except one’s own security.  The God 
who is coming soon is rejected precisely because he is coming as a future 
that we cannot control, because God therefore calls into question the only 
thing that real sinners are not disposed to give up—their own security; and 
the real sinner is typified by the Pharisee and the person with power.164 
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  For Sobrino, sin involves the misuse of power.  This misuse of power results in 
two identifiable groups of people, the oppressors and the oppressed.  Sin affects each of 
these groups differently and consequently conversion calls each group to different actions 
of faith.  The oppressed are called to trust in God despite the lack of evidence of God’s 
active presence in the world.  The oppressors are called to use their power to eradicate the 
sinful structures that lead to oppression and death.165  Sin then is not simply something 
that must be pardoned but a power that must be eradicated.166  Sobrino’s use of the word 
liberation, therefore, points to recognition of the social and structural dimensions of sin 
and the need for transforming action resulting from converted lives lived out in love of 
God and love of neighbor. 
 Sobrino emphasizes that Jesus’ mission is lived out in the midst of concrete, 
historical reality, a reality that is structured by sin.  Jesus’ work toward liberation 
therefore is met with opposition and conflict.  He refers to this opposition as the anti-
kingdom.  Sobrino notes that the two poles of the relational identity of Jesus, his 
relationship to God the Father and his relationship to his mission, are continually 
changing and unfolding as Jesus lives out his life of faith.  He does not possess God but 
remains in relationship to God as he encounters the power of sin in the world.  Relying 
mainly on the Gospel of Mark,167 Sobrino posits two movements in the life of Jesus 
separated by what he refers to as the Galilean crisis.168  The first movement in Jesus’ life 
(Mk 1-7) is characterized by Jesus’ experience of the active, close, imminent presence of 
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God resulting in Jesus’ power to heal, call followers, and announce the arrival of the 
kingdom through his person.  According to Sobrino, Jesus does not introduce a new 
concept of God in this part of his ministry.  Jesus’ understanding of God and of his 
mission is in continuity with the orthodoxy of his day.169  The second movement begins 
in Jesus’ separation from the Pharisees (Mk 8:13), the misunderstanding of the disciples 
as a group and Peter particularly (Mk 8:21, 33), and Jesus’ realization that suffering and 
death are now part of his mission (Mk 8:31; 9:30; 10:32).  This second movement 
culminates in Jesus’ death on the cross.  In this second movement, Jesus realizes that he 
is no longer called to eradicate sin but to bear it.  He is no longer called to use his power 
to bring about the kingdom, but to sacrifice all that he is for the sake of the kingdom.  His 
relationship with God in this second movement is characterized by darkness, absence, 
and the sense of abandonment.  Suffering rather than power becomes the means of access 
to God.  Jesus’ relationship with the Father remains one of open, complete trust but that 
trust becomes trust against trust, trust without evidence, trust in darkness, trust that does 
not have rational content.170   
 According to Sobrino, this second movement in Jesus’ history reveals that the 
power that mediates God is the power of suffering love.  The fullest expression of this 
love is revealed on the cross of Jesus Christ.171  Understanding the suffering love of God 
revealed on the cross, however, cannot be separated from the history of Jesus’ 
relationship to the Father and to the kingdom.  Sobrino writes, “It is a conviction derived 
from accumulated historical experience that love has to go through suffering.”172   The 
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suffering of Jesus begins with incarnation.  God’s love expressed through the incarnation 
of Jesus is a love that goes through suffering.  According to Sobrino, incarnation 
introduces becoming and the future as modes of God’s being.173  Associating God with 
becoming, having a future, with suffering is revolutionary and new.  Sobrino notes that 
the cross of Jesus when understood against the backdrop of the whole of his life leads to a 
revolution in our understanding of God, a revolution that affects Christianity on both a 
theoretical and practical level.174   
 Sobrino begins his discussion of the theology of the cross by pointing out two 
obstacles in the way of grasping the meaning of the cross.  The first danger lies in 
isolating the cross from the concrete history of Jesus.  The second lies in isolating the 
cross from God.175  If one maintains the connection between the cross, Jesus’ history and 
what the cross reveals about God, a new concept of God will emerge.  Sobrino points out, 
however that allowing revelation to lead toward a new concept of God is often resisted.  
He demonstrates this fact by pointing to the difficulty that has existed historically in 
maintaining the scandal of the cross.  He notes that even in the New Testament itself, 
there is a movement away from the raw sense of abandonment explicit in Mark’s gospel.  
Sobrino claims that the reason for the difficulty in maintaining the scandal of the cross is 
that it transforms our questions and ideas of God.176 
 Sobrino finds it extraordinary that Mark’s anti-triumphant gospel was written 
down and included in the canon.  As the first gospel written, Sobrino finds it to be “the 
most adequate” of the four gospels.  He writes, “Mark’s account seems to me, objectively 
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and systematically, the most adequate because it conveys better than others the really 
tragic aspect of Jesus’ death, its radical discontinuity with his life.”177  This discontinuity 
is expressed in the fact that on the cross there is no sign of the nearness of the kingdom, 
no indication that Jesus is victorious in defeating the anti-kingdom, and most importantly 
there is a discontinuity between the concept of God Jesus proclaims in his life and 
ministry, a concept best identified by Jesus’ reference to God as a kind and merciful 
father, and his sense of God’s absence on the cross. While Sobrino admits it is impossible 
to know with certainty Jesus’ relationship to the Father when he dies, nevertheless Jesus’ 
death, as it is depicted in the Gospels, shows more desolation than consolation.178 
 Sobrino points out the difficulty that arises in relating God to the cross of Jesus is 
that presuppositions about God are questioned.  Sobrino states, “knowing God always 
presupposes, in one way or another, relating God to something positive.”179  Yet Sobrino 
also points out that “according to scripture, we know God through what God does and 
says in history.”180  If both these statements are true then the cross raises serious 
theological questions.  Sobrino points to a series of questions raised by the cross.  Why, 
on the cross, does sin appear to have greater power than God?   What does the cross say 
about what God does about suffering?  How do inactivity, silence and withdrawal reveal 
anything about God?181 
 Sobrino notes that theological attempts to explain the relationship of God to 
suffering usually take two different approaches.  In the first approach, it is assumed that 
God does not and cannot suffer; in which case the problem of God’s suffering is ignored.  
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In the second approach, God’s suffering is taken seriously and raised to the level of a 
scandal.182  Sobrino argues that both approaches are too extreme.  Sobrino praises the 
theology of Moltmann for articulating a relationship between God and suffering that does 
not look to God as a solution to suffering but rather sees suffering as a means for 
knowledge of God.  Yet, he criticizes Moltmann and Luther as well for taking the scandal 
of Jesus’ abandonment on the cross too far.  Noting Luther’s statement, “Nemo contra 
Deum nisi Deus ipse,”183 and that Moltmann indicates a “split within God and a breach 
between the Father and the Son,”184 Sobrino argues that this is conceptual extremism.  
Instead, Sobrino describes God’s suffering on the cross is a participation in the suffering 
of Jesus.  God suffers by being Jesus’ “non-active and silent witness.”185    
  If God’s silence and inactivity are as Sobrino states, “the negative way that the 
cross affects God himself,”186 then one has to struggle with what that silence and 
inactivity reveal about God.  Sobrino points to the New Testament’s explanation that on 
the cross it is God’s love that is revealed.187  This means that God’s inactivity and silence 
are God’s expression of love for human beings.  God’s love is seen in God’s surrender of 
what was most precious to God, his son.  This surrender of the son indicates that there is 
no limit to God’s love for human beings.188   
 Sobrino insists that the cross is the consequence of God’s original choice for 
incarnation.  In the incarnation, God chooses to draw near to human beings in love and on 
the cross God does not escape that choice even though remaining in loving solidarity 
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causes God to suffer.  Sobrino claims that the title “Crucified God” can be equated with 
the title “God of Solidarity.”  He argues that solidarity is powerful.  God’s power lies in 
God’s suffering love on behalf of the oppressed and lowly in the world.  Sobrino writes,  
 What does Jesus’ cross really say?  It says that God has irrevocably 
drawn near to this world, that he is a God “with us” and a God “for us.”  
And to say this with the maximum clarity he lets himself be a God “at our 
mercy.”189     
 
 While Sobrino articulates a theology of the cross that emphasizes God’s power 
revealed in apparent weakness and knowledge of God forged in suffering, he guards 
against the conceptual extremism he accuses Moltmann and Luther of by pointing to 
other important revelatory moments in Scripture.  God is reveled in creation in Genesis, 
liberation in Exodus, justice in the prophets, and silence in Job.  Sobrino argues that it is a 
mistake to make any of these moments absolute or to try to systematize them.  Instead, 
the revelation inherent in each event should be appreciated as one aspect of the great 
mystery that is God.190    
 Another important revelatory event Sobrino points to is the resurrection of Jesus. 
Sobrino emphasizes the connection between cross and resurrection and with that 
connection in mind, claims that the resurrection confirms two truths.  It confirms that the 
way of Jesus is the true way and it confirms that the love of God revealed on the cross, 
love in solidarity, suffering love has real power.  Sobrino writes, “Without the 
resurrection, love would not be authentic power; without the cross the power would not 
be love.”191   
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 The revelation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ affects Christianity not only on 
a theoretical level but on a practical level as well.  Sobrino argues that the resurrection 
reveals that Jesus’ way to God is the true way.  Resurrection hope, he argues, is not a 
general hope, but an apocalyptic one, a hope for justice in an unredeemed world.  
Following Jesus then involves living life on behalf of the little ones.192  Sobrino points to 
the example of Oscar Romero.  Sobrino states that if there is any doubt about the power 
of solidarity, one need only look at the gratitude and enthusiasm of the poor in El 
Salvador when Archbishop Romero was offered personal protection from the Salvadoran 
government but refused it stating: “The shepherd does not want protection when his flock 
is denied it.”193  According to Sobrino, those words were accepted by the people as a 
clear expression of Romero’s love for them.194 He refers to a statement made by Ignacio 
Ellacuria who said, “In Monsignor Romero, God passed through El Salvador.”195   
 Sobrino points to the example of Romero in order to illustrate the practical affects 
of a theology of the cross.  Romero is not only an example of someone who followed 
Jesus by living a life of solidarity for the poor but Romero also provides an example of 
someone for whom the poor, suffering, and oppressed became the access for communion 
with God.  Sobrino relates a story that when Archbishop Romero addressed a group of 
terrorized peasants who had survived a massacre he said, “You are the image of the 
pierced savior.”196  Sobrino closes his book, Jesus the Liberator, with a chapter entitled, 
“The Crucified People.”  His claim is that the people of El Salvador, and all the worlds 
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suffering and oppressed are the body of Christ on earth, that the poor are “the privileged 
locale of access to God.”197   Following the way of Jesus involves transforming action for 
the most oppressed in this world.  It is through this action that one will come into 
communion with God.   
 Sobrino claims that human sorrow is aroused when contemplating the suffering of 
God on the cross.  Sorrow is also the attitude that leads one to recognize God in all the 
crucified people of history, to walk compassionately along side of them and to work to 
alleviate the causes of their suffering.198  Sorrow, rather than wonder, or as Sobrino 
claims, as “a highly qualified sort of wonder” is the means of access of God.199  For this 
reason, Sobrino claims, “In reflecting on God and the cross, whether one knows it or not, 
one is saying which God one believes in, one is setting out one’s vision of history and 
human beings.”200  Recognizing God on the cross, understanding the poor and oppressed 
as the “privileged locale of access to God” unmasks idols and therefore leads to conflict.  
Discussing the causes of Jesus’ death, Sobrino writes, “To say Jesus died because of 
God’s design is, in my opinion, to say much too little.  We do much better to say that 
Jesus died because he chose to bear faithful witness to God right to the end in a situation 
where people really wanted a very different type of God.”201  Sobrino insists that the 
situation is not different for Jesus’ disciples in today’s world.  Walking compassionately 
and in solidarity for the world’s poor and oppressed will lead to conflict because people 
are still looking for a very different type of God.  Hope in the world continues to lie in 
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human beings living lives centered on love of a particular God, the crucified God, and 
love of neighbor, lives intent on fashioning the kingdom while at the same time awaiting 
its arrival in grace. 
Strengths and Weaknesses of Sobrino’s Theology of the Cross 
 Critiques of Moltmann’s theology of the cross centered on the relationship 
between God and suffering that Moltmann articulates.202  Despite the fact that Sobrino’s 
concept of the relationship between God and suffering is very similar to Moltmann’s, 
there is scanty reference to the relationship between God and suffering in critiques of 
Sobrino’s theology.  Instead, critiques of Sobrino shift to concerns about his Christology.  
Sobrino is criticized for his selectivity of the Gospel texts in constructing the life of the 
“historical Jesus,” for his “weak” view of sin, and for having an inadequate articulation of 
the uniqueness and divinity of Christ.203  In part, the shift to Christology in critiques of 
Sobrino’s theology is the logical outcome of Sobrino’s stated methodology, which is to 
follow the way of Jesus as the way to knowledge of God.  Getting lost however, in 
critiquing Sobrino’s Christology is to miss the forest for the trees.  While Sobrino claims 
to come to knowledge of God through following the way of Jesus of Nazareth, his 
understanding of the relationship between God and suffering clearly influences his 
analysis of that path.  In other words, Sobrino’s concept of God and Sobrino’s experience 
of God in the midst of a pastoral ministry that takes place in the context of poverty and 
oppression exerts a tremendous influence on his Christology.    
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 In his article, “Christology from the Underside of History: The Case of Jon 
Sobrino,” Georges De Schrijver notes two scholars who criticize Sobrino for his 
selectivity of biblical texts in constructing his understanding of the history of Jesus.  
Schrijver notes that in the article, “Jesus from the Other Side of History: Christology in 
Latin America,” Michael Cook claims that Sobrino’s approach is not historical but 
kerygmatic and lists three reasons that Cook uses to support that claim.  Cook’s three 
reasons as reported by Schrijver are:  Sobrino’s choice to follow mainly Mark’s gospel, 
his emphasis on the “Galilean crises” and his description of the praxis of Jesus, a 
description that is suspiciously similar to the praxis needs of Latin America.204  Schrijver 
also points to John P. Meier’s further criticism of Sobrino’s selectivity of biblical texts.  
Schrijver reports that Meier charges that while Sobrino claims to base his work on the 
“historical Jesus” his use of the biblical text is much more influenced by hermeneutics 
than by exegesis.  Meier supports his argument by pointing to Sobrino’s references, 
noting that the leading authors Sobrino points to are Rahner, Pannenberg, and Bultmann, 
with very few references to German exegetes.205 
 It has already been noted in this paper that Sobrino claims to find Mark’s gospel 
the most “adequate” in reporting the death of Jesus and that Sobrino draws the life of  
Jesus mainly from the gospel of Mark concentrating on the Galilean Crises as a pivotal 
point in Jesus’ life.206  Despite Meier’s charge that Sobrino does not rely on Biblical 
exegetes, Sobrino does list the works of several biblical scholars he consulted in making 
this choice and he quotes as support the work of Leon-Dufour.207  Once Sobrino 
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discusses the primacy of Mark’s gospel, however he does not entertain any challenge or 
question from other gospel depictions of the life and death of Jesus.  He makes his case 
for Mark’s version as primary and from that point on draws his understanding of Jesus 
from this one gospel narrative.  Sobrino’s exclusive use of Mark’s gospel for Jesus’ life is 
largely not the result of exegesis but springs from his explicitly stated methodology.  
Sobrino begins his “historical-theological” view of Jesus’ life by stating that the 
methodology of the four gospel writers was two-fold.  Each writer began with faith in 
Jesus as the Christ derived from the resurrection of Jesus, and then interpreted Jesus’ life 
in light of the needs, concerns and questions of the various communities they were 
addressing.  Sobrino explicitly states that this is the methodology he intends to follow.  
Unfortunately, Sobrino defends his choice of Mark’s gospel by appealing to exegesis.  He 
could have made a better argument for the exclusive use of Mark’s gospel by claiming 
that this gospel presented a view of the life and death of Jesus that most adequately 
addressed the needs, concerns, and questions of his explicitly stated context, the context 
of Latin America.   
 In an article, “Old Wine in New Skins? Jon Sobrino’s Liberation Christology,” 
Douglas McCready claims that the faults in Sobrino’s Christology can be attributed to his 
“weak” view of sin.  McCready charges that Sobrino emphasizes the external reality of 
oppression and does not address its internal dimensions.  McCready writes,  
Put plainly, Sobrino has a superficial, external understanding of sin.  The 
problem is “out there, it’s them, in society.”  Nowhere does he say, “I’m 
part of the problem because I’m a sinner in bondage to my own sinful 
nature (or even my own sinful practice).”  But this is what the Bible says 
about human sin.  Biblically, sin is an evil at the root of each individual 
human existence placing the person in opposition to—better, in rebellion 
against—God.  Sin is also an external reality that oppresses, but the 
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biblical order is personal, than social, because sin against God issues forth 
in sin against others.208 
 
 In this critique, McCready reveals a “weak” read of Sobrino’s understanding of 
sin.  A careful reading of Sobrino reveals that he views sin in exactly the way McCready 
claims is biblically correct.  Sobrino states that sin begins in the individual person 
securing him or herself over/against God, holding onto his or her own power, not yielding 
to God and then using that power over/against neighbor.209  Once again, it is Sobrino’s 
explicitly stated context for doing Christology, from the point of the victims of 
oppression in Latin America, which dictates his emphasis on the external, structural 
dimensions of sin.  Despite this emphasis in his work however, it is wrong to claim that 
he has a “weak” view of sin.  In fact Sobrino specifically states that sin leads to death and 
that sin is not simply something that must be pardoned but a power that must be 
eradicated.210 
 McCready continues his argument stating that because of Sobrino’s weak view of 
sin, he has a correspondingly weak Christology.  McCready argues that Sobrino’s 
avoidance of ontological language and his emphasis on function verses essence are 
problematic.  McCready claims that while Sobrino explicitly excludes Adoptionism from 
his Christology, he nevertheless makes statements that imply an Adoptionist 
understanding of Christ.211  While McCready’s statements concerning Sobrino’s view of 
sin do not adequately consider the depth of Sobrino’s analysis of sin, his statements 
concerning Sobrino’s Christology have some legitimacy. 
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 Objecting to the ontological language of the conciliar dogmatic definitions of 
Christ, Sobrino emphasizes Jesus’ relational identity.  Emphasizing the relational identity 
of Jesus is valuable.  Sobrino’s emphasis on Jesus’ relational identity takes very seriously 
the humanity of Jesus and his struggle to live in the context of sin.  It allows one to relate 
to Jesus, to understand the emphasis on the kingdom and its continued relevance, and it 
calls forth genuine discipleship.  Nevertheless, the complete lack of ontological language 
in regard to Jesus in Sobrino’s work does lead to confusion about the unique identity and 
the divinity of Jesus.  When Sobrino writes, “Thus we can claim that Jesus becomes the 
Son of God rather than that he simply is the Son of God,”212 it is difficult to know exactly 
what he means by this and it is understandable that some may find traces of Adoptionism 
in his Christology. 
 McCready is not alone in this critique of Sobrino’s Christology.  On November 
26, 2006, the Congregation for the Doctrine of Faith issued a Notification on the Works of 
Father Jon Sobrino, SJ.  The notification makes the claim that in two of his books, Jesus 
the Liberator and Christ the Liberator, Sobrino makes “certain propositions which are 
not in conformity with the doctrine of the Church.”213   The notification lists six areas of 
Sobrino’s work that contain errors: his methodology, Christ’s divinity, the Incarnation, 
Jesus’ relation to the Kingdom of God, Jesus’ self-consciousness, and the salvific value 
of his death.214  Five of the six areas listed as problematic have to do with Sobrino’s 
Christology. 
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 Before moving into a discussion of the council’s assessment of Sobrino’s 
Christology, however, it is necessary to call attention to the methodology of the CDF in 
assessing Sobrino’s work.  Early in the notification the CDF states, “The Congregation 
does not intend to judge the subjective intentions of the Author.”215 This statement is 
interesting, because Sobrino is upfront about his intentions in the early pages of all of his 
books.  In Sobrino’s book, Jesus the Liberator, he writes, “The purpose of this 
Christology is to put forward the truth of Christ from the standpoint of liberation, and this 
means that it follow the lines I have set out some years ago.”216  In referring to “the lines 
I have set out some years ago,” Sobrino refers to his book, Christology at the Crossroads, 
a book that is not included in the notification.  In the preface to the English edition of the 
book, Sobrino states, “The Christology presented in this book is meant to be ecclesial, 
historical, and Trinitarian.”217  In that same preface, Sobrino makes note of his own 
limitations.  He writes, 
 While these are the underlying intentions of this Christology, the 
author is also well aware of its deficiencies.  First of all, it is addressed to 
a specific group of Christians, to those who have seriously committed 
themselves to the process of liberation.  But while it is addressed to those 
Christians who have committed themselves to the cause of the masses, to 
the cause of the majority of Latin Americans, it does not offer an adequate 
analysis of the problems to be found in the Christology held by the 
majority of the population.  Nor does it provide a clear and direct 
expression of what the majority think about Jesus.218   
 
 
 The importance of noting the CDF’s hesitancy in regard to judging Sobrino’s 
intentions is that while they hesitate to judge his intentions, they summarize Sobrino’s 
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carefully argued positions and make subjective comments about what Sobrino intended to 
say.  For example, the notification states,  
Father Sobrino considers the dogmatic development of the first centuries 
of the Church including the great Councils to be ambiguous and even 
negative.  Although he does not deny the normative character of the 
dogmatic formulations, neither does he recognize in them any value 
except in the cultural milieu in which these formulations were 
developed.219   
 
There is no reference indicating where Sobrino made these negative evaluations of the 
dogmatic formulations.  This summary of his “thinking” on this matter is subjective not 
factual and does not take into consideration Sobrino’s carefully laid out discussion about 
the role of the councils in Christology.  As already noted in this paper, Sobrino does 
articulate what he considers to be limitations of the creeds as a starting point (my 
emphasis) for Christology.  He expresses a concern that if the dogmatic creedal 
definitions of Christ are expressed as universal truths but are disconnected from the 
history of Jesus of Nazareth written in the gospels, then these dogmas can be used to 
secure an abstract faith that is disconnected from genuine discipleship.  He also argues 
that the dogmatic definitions are not self-explanatory but are always in need of re-
interpretation in light of contemporary issues, understandings and questions.  The CDF’s 
summary of Sobrino’s position is a subjective characterization that contradicts Sobrino’s 
explicitly stated intent.  In an article critical of the notification of Sobrino, William P. 
Loewe states, “In part, at least, the congregation seems to be applying Murphy’s Law: if 
something can be read in a sense contrary to the faith, it will be, whether or not the author 
intended that reading or the context warrants it.”220 
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 Sobrino’s explicitly stated intent in putting forth a book on Christology should not 
go unrecognized.  His intent in writing a book on Christology from one specific, 
particular perspective is to offer new insights that both deepen understanding of 
traditional Christology and challenge some of its presuppositions that have allowed 
traditional Christologies to overlook the plight of the poor and oppressed.  Similarly, he 
explicitly claims that the creeds are normative, that he does not seek to overturn them but 
to recognize their limitations and reinterpret them in light of contemporary questions and 
philosophical understandings. If Sobrino’s stated intent is taken seriously, then the 
statements he makes about Jesus’ relational identity rather than being dangerous can be 
understood as insights to be considered in deepening perspectives on the mystery of Jesus 
Christ.  Furthermore, an evaluation of Sobrino’s Christology should include consideration 
of statements Sobrino makes that do indicate the unique identity and the divinity of 
Jesus.221 
 The one area that the CDF’s notification of Sobrino identifies as problematic 
outside of Christology is Sobrino’s methodology.  The CDF objects to Sobrino’s 
statements that the ecclesial “setting” for the Christology of Latin America is the “Church 
of the Poor.”  The CDF writes, “The ecclesial foundation of Christology may not be 
identified with ‘the Church of the poor’, but is found rather in the apostolic faith 
transmitted through the Church for all generations.”222  J. Matthew Ashley points out that 
the CDF chooses to use the phrase “foundation for Christology” which is quite different 
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than the choice of the phrase “setting for Christology” used by Sobrino.223  In several 
pages of argument, Sobrino states that while the texts about Christ are preserved and 
transmitted through the church, the transformation of lives through Christ is the primary 
setting for Christology.  Sobrino argues that in Latin America, this “real setting” is 
among the poor.  Sobrino argues that this is not an arbitrary choice but an essential choice 
because the poor “shed light” on Christology revealing new insights.224  Sobrino writes, 
It is said of the Servant of Yahweh that God has set him up as a light of 
the nations.  Pauline theology says that the crucified Christ is wisdom, and 
John’s theology says that we must fix our eyes on this man who was 
crucified.  If these expressions are not understood as purely rhetorical, 
they are saying that there is something in this crucified man that gives our 
intellect a light it does not obtain in other places.  This is exactly what I 
am trying to say about the world of the poor.225 
 
 
Sobrino is arguing that the world of the poor “sheds light” on the way we read 
scripture and understand tradition.  This light is the light of the theology of the cross.  It 
raises questions from the lived experience of pain and challenges our presuppositions 
about God.  Sobrino allows scripture and tradition read through the lens of the world of 
the poor to lead to new insights about the mystery of God and God’s relationship to 
suffering.  Sobrino’s theology offers a penetrating critique of Western theological 
tradition.  It is not surprising that Sobrino’s theology has led to conflict with the CDF.  
The conflict between the CDF and Sobrino is a conflict that illustrates the tension 
described by Walter Brueggemann as the tension between the majority and the minority 
voice, a tension that according to Brueggemann goes back to the formation of the Old 
Testament.  Brueggemann claims that the Old Testament provides a “common theology”, 
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but at the same time testifies to a crisis in that theology.  That crisis is given expression 
by the minority voice, a voice that embraces pain and through that embrace challenges 
the common theology of the majority voice. The crucial importance of the minority voice 
is expressed by Brueggemann.  He writes,  
Faith is against voicelessness, against a society in which speech 
about power and powerlessness is banished and in which social power is 
so concentrated that it need no longer listen and is no longer capable of 
hearing. …The primary critical function of the Bible is to keep the voice 
of hurt present in the public process.  That voice, so cherished and 
honored in the Bible, is the voice of the marginal, whose testimony is 
oddly transmitted to us in the canonical process, as the voice of God.226  
 
Sobrino’s theology is one of several contemporary theologies that give voice to the 
voiceless.  It is a valuable voice.  Sobrino insists that the lived reality of pain of the poor 
and oppressed of Latin America is a crucible for contemplating the mystery of God 
revealed on the cross of Jesus Christ, a mystery that will challenge our presuppositions 
and deepen our understanding of both God and humanity. 
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Chapter Four 
Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino in Conversation 
 
Both Moltmann and Sobrino view the cross of Jesus Christ as the most radical 
expression of God’s embrace of pain.  In Jesus’ cry of abandonment from the cross, they 
discern a question that remains open and unanswered evoking a crisis for all Christian 
theology.  That crisis revolves around the tension between the promises and purpose of 
God and the reality of the experience of suffering in the world.  Brueggemann discerns a 
similar crisis as central to Old Testament theology, a crisis that arises when the 
experience of suffering evokes questions and challenges for the covenantal theology, 
which is the dominant theology of the Old Testament.  In the contemporary world the 
questions raised from the depths of suffering have become more sharply focused and beg 
for a response.  A conversation between the Old Testament theology of God of 
Brueggemann and the theologies of the cross of Moltmann and Sobrino will deepen 
understanding of both the questions raised by suffering and a biblical response that resists 
resolution yet offers hope.   
 The theologies of Moltmann and Sobrino are focused on God’s entry into the 
world through the incarnation, life, death and resurrection of Jesus and lead to a notion of 
God drawn largely from God’s revelation on the cross of Jesus Christ.  This notion of 
God, drawn from the cross, involves the themes of hiddenness, absence, silence, and 
suffering.  The insights of Moltmann and Sobrino can therefore be challenged and 
strengthened by Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology of God, which recognizes the 
integral role the themes of hiddenness, absence, silence, and suffering play in Israel’s 
discernment of God and in the formation of Israel’s faith. 
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 Through summary analysis of the work of Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino, 
this chapter will bring into conversation notions of God drawn from Old Testament 
traditions with notions of God drawn from interpretations of the cross.  Included will be a 
discussion of the use of the Old Testament in the work of Moltmann and Sobrino, the 
questioning of presuppositions in their work that ignore Old Testament theology, and the 
enrichments that insights from Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology can provide. 
 
The Influence of Old Testament Theology on Moltmann’s Theology of the Cross 
 
 The most important influence that Old Testament theology exerts on Moltmann’s 
theology of the cross is as a model for his theological method.  Moltmann’s theological 
method is shaped by the process of formation that he sees operating in the formation of 
the Old Testament text.  In Theology of Hope, that formation is described as a process of 
struggle between tradition and new experience.  According to Moltmann, Israel’s 
tradition was formed in the preservation of events in which God’s promises were 
revealed.  These revelatory events provided the foundation for Israel’s traditions but 
because God’s promises pointed to the future, those traditions did not remain static.  As 
Israel encountered new experiences, questions of the tradition emerged.  Israel endured a 
process of struggle between traditional understandings of the promises and demands of 
God and the questioning that was generated by new experiences.  By allowing the 
questions, generated by new experiences to lead to a struggle with tradition, new insights 
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emerged, insights that lay dormant, undiscovered, powerfully hidden in the revelatory 
events preserved in Israel’s tradition.1   
 That same process of struggle is foundational for Moltmann’s theology of the 
cross in The Crucified God.  Moltmann begins with the contemporary questions raised by 
the loss of Christian identity and relevancy in Europe following World War II and allows 
those contemporary questions to lead to a struggle with the Christian tradition’s 
understanding of God’s promises and demands.  He reaches back to the Christian 
revelatory event of the incarnation, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ preserved in 
the New Testament writings.  He allows the contemporary problems of protest atheism 
and post-Christian humanism, responses to the questions raised by the massive suffering 
of the twentieth century, to lead to a struggle between contemporary experience and 
tradition from which emerges new insights that lay dormant, undiscovered and 
powerfully hidden in the revelatory event of the cross.2 
 Because Moltmann is re-reading the New Testament in light of contemporary 
experience, the question of God’s relationship to suffering and the interest of liberation 
from constricting and dangerous socio-political institutions are prominent in Moltmann’s 
analysis of the New Testament.  Jesus is viewed as a political figure confronting the 
socio-political environment created by the both the Jewish religious leadership and the 
Roman political leadership.3  Jesus addresses both the failure of these socio-political 
structures to prevent suffering and the complicity of the socio-political leaders in causing 
suffering.  Jesus is tried as a political rebel and a blasphemer.  Lying behind Jesus’ 
                                                 
1 Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology 
(London: SCM Press, 1967), 95-127; Don Schweitzer, “The Consistency of Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology,” 
Studies in Religion 22, no. 2 (1993): 198-199. 
2 Schweitzer, 203. 
3 Ibid. 
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historical trial is a trial of the God he proclaims.  The God Jesus proclaims challenges the 
God of the Jewish religious authorities and the gods of the Roman Empire.  Most 
importantly, Jesus is depicted as one who is abandoned by God.  Jesus’ abandonment by 
God on the cross is the Trinitarian event that reveals that God and suffering are not 
contradictory but that God is revealed in the midst of suffering.   
 While Moltmann’s approach to reading the New Testament is shaped by his 
understanding of the theological method that led to the formation of the Old Testament 
text, he fails to adequately address the theology of the Old Testament itself and its role 
both in forming Jesus’ understanding of God and in shaping the New Testament text.   
His reading of the issues that form the context for Jesus’ preaching and teaching are 
shaped more by contemporary issues than by the Old Testament theology in which that 
teaching and preaching is rooted.  His desire to see new revelation in Jesus informs his 
reading so that he assigns as novel to Jesus ideas that are imbedded deep within Israel’s 
tradition. Moltmann addresses the fact that eschatology is vital to understanding the 
theology of the cross but he draws the content used to inform that concept from 
contemporary theology and philosophy rather than from the Old Testament.  Finally, 
Moltmann’s presuppositions about the understanding of the law at the time of Jesus are 
read into the text and Israel’s understanding of the law is presented as a unified voice 
under the rubric of “legalism.”  This not only skews his understanding of New Testament 
theology but ignores the many voices and theologies that give the Old Testament its 
depth and texture.    
 Moltmann’s most explicit use of the biblical text is concentrated in two chapters 
of The Crucified God: “The Historical Trial of Jesus” and “The Eschatological Trial of 
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Jesus Christ.”4  Both of these chapters deal with the history of Jesus.  The first 
approaches the subject from a historical perspective, beginning with Jesus’ birth and 
following his life and ministry to his death on the cross.  The second approaches the 
subject from an eschatological perspective beginning with the hope in God’s promises 
generated by the resurrection of Jesus and looking backwards to Jesus’ trial and cross for 
the meaning of those events.5  Moltmann indicates that both approaches are needed for 
complete understanding of the meaning of the cross.  Moltmann’s re-reading of the New 
Testament in light of contemporary questions concentrates on the conflict between the 
God of Jesus and the God of the “guardians of the law.”6   Exploration of Moltmann’s 
depiction of this conflict reveals his problematic use of the Old Testament. 
 The conflict between Jesus and the “guardians of the law,” a conflict that results 
in the charge of blasphemy, dominates Moltmann’s discussion of Jesus’ way to the cross. 
Moltmann discusses several factors that contribute to the conflict between Jesus and the 
Jewish leadership: the authority claimed by Jesus, the contrast between Jesus’ claim to 
authority and his poverty, and Jesus’ notion concerning God’s freedom to show grace.  
Moltmann’s discussion of these three factors is influenced by his presuppositions about 
the understanding of the law at the time of Jesus.  
 In Moltmann’s discussion of Jesus’ claim to authority as a contributing factor in 
the conflict between Jesus and the Jewish religious authorities, he discusses both Jesus’ 
actions and his preaching.  Jesus’ actions, such as: healing on the Sabbath, eating with 
sinners, and forgiving sins, shows a freedom from the law, a freedom that is possible only 
                                                 
4Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God: The Cross of Christ as the Foundation and Criticism of Christian 
Theology (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1993), 112-145, 160-187. 
5 Ibid., 112-114. 
6 Moltmann uses this term to refer to the Jewish leadership throughout his discussion of the history of 
Jesus.  Ibid.,112-187. 
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if one considers himself to have an authority above the law.7  In addition, in his preaching 
Jesus sometimes claims an authority above the Law of Moses as he does in the Sermon 
on the Mount.8  Moltmann describes Jesus’ claim to authority as “above the limits of the 
contemporary understanding of the law” and as demonstrating “God’s eschatological law 
of grace.”9  He argues that through Jesus’ claim of authority, he ceases to be a prophet in 
the succession of Moses.10  Moltmann interprets the conflict caused by Jesus’ claim to 
authority in stark terms that move beyond the New Testament text and that emphasize a 
distinction between the God of judgment, represented by the “guardians of the law” and 
the God of grace, represented by Jesus.  He argues that Jesus’ claim to forgive sins 
“abolished the legal distinction between religious and secular, righteous and unrighteous, 
devout and sinful… and he revealed God in a different way from that in which he was 
understood in the law and the tradition and was perceived by the guardians of the law.”11  
For Moltmann, a presupposition is operating and dominates his discussion of Jesus’ 
history throughout these two chapters.  That presupposition is that there is a stark contrast 
between Old Testament theology interpreted legalistically by Jesus’ contemporaries and 
the theology of Jesus.  The dominance of this presupposition is evident here because even 
as Moltmann discusses the factor of Jesus’ authority, his presupposition regarding the 
contrasting theologies of the “guardians of the law” and Jesus becomes the interpretive 
lens for understanding Jesus’ claim to authority.  
 The conflict between Jesus and the Jewish religious authorities is deepened by a 
second factor, the contradiction between Jesus’ authoritative claims and the poverty that 
                                                 
7 Ibid., 128-129. 
8 The Gospel of Matthew, chapter 5. 
9Moltmann, The Crucified God, 128. 
10 Ibid. 
11 Ibid., 128-129. 
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Moltmann states “is characteristic of his whole appearance.” Moltmann describes this 
contradiction, 
The source of the contradiction is that he, a human being who was 
powerless, should anticipate the power of God as grace amongst the 
rejected and the powerless.  Through its association with his lowliness, his 
preaching was open to rejection.  Through its association with his claim 
for authority, his humanity could be refuted by casting him out and killing 
him.  The inner contradiction between his claim and his poverty is 
characteristic of his whole appearance.  Such a claim associated with such 
poverty was bound to be understood as a contradiction.12 
 
Again, in his discussion of Jesus’ poverty, Moltmann points to the power of God as grace 
and contrasts this with the God of judgment.13    
 While Jesus’ claim to authority and the contrast between that claim and his 
poverty are mentioned in Moltmann’s analysis as factors contributing to the conflict 
between Jesus and the Jewish authorities, it is the third factor that gets the greatest 
emphasis in Moltmann’s analysis of that conflict.  That factor centers around the issue of 
God’s freedom to show grace.  Moltmann argues that Jesus claims that God is free to 
show grace apart from the law while the “guardians of the law” are guilty of “legalism” 
and “codifying the will of God.”14   
 As Moltmann moves through his discussion of the conflict between Jesus and the 
Jewish leadership his rhetoric concerning the contrast in interpretation of the law between 
Jesus and the “guardians of the law” increases.  He begins this discussion by noting the 
differences between Jesus and John the Baptist that culminate in Jesus’ break from John 
and the beginning of his own ministry.  Moltmann notes that while both men claim that 
“the kingdom of God is at hand,” John points to judgment according to the law while 
                                                 
12 Ibid., 131. 
13 Ibid., 131. 
14 Ibid., 132. 
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Jesus points to the unconditional and free grace of God to the unrighteous.15    After 
moving through Jesus’ preaching and healing ministry and the increasing conflict 
between him and the guardians of the law Moltmann writes, “Consequently, his 
preaching set men free from the legalism with which they sought to bring themselves into 
accordance with the God of vengeance.”16   By the time he gets to the description of 
Jesus’ death by crucifixion he writes, “Does inhuman legalism triumph over the crucified 
Christ, or does God’s law of grace triumph over works of the law and of power?”17  
These statements indicate that the Jewish tradition at the time of Jesus was legalistic, 
claimed to have “codified the will of God,” and served a “God of vengeance.”  Jesus is 
depicted in absolute contrast to the Jewish faith of his time rather than as a person 
springing from that faith tradition.  Moltmann does not recognize that while Jesus differs 
from that tradition in some important ways he also makes statements that indicate 
continuity with the Jewish tradition of his time.18  
 Moltmann’s depiction of the conflict between Jesus and the religious authorities is 
marred by two interpretive errors.  The first is that he reduces the complexity of the Old 
Testament and its interpretation by Jesus’ contemporaries to a unified view that revolves 
around a retributive justice theme.  The second has already been mentioned, Moltmann’s 
presupposition that there is a stark contrast between Old Testament theology interpreted 
legalistically by Jesus’ contemporaries and the theology of Jesus.  
                                                 
15 Ibid., 128-129. 
16 Emphasis mine.  Ibid., 143. 
17 Ibid., 175. 
18 In the article, “Torah, Urzeit, Endzeit,” Dale Allison presents scriptural statements attributed to Jesus.  
Some show Jesus to be radical in his interpretation of the law.  Others show Jesus to be conservative in his 
interpretation of the law.  Dale C. Allison, “Torah, Urzeit, Endzeit,” in Resurrecting Jesus: The Earliest 
Christian Tradition and Its Interpreters (New York: T & T Clark, 2005), 149-197. 
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 Moltmann’s error of reducing the complexity of the Old Testament and its 
interpretation by Jesus’ contemporaries to a unified view that revolves around a 
retributive justice theme can be demonstrated through exploration of Moltmann’s 
discussion of the role of “figures of messianic hope.” Moltmann writes,  
They all represented the victory of the righteousness of God according to 
the law with the exaltation of the righteous who suffer injustice on earth, 
and the putting to shame of the lawless and godless.  The splendor of all 
their hopes was merely a reflection of the mighty and glorified Torah at 
the end of history.19  
 
 In this statement, Moltmann is asserting that there is a unified messianic hope in 
Israel and that hope involves the exaltation of the righteous and the putting to shame of 
the lawless.  A careful study of the many messianic hopes in Judaism at the time of Jesus 
however reveals many expectations for the messianic figure ranging from a future 
political and spiritual leader to a prophet, a teacher or an eschatological priest.  In the 
book, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is, N.T. Wright states, 
“It is important to recognize from the start that there was no single unified concept of the 
Messiah in the first century.”20  Wright goes on to list some of the messianic hopes of 
Israel: “the hope for liberation, for the end of exile, for the defeat of evil, for Yahweh to 
return to Zion.”21  In an important text from Qumran, 4Q521, a discussion of the Messiah 
includes mention of releasing captives, giving sight to the blind, healing the wounded, 
giving life to the dead, preaching good news to the poor, leading those who had been cast 
out, and enriching the hungry.  The obvious background of this text is Isaiah 61, the same 
                                                 
19 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 129. 
20 N.T. Wright, The Challenge of Jesus: Rediscovering Who Jesus Was and Is (Downers Grove, Illinois: 
Intervarsity Press, 1999), 75. 
21 Ibid., 76. 
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text Jesus reads in the temple at the beginning of his ministry in Luke’s gospel.22  
Moltmann’s presentation of the messianic hopes in Israel at the time of Jesus as a unified 
voice centered around a notion of retributive justice is characteristic of his problematic 
use of Old Testament theology throughout his re-reading of the history of Jesus. 
 The Second major problem in Moltmann’s depiction of the conflict between Jesus 
and the Jewish religious authorities is his presupposition that Judaism at the time of Jesus 
is characterized by “legalism” and is in stark contrast with the teaching and preaching of 
Jesus.23  In a study of German-Jewish thought, Susannah Heschel discusses the 
prevalence of this presupposition operating amongst the best German Christian Scholars.  
She writes, 
For the liberals and radicals of the Tübingen School, Judaism was the 
legalistic, religiously impure element within Christianity, against which 
gentile Christianity struggled during the first two centuries, eventually 
prevailing in the emergent church. 24  
 
She further notes that the historical critical method of biblical interpretation did nothing 
to avert this presupposition,  
The rise of critical biblical scholarship in Germany made use of anti-
Jewish stereotypes developed by the anticlericalism of the Enlightenment 
to resolve the conflict between historical analysis and the dogma of 
revelation.  Whatever elements in the Old Testament had been rejected by 
Christianity were said to characterize Judaism, and the religion was held to 
be simply a formal expression of the unfortunate character of the Jews as a 
people.25 
 
Through analysis of both twentieth century and contemporary scholars, Heschel 
demonstrates that despite thorough meticulous scholarship in investigating most of the 
                                                 
22 Luke 4:17-19; Donald Gowan, Eschatology in the Old Testament (Edinburg: T&T Clark, 2000), 38. 
23 In a careful and thorough study, E.P. Sanders shows that the claim of a radical difference between the 
notion of God of the “guardians of the law” and the notion of God of Jesus is false.  E.P. Sanders, Paul and 
Palestinian Judaism: A Comparison of Patterns of Religion (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1977). 
24 Susannah Heschel, Abraham Geiger and the Jewish Jesus (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 
1998), 66-67. 
25 Ibid., 67. 
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historical background of biblical texts, many German biblical scholars continue to allow 
stereotypical assumptions about Judaism go unquestioned.26  Moltmann’s discussion of 
Jesus’ history shows that these common stereotypical assumptions about Judaism lead 
him to make interpretive errors in understanding that history.  One of the most important 
of those errors is his understanding of the charge of blasphemy that is leveled against 
Jesus by the Jewish leadership.   
 As argued above, while Moltmann mentions Jesus’ claim to authority and the 
contrast between that authority and his poverty as contributing factors in the conflict 
between the Jewish leadership and Jesus, a conflict that resulted in the charge of 
blasphemy, the factor that dominates Moltmann’s interpretation of this conflict is the 
contrast between Jesus’ gospel of grace and the law.  That this is the central 
understanding of Moltmann’s interpretation of the charge of blasphemy cannot be denied.  
Throughout his discussion of the trial, Moltmann charges numerous times and in 
numerous ways that the basic conflict between the Jewish leadership and Jesus involved 
the understanding of God’s righteousness and the relationship of that righteousness to the 
law.  Moltmann writes, “The life of Jesus was a theological clash between him and the 
prevailing understanding of the law.  From this clash arose the legal trial concerning the 
righteousness of God in which his gospel and the law were opponents.”27   In the gospel 
accounts of Jesus’ trial before the Sanhedrin however, there is no reference to Jesus’ 
interpretation of the law or to God’s freedom to show grace.  Instead, Jesus’ 
proclamations concerning the temple and questions concerning his messianic identity are 
the focus.  In The International Critical Commentary on Mathew, Dale Allison writes,  
                                                 
26 Ibid., 230-242. 
27 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 133. 
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 Unfortunately Matthew (following Mark) does not spell out 
exactly what the Sanhedrin finds blasphemous (cf. the silence of 9.3).  But 
Jn 10.36 has Jesus’ claim to be the Son of God evoke the accusation of 
blasphemy, and this must be close to the sense in Matthew.  The 
accusation of blasphemy is a response to Christology.  Jesus, by claiming 
to be God’s Son, to have a heavenly throne, and to be the exalted figure of 
Dan 7.13, insults the majesty of God.28 
 
 Moltmann’s presuppositions about Judaism at the time of Jesus lead him to 
misinterpret the reason for the charge of blasphemy against Jesus and miss that the charge 
involves Jesus’ identity.  This is surprising considering the importance of Jesus’ identity 
as the Son of God in Moltmann’s theological vision.  Moltmann’s presuppositions cause 
him to miss other themes in the New Testament text that are important to his theology as 
well.  The relationship between God and eschatological history, the relationship between 
God and suffering, and the liberating nature of Christian faith are all affected by 
Moltmann’s skewed interpretation of Old Testament theology.   
 Despite his claim that eschatology is essential for understanding Christian faith, 
Moltmann ignores the eschatological symbols in Jesus’ ministry.   Jesus’ actions and 
preaching concerning the Sabbath, the temple, and torah, were less about correct 
interpretation of these Jewish symbols and more about Jesus’ identity as an 
eschatological prophet.29  The definitive feature of eschatology is that it offers a 
particular kind of hope, a hope focused on the in-breaking of a new age.30  When Jesus 
announces that the kingdom of God is at hand and then offers forgiveness and healing on 
the Sabbath, he is claiming that God’s eschatological promises are breaking into history 
                                                 
28 W.D. Davies and Dale C. Allison Jr., The International Critical Commentary: The Gospel According to 
Saint Matthew, (Edinburgh: T & T Clark, 1997), vol. 3, 533. 
29 Wright, 58-73. 
30 Gowan, Eschatology in the Old Testament, 121-122. 
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through his person.31  This is why the question of Jesus’ identity as the Messiah, and his 
statements about the temple are the focus of his trial before the Sanhedrin.  
 The significance of Moltmann’s error in overlooking the significance of these 
symbols is even more glaring when these symbols are understood in the context of 
Judaism at the time of Jesus.  Wright discusses the misreading of the Pharisees in 
contemporary scholarship.  Wright claims that what is often missed in interpretations of 
the Pharisees is the larger purpose and reason for the pharisaic interpretation of torah.  
Wright writes,  
 The agenda of the Pharisees in this period was not simply to do 
with “purity,” whether their own or other peoples’.  All the evidence 
suggests that at least the majority of the Pharisees, from the Hasmonean 
and Herodian periods through to the war of A.D. 66-70, had as their main 
aim that which purity symbolized: the political struggle to maintain Jewish 
identity and to realize the dream of national liberation.32 
 
 Wright claims that the source of controversy between Jesus and the Pharisees was 
a differing political vision.  The Pharisees believed their security as a people was tied to 
the right practice of their traditions.  The reason they looked for this security was not 
because they had “codified the will of God,” or because they had a notion of a “God of 
vengeance.”33  Rather, the Pharisees were interested in preserving the faith identity of 
Israel making liberation and restoration of Israel possible.  They wanted political 
liberation.  Jesus believed that the liberation and restoration of Israel was already 
happening through his ministry.  He was bringing the kingdom of God, a new age 
breaking into history and this new age required a new interpretation of the symbols of 
Israel.  Jesus’ vision is one of eschatological hope.  The content of that hope came from 
                                                 
31 Wright, 58-60. 
32 Ibid., 56. 
33 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 132. 
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the eschatological promises of the Old Testament.  These promises include: 
transformation of human society, transformation of the human person and transformation 
of nature.34   
 In the book, Eschatology in the Old Testament, Donald Gowan discusses some 
important characteristics of Old Testament theology.  It is a worldly hope that 
understands that the present circumstances are in need of transformation.  People are 
called to work towards that transformation through repentance and obedience while at the 
same time recognizing that the future is in God’s hands.  Transformation of human 
society is emphasized over personal salvation.  Finally, it is a comprehensive hope 
embracing liberation from all causes of oppression.35  
 Moltmann’s presuppositions about Judaism at the time of Jesus lead him to miss 
the cause of liberation in Jesus’ preaching and teaching.  It is not liberation from the law 
that is the focus for Jesus, nor a concern for less stringent religious practice, but the good 
news that God had drawn near to liberate Israel from all forms of oppression.  
Moltmann’s claims to eschatological hope through Jesus would be deepened through 
engagement with Old Testament eschatology. 
 Moltmann’s presuppositions about Old Testament theology affect the theme most 
central to his theology of the cross, the relationship between God and suffering.  In 
Moltmann’s theology of the cross, Jesus’ cry of dereliction, “My God, my God why have 
you abandoned me?” (Mark 15:34) is of pivotal importance.  It is this question on the 
dying lips of Jesus that Moltmann claims as evidence that the question of God and the 
                                                 
34 Gowan, Old Testament Eschatology, 1-3. 
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question of suffering belong together.36  He sees this cry as the starting point for 
discussion of the trinity and he argues that through this cry Jesus makes visible the 
openness of the history of God for the history of the world.37  Moltmann claims that this 
statement is vital for understanding the identity of Jesus and the identity of God.  Yet in 
his discussion of this vital statement Moltmann writes,  
In the original Ps. 22 “My God” means the covenant God of Israel, and the 
“I” who has been forsaken is the other partner of the covenant, the 
righteous sufferer.  But in Jesus’ case the cry “My God” implies the same 
content as his own message of God who comes close in grace, the message 
he had often expressed in the exclusive words “My Father”.  And the 
community which may have placed these words from the psalm on the lips 
of the dying Jesus must have regarded them in this way and related the 
psalm to Jesus’ situation.  He is no longer crying for Israel’s covenant 
God…….  
  If this were not so, then Ps. 22 on the lips of Jesus would merely 
show that after all his conflicts with the Pharisees and Zealots and their 
understanding of the law, Jesus had returned at his death to the God of the 
fathers.  But this would mean the end of his novel message and the 
liquidation of his special mission. 
 
 
 Is Moltmann arguing that Jesus prays to a different God than his Jewish 
contemporaries?  Is he arguing for a complete rejection of the God of the Old Testament?  
Is there no continuity between Jesus’ identity, mission, and notion of God and the 
traditions of Israel?  It is one thing for Moltmann to argue that the cry on the lips of Jesus 
has more significance than on the lips of any righteous sufferer because he is the Son of 
God but in the statement quoted above, Moltmann goes further than that.  Moltmann’s 
presuppositions about the notion of God of the religious leadership at the time of Jesus, 
lead him to deny any similarity between the notion of God of Old Testament theology 
and the notion of God of Jesus.  Throughout Moltmann’s discussion of the history of 
                                                 
36 Moltmann, The Trinity and the Kingdom, 49. 
37 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 244. 
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Jesus there is no recognition of God’s concern for the outcast, the widow, the orphan and 
the alien that is a vital tradition preserved in the Old Testament.  In discussing the 
suffering of God, Moltmann makes use of Abraham Heschel’s notion of the pathos of 
God and refers to the Shekinah theology of the Rabbis but he never discusses the fact that 
these important ideas are reflections drawn from the Old Testament texts.38   
 This review of the Old Testament in Moltmann’s theology of the cross has 
revealed that Moltmann’s reading of the New Testament as background for his theology 
of the cross is subject to serious interpretive errors rooted in Moltmann’s presuppositions 
about Judaism and the God of the Old Testament.  Before bringing Brueggemann’s Old 
Testament theology into conversation with Moltmann’s theology of the cross, the role of 
the Old Testament in the theology of the cross of Jon Sobrino will be examined. 
The Influence of Old Testament Theology on Sobrino’s Theology of the Cross 
 
 Old Testament theology influences Sobrino’s theology of the cross in several 
important ways.  First, Old Testament theology reveals that God acts in history and this 
revelation is foundational for understanding God’s action in the history of Jesus of 
Nazareth.  Second, Jesus’ notion of God is formed by Old Testament theological 
traditions.  Third, Old Testament traditions concerning the relationship between God and 
human beings form the basis for understanding the meaning of the cross.  Unlike 
Moltmann, Sobrino emphasizes Jesus’ continuity with the tradition of Israel while at the 
same time recognizing that what Jesus reveals about God moves beyond those 
traditions.39 
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 Sobrino states that the subject of the Old Testament is not God in Godself but 
God as God is related to history.  He points to four Old Testament traditions: the exodus, 
prophetic, apocalyptic, and wisdom traditions.  In each of these traditions, God’s 
relationship to history is different.  The exodus tradition is marked by God’s hearing the 
cry of the oppressed and God’s saving actions as a result.  The prophetic tradition is 
characterized by denunciation of the oppressors, the defense of the oppressed and the 
hope of a new covenant.  The apocalyptic tradition reveals the hope for God’s re-
formation of people and the whole of creation in accord with God’s eschatological 
promises.  The wisdom tradition reveals God’s provident activity hidden in God’s 
silence.40  According to Sobrino, these traditions form the foundation for Jesus’ 
understanding of the kingdom of God.  Sobrino writes,  
Jesus put forward his own concept of the kingdom, as we shall see shortly.  
First, however, I should like to reflect briefly on the fact that Jesus came 
following a tradition of hope for oppressed history, that the first 
impression he made was above all in continuity with a hope-filled 
tradition.41 
 
 Sobrino’s recognition of the role Old Testament traditions played in shaping 
Jesus’ notion of the kingdom provides a way for him to contrast Jesus’ teaching with that 
of the Pharisees without the distortions that appear in Moltmann’s analysis.  Sobrino 
acknowledges that the Pharisees inherited the same hope filled tradition as Jesus and that 
their attention to a life of purity, contemplation, and observation of the law was a way of 
hastening the coming of that promised kingdom.42  According to Sobrino, while the 
Pharisees and Jesus inherited the same tradition they differed in the accent they placed on 
God’s mercy and compassion.  For Jesus, mercy and compassion is the basic identity 
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marker for God and this leads Jesus to reach out to those most in need of God’s mercy 
and to confront the causes of oppression.43 
 While Jesus’ notion of God places an accent on God’s mercy and compassion, 
Sobrino emphasizes that Jesus’ relationship to God grows out of and is influenced by 
notions of God drawn from the Old Testament.44  Sobrino argues that from the prophetic 
tradition Jesus came to understand that God takes sides and defends the poor, the weak, 
and the oppressed, calls people to repentance and to living out their calling from God.  
From the apocalyptic tradition, Jesus came to understand that God and God alone 
possesses the power to transform reality into God’s absolute future.  From the wisdom 
tradition, Jesus understands God as provident creator looking after everyday needs.45  
Sobrino recognizes that each of these traditions preserves different understandings of 
God and claims that Jesus drew his notion of God from weaving together insights from 
each.  Sobrino argues that there is value in the diversity and novelty of each tradition and 
so the diversity and novelty of each should be preserved.46   
 By recognizing that these traditions shaped Jesus’ notion of God, Sobrino 
acknowledges that Jesus’ understanding of the goodness of God was not new; it was born 
in and came from these Old Testament traditions.  Jesus’ contemplation of God led him 
to differ from these traditions not by countering them or by adding complexity to these 
notions but by a deepening understanding of God’s grace.  Sobrino writes,  
Jesus’ way of revealing the truth about God and human beings is through 
what is least esoteric and most common – love; and if we are looking for 
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discontinuity , this is to be found not in the “beyond,” but in this very love 
a limitless love, valid to the point of the cross.47 
 
 Jesus’ journey to the cross shapes his revelation of God’s limitless love in two 
important ways; ways that Sobrino ties to Old Testament theology.  First, the cross 
testifies to the fact that Jesus’ proclamation of God’s love takes place in a world 
characterized by sin.  Second, as Jesus journeys to the cross his understanding of God is 
influenced by what Sobrino calls the existential tradition of the Old Testament.48  
 Sobrino describes Jesus’ proclamation of God’s love as having two dimensions, a 
messianic dimension and a prophetic dimension.49  Jesus’ messianic activity centers 
around the positive aspects of God’s coming near.  Therefore his messianic activity 
involves his outreach and ministry to the poor and oppressed, the ones for whom God’s 
drawing near is good news.  By contrast, his prophetic activity centers on judgment and is 
directed toward those who contribute to the miserable lives of the poor and oppressed.  In 
Jesus’ prophetic activity he “unmasks” the idols that people create in order to gain and 
maintain power and security.  These idols are political, sociological and theological and 
reveal the power of sin in the world.  Sobrino attributes Jesus’ Sabbath controversies, his 
parables, and his critique of the temple to his prophetic praxis.50  This prophetic praxis is 
essential because it reveals that Jesus doesn’t talk about sin in general terms but attacks it 
in its specific manifestation in the world.  Sobrino argues that Jesus’ prophetic activity 
reveals the misuse of power as a central component of the shape that sin takes.  He ties 
Jesus’ prophetic role to the Old Testament tradition of the prophets noting that the fact 
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that Jesus’ prophetic activity leads to controversy, persecution and ultimately death is in 
continuity with that prophetic tradition.51    
 Sobrino’s use of the Old Testament as a source for understanding Jesus’ prophetic 
activity is influenced and limited by Sobrino’s agenda of liberation.  When Sobrino 
discusses God’s preferential option for the poor, he focuses on wealth/poverty as a 
general category and ignores the fact that God’s preferential option is expressed in the 
Old Testament within the particularity of his call to Israel.  Israel’s identity is to be 
marked by care for the poor but God’s choice of Israel moves beyond a general option for 
the poor.  The option for the poor is one part of a larger mission.  When Sobrino 
discusses Jesus’ critique of the temple and his Sabbath controversies, he argues that Jesus 
is defending the rights of the victims of religious oppression but he ignores the 
eschatological symbolism of the temple and Sabbath.  The eschatological symbolism of 
the temple and the Sabbath points to the identity of Jesus as the source of controversy.   
Sobrino begins his discussion of Jesus preaching and mission by claiming that Jesus did 
not preach about himself but about the kingdom.52  This presupposition shapes Sobrino’s 
analysis of Jesus’ preaching and teaching so that he understands the controversies of 
Jesus in general terms revolving around misuse of power rather than seeing that while 
these controversies contain a critique of the misuse of power they move beyond that 
critique and point to the larger issues of Jesus’ identity and the particularity of God’s 
choice and mission for Israel. 
  Sobrino discusses a second way that Jesus’ journey to the cross influences his 
notion of God.  That is through Jesus’ historical experience of God’s silence.  Sobrino 
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links Jesus’ historical experience of God’s silence with the existential tradition of the Old 
Testament.  Sobrino describes that existential tradition as “times when all that can be 
heard is God’s silence.”53   He observes that the tradition is preserved only sporadically in 
the Old Testament appearing in all theodicies and particularly in the books of 
Lamentations, Jeremiah, Ecclesiastes, and Job.54  He notes that the notion of God drawn 
from the existential tradition is contrary to the God of the kingdom and yet as Jesus lives 
his historical life, the silence of God increasingly becomes his experience of God.  
Sobrino describes this as Jesus’ conversion.  Jesus begins his ministry proclaiming the 
coming of God’s kingdom and the good news of God’s drawing near.  As it becomes 
more evident that his mission will end on the cross however, the coming of the kingdom 
is increasingly cloaked in mystery.  Sobrino writes, 
 There is, then, no doubt that the theologal vision presented by 
Jesus at the end of his life was very different.  It still contains the formal 
elements there at the beginning: God, mission, sin, following, prayer, but 
their historical embodiment is quite other.  His vision is now dominated by 
the mystery of God and what there is of the mystery in God.  The subject 
matter may be the same, but Jesus has been through a process of 
embodying it, not only conceptually, but historically.  He set out to change 
history according to the will of God, but history changed him in relation to 
God.55  
 
 According to Sobrino, Jesus’ historical experience of the silence of God leads him 
to an increasing awareness that God is a “supremely dialectical reality: absolute intimacy 
and absolute otherness.”56  According to Sobrino this dialectic is rooted in the question of 
theodicy.  The question that Jesus asks from the cross is the question that all who trust 
that God is love ask when confronted by evil and injustice.  Theodicies do not cover up 
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the scandal of injustice and evil by giving an explanation but neither do they give up hope 
that evil and injustice are not the last word.  Theodicies hold onto the hope that history 
has meaning.  “However, this hope is not drawn from ‘knowledge’ of the mystery, but 
from ‘faith’ in this particular God with this particular plan.”57   As Jesus walks with God 
through the trials of his life, he increasingly understands God as the one who is both 
intimate and other and his relationship with God is described by Sobrino as one of trust-
availability.58  Jesus trusts that God the Father’s transcendence is not a remote 
transcendence but a transcendence of love and grace.  Jesus’ mission of availability to his 
Father-God leads him to realize that he is called not to eradicate sin but to bear it.     
 According to Sobrino, the pattern for exploration of the meaning of Jesus’ cross in 
the New Testament is similar to the pattern followed in Old Testament explorations of the 
meaning of suffering in the existential traditions.  The New Testament will not let the 
scandal of the cross be the last word but “hopes” that there is meaning to the cross, a 
meaning hidden in the mystery of God.59  In reflecting on the meaning of the mystery of 
the cross, the New Testament reaches back to Old Testament traditions revolving around 
the relationship between God and human beings such as: the sacrificial system of Israel, 
the role of the law, the image of the new covenant and role of the suffering servant.  The 
New Testament writers find in these traditions a way to understand the new relationship 
between God and human beings that is revealed on the cross of Jesus Christ.  Sobrino 
asserts that the prevalent and most important reflection on the meaning of the cross is that 
the cross reveals the credibility of God’s love.  Jesus testifies throughout his lifetime that 
God is good and that God is for us.  On the cross Gods’ being for us is revealed to go so 
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far that God is even at our mercy.  The notion of God that emerges from the cross is a 
dialectical notion.  God is absolute immanence even to the point of death and at the same 
time absolute transcendence.   The transcendence of God is not understood as a remote 
transcendence, however, but as a transcendence of love.60   
 In Sobrino’s theology, Jesus’ notion of God is the basis for the notion of God that 
emerges from the cross.  That notion is rooted in and grows out of Old Testament 
traditions.  Deeper exploration of these Old Testament traditions through the theology of 
the Old Testament of Walter Brueggemann can lead to a deeper contemplation of the God 
of Jesus and therefore of the notion of God that emerges from the cross. 
Common Themes in the Theology of Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino 
 The Old Testament theology of Walter Brueggemann and the theologies of the 
cross of Jurgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino share some common themes such as:  
1. the recognition of the political nature of all theology; 
2. the importance of the question of theodicy for shaping theological insights and  
3. the dialectical nature of God leading to an exploration of God’s power.   
A summary analysis of these common themes in the works of Brueggemann, Moltmann, 
and Sobrino provides a way to bring their theologies into conversation and arrive at 
deeper theological insights. 
 The recognition of competing theological claims in the Old Testament provides 
the framework for Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology.  His theology is structured 
around the themes of testimony within the metaphor of a law court because he recognizes 
that all theological claims are provisional, open-ended, and dialogical.  When he divides 
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the theological testimonies of the Old Testament into two major categories, which he 
refers to as the majority voice and the minority voice, he acknowledges that these 
theological claims are not neutral.  Each claim has political and sociological 
ramifications.61   
 In order to provide an example of the political and social ramifications of 
theology, Brueggemann appeals to creation theology.  Creation theology in the Old 
Testament asserts that there is an ordered quality to life and that this ordered quality is the 
result of the will and desire of the Creator.  Reflection upon this insight leads to a belief 
in an ordered moral coherence to the world.  Recognition of the ordered quality of life 
and the moral coherence that follows from this insight is an essential component of the 
“common theology” of Israel that Brueggemann labels the majority voice.62  
 Brueggemann states that this order and coherence must first be appreciated as a 
way to access faith and meaning for the people of Israel.  This same order and coherence 
however also becomes the grounds for the political, theological, and sociological 
structures of Israel.  Once the ordered quality of creation and the moral rationality that 
follows from that order becomes part of the power structures of Israel it is easily co-opted 
and exploited.  He claims,  
And so there is a convenient match (often regarded as an ontological 
match) between God’s order and our order.  What starts as a statement 
about transcendence becomes simply self-justification, self-justification 
made characteristically by those who preside over the current order and 
who benefit from keeping it so.63 
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 The exploitation of theological claims by those in power leads to a closed system 
that is intolerant of challenges.  Brueggemann argues that experiences of life in the world, 
particularly painful experiences, challenge the claims made by the majority voice.  
Silencing the voices of pain therefore becomes vital for the maintenance of power in a 
closed system of order and moral rationality.64 
 Brueggemann asserts that it is important to pay attention not only to the meaning 
of texts but to the way those texts function.  When the texts function to silence the voices 
of pain this leads to illegitimate systems that lack a human face.  He writes, “Contractual 
theology offers a world in which pain need not occur, and where it occurs, pain is a 
failure to be corrected.”65  He argues that what is remarkable about the Old Testament is 
that while it claims this contractual theology, it at the same time testifies to a crisis in that 
theology.  That crisis is given expression by the minority voice, a voice that embraces 
pain and through that embrace challenges the common theology of the majority voice.  
 According to Brueggemann, in the Old Testament there is a tension between the 
celebration of contractual theology and a sharp critique of that same theology.  This 
tension is essential for faith.  It is not an evolutionary tension that is resolved in the 
testimony of the New Testament or in post-biblical Judaism.66  Rather, it is a tension that 
must be maintained for faith because within this tension God is revealed.   
 Brueggemann’s analysis of the political nature of theology draws attention to 
several important points.  First, in addition to addressing the meaning of texts, attention 
must be paid to the way in which texts function.  Second, there is a tendency to simplify 
diverse theological voices into a unified view that can be co-opted and exploited by those 
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in power.  This tendency can be described as a tendency toward closure.  Third, the 
notion of God that is drawn from theological statements has vital sociological and 
political ramifications.  Fourth, the minority voice, the voice of those in pain, is a vital 
critical voice.  Through this vital theological voice faith remains connected to life in the 
world and is prevented from dissolving into a triumphant faith that either ignores or 
condemns the needs and problems of those who are suffering.  
 The political nature of theology is an important theme in the theologies of the 
cross of both Moltmann and Sobrino.  While their theologies are systematic in nature and 
therefore move beyond the text, the points that Brueggemann draws attention to in his 
analysis of the political nature of Old Testament theology are important points in the 
systematic analyses of Moltmann and Sobrino as well.   
  Moltmann most directly addresses the function of texts by noting the theological 
process that shaped the Old Testament text.  That process is described as a conflict 
between theological traditions and new needs, concerns, and questions that arise as a 
result of life experience.  In recognizing this process, Moltmann, like Brueggemann 
understands the nature of theology to be provisional, open-ended, and dialogical.  This 
understanding of the shaping of the Old Testament text leads to Moltmann’s theological 
method, a method that is able to bring the questions, needs, and concerns of post-World 
War II Europe into dialogue with traditions in Christian theology.67   
 While Moltmann recognizes the use of this theological method in shaping the Old 
Testament, and then uses this method for his own theological insights, he does not 
address this issue in regard to the shaping of New Testament texts.  He does not discuss 
                                                 




the Old Testament traditions that lie behind the New Testament text, nor does he 
acknowledge the function of the New Testament texts in the context of the communities 
for which they were written.  
 Sobrino is more attentive to the functioning of New Testament texts than 
Moltmann is.  In Christology at the Crossroads, Sobrino draws attention to the 
methodology of the gospel writers.  He points out that the writers of the gospels begin 
with faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ and then reach back into the history of Jesus 
to understand the meaning of resurrection faith.  As the writers explore the meaning of 
Jesus’ life in light of the resurrection, they are also concerned with their audience and the 
particular faith communities among whom they are living and to whom they are 
addressing the gospel message.  Each writer knows the particular needs, questions and 
concerns of the community they are addressing and so there is a dialogue between the life 
experience of the community and the message of the gospel.  The questions that arise 
from the life experience of the community become the foundational questions for 
exploring the meaning of the life, death and resurrection of Jesus and the gospel message 
is written to address the needs and concerns of each particular community of faith.  
Sobrino recognizes the dialogical quality of the New Testament text and like Moltmann 
allows the process that lies behind the formation of the text to shape his own theological 
method.  He begins with faith in the resurrection of Jesus Christ and then moves to 
articulate that faith in light of the needs, questions, and concerns of the poor in Latin 
America.68    
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 Both Moltmann and Sobrino recognize that theology is wed to the political and 
sociological needs of communities in specific times and places.  Both writers therefore 
allow the political and sociological needs of the communities in which they do their 
theology to shape their theological inquiry.  For Moltmann, the lack of identity and 
relevancy of Christianity in post-World War II Germany provides that context.  For 
Sobrino it is the poor of Latin America.  For both writers, working in very different 
contexts, the theological questions raised by innocent suffering emerge to form the 
dominant theological voice of these communities.  The theological issues raised by 
innocent suffering become the lens for exploring the meaning of Christian theology for 
these communities.  In engaging the Christian tradition from the perspective of suffering, 
both Moltmann and Sobrino become aware of triumphant faith claims that are prevalent 
in the Christian tradition that ignore and sometimes condemn those who are suffering.  
They recognize that this triumphant faith is easily co-opted and exploited by those in 
power and that there is a tendency toward closure in Christian theology that is 
problematic.  
 Moltmann focuses on the presupposition that God does not suffer as a form of 
closure in Christian theology.  This presupposition prevents the meaning of the cross of 
Jesus Christ from being fully integrated into a Christian doctrine of God.  Instead the  
god of theism remains the dominant image of God and the cross is then viewed as a 
means to reconcile fallen human beings with the unchangeable nature of God rather than 
the revelation of a Trinitarian God who suffers with human beings to offer them new 
life.69   
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 Sobrino highlights the problem of universalizing an image of Christ and salvation 
that is detached from the history of Jesus.  He claims that universalizing the image of 
Christ is done by those in power who then focus on the cross as the means to an eternal 
life detached from life in the world.  Only when the cross remains connected to the 
history of Jesus does it reveal its true meaning, the solidarity of God with the suffering, 
lowly, oppressed people in the world.70 
 By emphasizing both the revelation of the Trinitarian God on the cross and the 
connection between the cross and the history of Jesus, Moltmann and Sobrino draw 
attention to the importance of the political and sociological challenges posed by the 
historical Jesus.  Jesus’ trial before the Sanhedrin and then before Pilate is understood as 
a trial that encompasses the political, sociological and theological challenges of Jesus.  
Jesus is tried as both a blasphemer and a rebel, and at stake is not only his challenge to 
the religious and political leaders but also the notion of God that those leaders use to 
secure their power.  Moltmann writes,  
The history of Jesus which led to his crucifixion was rather a Theological 
history in itself, and was dominated by the conflict between God and the 
gods; that is, between the God whom Jesus preached as his Father, and the 
God of the law as he was understood by the guardians of the law, together 
with the political gods of the Roman occupying power.71  
  
Similarly, Sobrino writes,  
The divinities and their mediations are at war, and so therefore are their 
mediators. Jesus’ trial is the trial of a mediator, but it is held to defend a 
mediation, and this is done in the name of a god.  In other words Jesus’ 
trial is also the trial of his God.72   
 
                                                 
70 Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, 179-181. 
71 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 127. 
72 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, 209. 
 187 
 What is it about Jesus’ notion of God that is so unnerving, disruptive, and 
challenging to the Jewish and Roman leadership of his day?  Exploring Moltmann and 
Sobrino’s analysis of Jesus’ notion of God sheds some light on this issue.  Moltmann 
emphasizes the discontinuity of Jesus’ notion of God with that of the Jewish leadership.  
He claims that this discontinuity lies in Jesus’ assertion that God is free to show grace to 
the unrighteous.73  Sobrino emphasizes the continuity between Jesus’ notion of God and 
notions of God drawn from Old Testament traditions.74  While emphasizing continuity, 
he also notes that Jesus’ notion of God is different than those of the Jewish leaders of his 
day.  Sobrino, like Moltmann, argues that this difference lies in a deeper understanding of 
God’s grace expressed in the New Testament’s claim that God is love.75   
 Both Moltmann and Sobrino point to Jesus’ healing ministry as demonstrative of 
his notion of God.76  His outreach to the sick, the dying, the poor, and sinners is an 
outreach that demonstrates both God’s freedom to show grace and that God’s drawing 
near is good news because it is the drawing near of God’s love.  Jesus’ ministry is 
therefore characterized as one that is open to hear the voices of those in pain.  Through 
Jesus’ ministry, those on the margins of society are healed.  This healing involves not 
only removal of their affliction but inclusion in the family of faith with an accompanying 
realization of God’s love for them and of their value.   
 A deeper understanding of the political ramifications of Jesus’ notion of God 
emerges when Moltmann and Sobrino’s analysis is brought into conversation with 
Brueggemann’s recognition that oppressive systems are characterized by closure and the 
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inability to hear the voice of the wounded party.77  Brueggemann argues that when 
theological statements are co-opted and exploited by those in power it results in 
illegitimate political and sociological systems that lack a human face.  Not only are the 
leaders of these illegitimate systems closed to the voice of pain, but they secure power by 
promoting a notion of God that is a “convenient match” for the ordered system that is the 
realm of their rule.78  While Moltmann emphasizes the closed system of laws of the 
Jewish leadership and Sobrino emphasizes the oppression of the poor by those who 
control the temple, both recognize that the Jewish leadership during the time of Jesus is 
oppressive particularly to those who are on the margins of society.79  Jesus’ ministry is 
characterized by grace and mercy shown particularly to those most oppressed by this 
same society.  Jesus’ ministry challenges the system of the religious leadership of his day 
by confronting that system with the human faces of those in pain.  Brueggemann writes, 
“Indeed the presence of pain-bearers is a silent refutation of the legitimated structures, 
and therefore they must be denied legitimacy and visibility.  Visible pain-bearers assert 
that the legitimated structures are not properly functioning.”80  Jesus’ ministry not only 
makes visible the pain-bearers of Israel but these pain-bearers become the locale for the 
revelation of God’s power.  Through Jesus, God’s power is operating for and with the 
oppressed and therefore against and in judgment of the oppressors.  For this reason, the 
Jewish leadership seeks to silence Jesus and through this action, silence the voices of pain 
that challenges their system and their notion of God.   
                                                 
77 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, I,” 28-46.  
78 Ibid., 42-44. 
79 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 112-187; Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, Sobrino, Jesus the 
Liberator, 67. 
80 Brueggemann, “Shape for Old Testament Theology, I,” 44. 
 189 
 Moltmann and Sobrino do not discuss in detail the gods, or the notion of god in 
the Roman Empire.  Moltmann, however, notes that “in the societies of that time there 
was no politics without religion, any more than there was a religion without politics.”81  
He calls attention to the fact that the “Pax Romana was associated with compulsory 
recognition of the Roman emperor cult.”82  He notes that despite a wide reputation for 
religious tolerance, the Romans attributed the Pax Romana to the state gods of Rome.  
Both Moltmann and Sobrino draw attention to the fact that Jesus was killed by 
crucifixion, a punishment reserved for crimes against the state, and that the inscription 
above the cross read, I.N.R.I. (Iesus Nazarenus Rex Iudaeorum).83  Both point out and 
object to the way Jesus’ statement, “My kingdom is not of this world,” is used to support 
a religion concerned with personal internal dispositions that ignore the political and 
sociological affects of religion.  Moltmann notes that Jesus’ statement, “My kingdom is 
not of this world,” does not imply that the kingdom is somewhere else but rather that it 
follows a different pattern than kingdoms of this world.  The Roman Empire associated 
with the state gods of Rome operated through power and domination.  Jesus’ ministry of 
agapic love lived out amongst the poorest of society and patterned after his Father-God 
challenged the order of Roman society and called into question the state gods of Rome.  
Moltmann writes,  
For Pilate, the case of Jesus of Nazareth was clearly on the same level as 
that of Barabbas, who was probably a Zealot; we read of him as a ‘rebel’ 
captured ‘in the insurrection’ (Mark 15.7).  Such an ‘error of justice’ 
would probably not have been possible on the part of the Romans if the 
effect of the ministry of Jesus had not created at least the danger of a new 
popular revolt.84 
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  The trial and death of Jesus is evidence of the political nature of all theology.  
Jesus’ ministry was not violent and yet it challenged the fabric of both Jewish and Roman 
societies.  Sobrino writes, “And if one asks how a religious man, like Jesus could be so 
dangerous to the empire, and have so much political influence, the answer is that religion 
touches and moves the foundations of society in a radical way.”85   
 Brueggemann insists that the issue of pain is the touchstone for evaluating 
political, sociological and theological systems.  He writes,  
It must be always decided again whether pain is simply a shameful 
aberration that can be handled by correction, or whether pain is the stuff of 
humanness, the vehicle for a break with triumphalism, both sociological 
and theological.86 
 
 According to Moltmann and Sobrino, Jesus’ notion of God and Jesus’ ministry 
patterned after that notion breaks with the triumphalism operating in both the Jewish and 
the Roman political systems.  By silencing Jesus, the Jewish and Roman leadership 
hoped to calm the challenge to their systems that came when Jesus’ ministry allowed the 
undercurrent of the voices of pain to surface.  Before Jesus died, however, one last cry of 
the wounded party was heard, “My God, my God, Why have you forsaken me?”87  This 
cry pierces the heavens and for both Moltmann and Sobrino becomes the basis for all 
Christian theology.  It becomes the permanent critique that guards against triumphant 
claims of closure in Christian theology.  This cry assures the suffering and oppressed of 
the world that God not only hears their cries but enters into their pain in complete 
solidarity.  This cry shapes the identity of Christians and of Christian theology.  
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Moltmann and Sobrino’s insight that Jesus’ cry of abandonment is identity forming for 
Christians and Christian theology can be challenged and deepened by bringing this 
insight into conversation with Brueggemann’s insistence that the exile is identity forming 
for Israel. 
 The Babylonian Exile is a time of profound crisis in Israel’s history.  The Exile 
marks the failure of Israel’s political, sociological, and theological structures.  It is a time 
when the certainty provided by these structures is lost and Israel is left to question the 
meaning of their faith in the darkness of doubt and vulnerability.  For Brueggemann, the 
exile is the paradigmatic event in Israel’s history.88  It is the event of the exile that both 
inspires much of the writing and determines the final form of the Old Testament text.  It 
shapes Israel’s faith and forms the identity of the people of Israel.89   
 Brueggemann points to three characteristic identity marks of Israel’s faith that 
result from the event of the exile.  First, the people of Israel understand themselves and 
their status in the world to be marked by risk and vulnerability.90  The radical questioning 
of triumphant faith claims that was brought about by the exile is not a questioning that 
remains in Israel’s past or gives way to new forms of certainty.  Rather, the exile 
becomes the lens through which they encounter reality.  When reality calls into question 
the certainty of their hope, their experience of God through exile and homecoming 
becomes the means for assessing the new challenge before them.  The people of Israel 
understand their status in the world to be determined not by their own resourcefulness or 
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by a security that can be counted and measured.  Theirs is a journey of risk made possible 
only through their continual trust in God.   
 Second, their faith is a practice of counter reality.  Israel’s lived experience in the 
world often contradicts their understanding of God and their vision of life lived in 
communion with God.  Rather then allow their circumstances to deny their hope or to 
become a new form of certainty, Israel articulates their vision of God and of their future 
with God in the midst of these contradictory circumstances.  According to Brueggemann, 
understanding their faith as a counter reality allows Israel to both fully articulate their 
pain and at the same time to hold onto the hope that lies in the promises of God.91    
 Third, their faith is characterized by waiting.  For Israel, God is a God of promises 
and promises point to the future.  As long as reality contradicts those promises, Israel’s 
faith is characterized by waiting.  Waiting however, is not simply a space of time, empty 
of meaning.  Rather, waiting is the fertile ground for deeper theological reflection.92  
Remarkably, as Israel reflects on God and God’s promises in the midst of waiting, in the 
midst of their journey of risk and vulnerability, and in the midst of lived reality that 
counters their hope, God is revealed as a God who enters into their exile and allows the 
vulnerability of their suffering to impinge upon God’s life.  
 Brueggemann claims that the exile is not only a crisis for Israel; it is a crisis in the 
life of God.93  This crisis is brought about by Israel’s disobedience, a disobedience that 
deepens the rift separating the people of Israel from God.  Israel’s disobedience affects 
the life of God because while Israel’s disobedience of the covenant demands of God leads 
to separation, accompanying that separation is God’s love and fidelity toward Israel and a 
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longing for renewal of the relationship.  According to Brueggemann, God does not 
remain unchanged by the event of the exile.  Because of God’s fidelity to Israel, God 
suffers in solidarity with the people of Israel and this suffering evokes new depths of 
compassion in God and a new resolve for fidelity.  The exilic event reveals Gods’ 
openness to Israel’s history.  It reveals that God takes suffering seriously and that Israel’s 
suffering impinges on the life of God.94   
 Risk and vulnerability, faith as counter reality, and waiting, are not only 
characteristic identity marks for Israel but characterize Christian faith as well.  In 
asserting that the essential question for theological inquiry is the question of theodicy, 
both Moltmann and Sobrino are attentive to the prominence of these characteristics for 
Christian faith.  Painful experiences of living in the world are primary for any theological 
inquiry approached through the question of theodicy.  For both Moltmann and Sobrino, 
the resurrection of Jesus Christ makes hope a dominant feature of Christian faith but just 
as the resurrection cannot be separated from the historical cross, Christian hope cannot be 
separated from the reality of historical suffering in the world.  The question Jesus asks 
from the cross, a question that springs from suffering and asks how the present evil and 
injustice can be reconciled with God, remains an open question.  If an open question is 
the source for Christian faith than risk and vulnerability are inevitable features of that 
faith.   
 In the preface to The Crucified God, Moltmann describes his own journey as one 
that increasingly led him to contemplate life from the viewpoint of the crucified Christ.  
Having written Theology of Hope, Moltmann increasingly came to realize that the 
fullness of Christian hope, while springing from the resurrection, is only completed 
                                                 
94 Brueggemann, “A Shattered Transcendence,” 173; idem, Theology of Old Testament, 311. 
 194 
through remembrance of the cross.95  Furthermore, events in history continue to call for a 
return to the cross.  Moltmann points to the impact contemporary history had on his own 
journey referring to the suffering of friends living under Stalinism in Eastern Europe, and 
under dictatorships in South Korea and Latin America and to the his own “dark night” as 
he continued to come to terms with the pictures and stories of the horrendous crimes 
committed in concentration camps during World War II.96  As long as suffering 
continues, as long as historical events call into question the goodness of God, the 
question Jesus asks from the cross remains an open question.  As long as the question 
Jesus asks, “My God, my God why have you abandoned me?” remains open, certainty is 
precluded and risk and vulnerability characterize Christian faith.  Moltmann writes, “For 
me, the crucified Christ became more and more ‘the foundation and criticism of Christian 
theology.’  And for me that meant whatever can stand before the face of the crucified 
Christ is true Christian theology.”97 
 In The Crucified God, Moltmann provides an excerpt from Eli Wiesel’s book, 
Night, a story that he finds paradigmatic for understanding Christian faith as a form of 
counter reality shaped by risk, vulnerability and waiting.  Before re-telling the story, 
Moltmann draws attention to a study by P. Kuhn focusing on Shekinah theology as it was 
expressed in the work of the rabbis at the turn of the century.98  Moltmann notes that 
according to Kuhn the rabbis articulated a series of humiliations, sufferings that God 
voluntarily entered into for the redemption of human beings and for Israel.  In 
Moltmann’s analysis of Kuhn’s work, several important insights emerge.  First, God 
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accommodates Godself to the limitations of human beings even to the point of suffering 
with and for them.  Second, God’s accommodation to the limitations of human beings is 
not limited to innocent suffering.  God also enters into the suffering of the guilty and 
sinful.  Finally, within God’s accommodation to the limitations of human beings there is 
an accompanying anticipation of God’s future indwelling of all creation.99  In Shekinah 
theology, risk and vulnerability, faith as counter reality, and waiting characterize Israel 
because God dwells with them in their suffering and Israel’s redemption will be God’s 
redemption.  Moltmann writes,  
Because his name has been bound up with Israel, Israel is redeemed when 
God has redeemed himself, that is, has glorified his name; and the 
suffering of God is the means by which Israel is redeemed.  God himself is 
‘the ransom’ for Israel.100   
 
 Moltmann follows this analysis of Shekinah theology with the story from 
Wiesel.101  In Night, Wiesel recounts a hanging he witnessed when he was a prisoner at 
Buchenwald.  Three prisoners were hanged and one of these was a young boy who 
because he did not weigh enough to cause immediate strangulation, gasped and struggled 
for breath for a prolonged period of time.  As the other prisoners witnessed this torment 
one called out “Where is God now?”  Wiesel hears an answer coming from within 
himself, “Where is he?  He is here.  He is hanging there on the gallows.”102 Read in the 
context of Wiesel’s book, the answer speaks of the death of the God that Wiesel was 
piously devoted to before his imprisonment.  Moltmann re-interprets Wiesel’s 
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observation that God is hanging on the gallows from a Christian perspective.103 
Moltmann writes, “Any other answer would be blasphemy.  There cannot be any other 
Christian answer to the question of this torment.”104  Using this story as a paradigm, 
Moltmann points to the distinctiveness of Christian faith.  Linking the story to the 
suffering of God in Jewish Shekinah theology and to the suffering of God on the cross, 
Moltmann asserts that Christian theology is valid only if it can be spoken in the presence 
of the historical reality of this kind of suffering, the senseless suffering of an innocent 
victim of hate.  The Christian response to this suffering is not an answer but a recognition 
that God suffers with and on behalf of this innocent victim, a recognition grounded in the 
cross and reaching back to Old Testament testimony.  If God suffers with and on behalf 
of innocent victims, God is at risk and Christian faith is characterized by risk and 
vulnerability.  Finally, Jesus’ cross and resurrection becomes the lens for viewing the 
suffering of this innocent victim in Buchenwald.  Just as Jesus’ entry into human 
suffering culminating in his historical cross is the ground for new creation so also God’s 
presence with this suffering innocent victim carries with it the promise and presence of 
redemption.  Recognizing this place of agonizing suffering as the place of God’s presence 
requires Christian faith to be a practice of counter reality, a counter reality that brings 
hope to the hopeless filling the emptiness of waiting with anticipation of the fulfillment 
of God’s promises.105  
 Sobrino, like Moltmann, understands the distinctiveness of Christian faith to lie in 
risk, vulnerability, and the practice of counter-reality.  In the first pages of his book, 
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Jesus the Liberator, Sobrino draws attention to the fact that even the title of his book is a 
practice of counter-reality in Latin America.  Sobrino writes,  
 This book seeks to present the Christ who is Jesus of Nazareth, and 
so I have called it “Jesus the liberator.”  This choice of title was not easy, 
however, since writing from Latin America and specifically from El 
Salvador, we tend to speak of “Jesus Christ crucified.”  Faith points 
ineluctably to the first title; history forcefully reminds us of the second.106 
 
 The recognition that history forcefully pushes Christians back to Jesus Christ 
crucified is shared by both Moltmann and Sobrino.  Both theologians are alike in 
articulating the idea that for Christians, the cross is understood as God’s entry into the 
risk and vulnerability of human suffering.  God’s entry into this place offers both 
solidarity with human beings in their suffering and hope for future redemption.  The 
contemplation of the cross for Christians then is identity forming in the same way that the 
exile is identity forming for Israel.  The conditions of suffering in the world are not 
escaped but are viewed through the lens of exile/homecoming, cross/resurrection.  For 
Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino therefore, the source for knowledge of God does 
not come from rising above the world but from entering into the risk and vulnerability of 
its most painful circumstances.  Understanding exile and the cross as identity forming for 
people of faith leads Brueggemann, Moltmann and Sobrino to articulate a dialectical 
notion of God.   
 For Brueggemann, Moltmann and Sobrino, the exploration of a dialectical notion 
of God has two components.  The first component is epistemological; all knowledge of 
God is arrived at dialectically.  The second component extends beyond this 
epistemological principle and arrives at a notion of God that involves suffering and 
humiliation as revelations of God.  While both components of a dialectical notion of God 
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are discussed by all three theologians, the emphasis of each writer differs and is worth 
exploring.   
 In the beginning of TOT, Brueggemann discusses the history of biblical 
interpretation noting the impact of Barth’s commentary on Romans.  In that commentary, 
Barth challenges nineteenth and early twentieth century biblical interpretations that 
rooted analysis of the biblical text in the cultural progressivism that dominated the 
intellectual and religious institutions of that time period.  Barth insisted that the Bible 
spoke on its own terms in polemical, abrasive, bold and daring speech and without appeal 
to “natural reason.”107  Brueggemann writes,    
Thus Barth programmatically reached behind Descartes and appealed to 
Anselm’s notion of “faith seeking understanding.”  That is, faith is not a 
conclusion that may or may not result from reflection.  It is, rather, a 
nonnegotiable premise and assumption of all right reading of the Bible and 
all right faith.  Barth understood that over against this claim, the premise 
of Enlightenment autonomy as expressed in historical criticism is also not 
a conclusion, but a nonnegotiable premise and assumption.  In this 
enormous epistemological maneuver, Barth placed in question the entire 
enterprise of modern criticism, which sought to conform the text to the 
canon of modern reason.  At its foundation, the epistemological reference 
point of nineteenth-century criticism is irreconcilable with Barth’s 
beginning point.108 
 
 Brueggemann argues that while many have easily charged Barth with fideism, the 
historical criticism that Barth challenged is also “an act of philosophical fideism.”109  
Brueggemann admits that biblical interpretation has necessarily moved beyond Barth but 
the theology Barth began, theology that was called “dialectical,” emphasized rhetoric, 
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and recognized that “reality is deeply grounded in speech,” continues to exert a powerful 
influence on all biblical interpretation.110 
 Brueggemann’s analysis of Old Testament interpretation concludes by noting that 
contemporary attempts to write Old Testament theology are dominated by various 
dialectical schemes.  These contemporary theologies are presented as bi-polar schemes 
that recognize two competing centers of thought in the Old Testament.  Brueggemann 
notes several examples of these bi-polar schemes: C. Westermann on blessing and 
deliverance, S. Terrien on aesthetic theology and ethics, and P. D. Hanson on cosmic 
theology and teleological theology.111  Each of these bi-polar schemes recognizes the 
need to move beyond any attempt to find a single center for the Old Testament as “no 
motif can contain all of the elements.”112 Rather, Israel’s speech about God moves in two 
directions, one that seeks certainty that rises above the conditions of the world and 
legitimates truth and another that acknowledges the ambiguity of lived experience.  
Brueggemann also follows a bi-polar scheme in his Old Testament theology refusing to 
eliminate the vital tension in the Old Testament between testimony (the majority voice), 
the voice that seeks certainty above the conditions of the world and legitimates truth, and 
counter-testimony (the minority voice), the voice that expresses the pain and ambiguity 
of lived experience. 
 Brueggemann, like Barth, believes that “reality is deeply grounded in speech.”113  
That there is tension in the speech about God in the Old Testament is evidence of tension 
in the reality of God.  Brueggemann argues that there is a tension in the character of God, 
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a tension between God’s sovereignty and God’s compassion to the point of pathos.  For 
Brueggemann, therefore the epistemological route to God is dialectical because God is 
dialectical.  The tension in the rhetoric of Israel is tension that has its basis in the subject 
of that rhetoric, God. 
 According to Brueggemann, recognizing tension in God reduces the danger of 
two forms of denial that negatively impact Christian theology.  The first is the denial of 
the irrationality of the human process and the second is denial of God as a party at risk.114  
When the irrationality of the human process is denied, pain is understood to have a 
rational cause, often tied to morality, which could be eliminated through some form of 
correction by the victims of suffering.  When pain is viewed in this light not only are 
other causes of suffering such as enemies of God, corrupted structures of power and 
unexplainable sicknesses ignored, but also expressions of rage and pain are silenced, and 
the minority voice that provides the Old Testament with the necessary tension for 
revealing God is eliminated.   
 Why is tension necessary for revealing God?  Tension is necessary because God 
is relational, dialogical and involved in every cubit of the drama of guilt and forgiveness 
that lies at the heart of the narrative of the Old Testament.115  Not only does the Old 
Testament allow for expression of pain but it actually testifies to God’s entry into that 
pain. God not only enters into the irrationality of the pain of innocent victims, but into the 
irrationality of the pain caused by sinful Israel.  Tension arises because God is sovereign 
and free and the Old Testament testifies to that sovereignty and freedom, but it also 
testifies to God’s entry into risky solidarity with Israel.  Brueggemann argues that the 
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metaphor of personhood is used to express the notion of God in the Old Testament.116  
That metaphor is used as God responds to both individual and corporate cries of lament 
with compassion and suffering love.  The dialogical and relational notion of God is 
expressed as the Old Testament narrative testifies to a deepening of God’s compassion 
and God’s willingness to suffer on behalf of Israel in, and through the drama of the guilt 
and forgiveness of exile/homecoming.117  Israel testifies that God enters into exile with 
Israel.  Without that risky solidarity, God would not be open to history, nor would God’s 
power be that of love.   
 Moltmann’s notion of God is influenced by the theology of Abraham Heschel.  
Heschel, like Brueggemann, recognizes that the speech about God in the Old Testament 
is bi-polar.  For Heschel, this means that God is both transcendent and immanent.  Rather 
than divide the relational qualities of God between sovereignty and compassion to the 
point of pathos as Brueggemann does, Heschel emphasizes that God is sovereign and 
compassionate in both God’s transcendence and immanence.  While Brueggemann 
divides the relational qualities of God, Heschel understands these relational qualities to 
be in the service of love.  Heschel also insists that God remains transcendent in his 
immanence and related in his transcendence.118  For Heschel, the transcendence of God 
precedes immanence and while human beings know God through God’s immanence, 
transcendence remains ever more than that immanence and therefore knowledge of God 
is partial and the mystery of God is protected.119  The mystery of God is not abstract, 
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however, but relational and according to Heschel the prophets understood the gulf that 
separates human beings from God to be crossed by God’s pathos.120  Heschel’s notion of 
God centers on the pathos of God.  God is in search of man and seeks a relationship with 
human beings even though this relationship causes pain to God, even though it involves 
risk and vulnerability for God.  For Heschel, God is at risk because the world is not fully 
redeemed.  Until redemption, God is grieved and suffers with the plight of the oppressed; 
God is pained by disobedience that results in injustice.  In an article, “Abraham Joshua 
Heschel: the Pathos of God,” John Merkle describes Heschel’s understanding of the 
cause of God’s suffering, “God experiences need and suffering not because God is 
imperfect but because God is not the only one with a role to play in the drama of 
redemption.”121   
 Moltmann follows Heschel by also insisting on the primacy of love in any notion 
of God and in recognizing that God’s suffering is a necessary and profound aspect of 
God’s love because the world is not yet fully redeemed.  Moltmann insists that a 
Christian understanding of God must move beyond a bi-polar conception of God to a 
trinitarian conception of God.  For Moltmann, a trinitarian conception of God deepens the 
dialectical nature of God because the notion of God as trinity begins with the revelation 
of God on the cross of Jesus Christ, an event in which God is against God.122 
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The break between the Father and the Son on the cross, results in the sending of the 
Spirit, the opening of the Trinity to history, and points to an eschatological future in 
which God will be all in all.123   
 Moltmann, however, draws his notion of God largely from one event, the 
revelation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ.  Furthermore, that event is viewed almost 
exclusively through the lens of innocent suffering.  As a result, his notion of God neglects 
the narrative of guilt and forgiveness between God and Israel that culminates in the event 
of the cross and he therefore fails to maintain the tension between God’s transcendence 
and immanence that is found in Heschel’s work.  Moltmann also collapses the tension 
between God’s sovereignty and compassion to the point of pathos that is articulated by 
Brueggemann.  Brueggemann writes of Moltmann’s discernment of the character of God 
reveled on the cross,  
If Moltmann’s rendering of the issue is correct, as I take it to be, then 
Christian theology is pushed into issues that are as difficult for Christians 
as for these witnesses in the Old Testament.  We are left with solidarity 
that is short of sovereignty…except for Easter.124  
 
 Brueggemann’s assessment of Moltmann expressed in this quote is accurate, but 
is Moltmann correct?  While Moltmann is led to his focus on innocent suffering by a 
concern with contemporary history and his belief that God is revealed in history, his 
neglect of the drama of guilt and forgiveness that lies at the heart of the narrative of 
God’s relationship with human beings is a neglect of history.  This neglect results in 
collapsing the dialectical tension between God’s sovereignty and compassion so that 
God’s sovereignty is pushed off into an eschatological future with little evidence of its 
transformative power at work in the world today.   
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 Brueggemann insists on maintaining a dialectical tension in the notion of God 
because this tension reduces the risk of two forms of denial in Christian theology: denial 
of the irrationality of pain, and denial of God as a party at risk.  Moltmann’s notion of 
God avoids one of these forms of denial; he does not attempt to provide a rational answer 
to the problem of pain and therefore does not deny the irrationality of pain.  Moltmann 
does, however, deny that God is a party at risk.  While Moltmann insists that God is open 
to history, his panentheistic understanding of the trinity ultimately denies that God is 
vulnerable or at risk.  God may for a time enter into risk and vulnerability but that risk is 
already resolved in the eschatological future of God’s indwelling of all of creation.   
 The differences between Moltmann and Brueggemann’s dialectical notion of God 
become evident when comparing their use of the word dialectical in expressing the 
epistemological route to knowledge of God.  Brueggemann articulates a dialectical 
epistemology in which speech about God is divided between the testimony of the 
majority voice and the minority voice, a tension between testimony to God’s freedom, 
sovereignty and power, and testimony to God’s mercy and compassion in the face of 
painful life experiences.  Brueggemann insists that this tension cannot be resolved 
because God exceeds our human concepts and the destabilization that occurs when this 
tension is taken seriously is necessary for a true encounter with God.125   
 Moltmann’s analysis of human speech about God moves beyond the text of the 
bible as he explores the difference between analogical and dialectical knowledge of God.  
Moltmann notes that in analogy, God is known by like whereas in dialectic, God is “only 
revealed as ‘God’ in his opposite: godlessness and abandonment by God.”126  Moltmann 
                                                 
125 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 45. 
126 Moltmann, The Crucified God, 27. 
 205 
argues that in Christian theology all knowledge of God must be dialectical knowledge.  
According to Moltmann, this does not eliminate analogy but means that analogy must 
proceed from dialectic.127  Insisting that dialectic precede analogy eliminates the tension 
in speech about God that Brueggemann finds essential.  While Moltmann does not deny 
analogy as a means to knowledge of God, he preserves the use of analogy for descriptions 
of eschatological hope while insisting that in this world God is known only through 
dialectical knowledge.  He argues that the Trinitarian event of the cross is an event of 
kenosis that dissolves “the old dialectic of Godhead and manhood.”  Moltmann writes,  
Humiliation to the point of death on the cross corresponds to God’s nature 
in the contradiction of abandonment.  When the crucified Jesus is called 
the “image of the invisible God,” the meaning is that this is God, and God 
is like this.  God is not greater than he is in self-surrender.  God is not 
more powerful than he is in this helplessness.  God is not more divine than 
he is in this humanity.  The nucleus of everything that Christian theology 
says about “God” is to be found in this Christ event.  The Christ event on 
the cross is a God event.128 
 
 Moltmann’s attempt to express the connection between God and suffering leads 
him to make statements that collapse the tension between God’s transcendence and 
immanence.129  Sobrino notes that Moltmann’s approach to the relationship between God 
and suffering, an approach that does not look to God as a solution to suffering and instead 
allows suffering to be a means to knowledge of God, is preferable to theologies that 
separate God from suffering.  Sobrino argues, however, that in seeking to articulate 
God’s relationship to suffering, Moltmann is guilty of conceptual extremism, especially 
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in his articulation of the separation between the Father and Son on the cross.130  
 Moltmann approaches Jesus’ abandonment from a trinitarian perspective and 
emphasizes in Jesus’ abandonment a break between the Father and the Son.  The 
suffering of the Father is different from the Son but both suffer from the loss of the 
beloved.  The break between the Father and the Son results in the sending of the spirit 
and the opening of the trinity to the suffering of history.131  
 Sobrino, like Moltmann, approaches the cross from a trinitarian perspective but he 
does not speak of a break between Father and Son.  Instead he discusses the surrender of 
the Father and the surrender of the Son out of love for the sake of human beings.132  The 
Son surrenders in the darkness of faith to the Father in order to fulfill his mission 
undertaken out of love for human beings and the Father surrenders what is most 
important to him, the Son, to the world out of love for human beings.  The Son suffers 
abandonment and the Father suffers by being Jesus’ “non-active and silent witness.”133  
Sobrino’s statements about God’s silence and inactivity given freely in love maintain the 
tension between God’s transcendence and immanence in a way that Moltmann’s 
statements involving the revelation of God in humiliation and helplessness do not.134  In 
addition, while both Moltmann and Sobrino are in agreement that the kenotic love of God 
is revealed on the cross of Jesus Christ, Sobrino emphasizes Jesus’ connection to his 
mission more fully than Moltmann resulting in a dialectical notion of God that is more 
connected to history and to the drama of guilt and forgiveness.  
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 Sobrino’s discussion of the “anti-kingdom” leads to a fuller articulation of the 
problem of sin than Moltmann.135  Sobrino’s emphasizes that Jesus’ identity is rooted in 
his relationship to God the Father and to his mission to bring about the kingdom.136  
Jesus’ relational identity is at risk, however, because he is trying to live out his 
relationship to God the Father and to the kingdom in the face of the “anti-kingdom.”  It is 
the force of the anti-kingdom that leads to Jesus’ existential experience of the silence of 
God culminating in his experience of abandonment on the cross.137  God’s surrender of 
the son to this experience of darkness is a surrender that is necessary in order for God to 
be in solidarity with the victim’s of the anti-kingdom.  By stressing the role of the anti-
kingdom, Sobrino’s dialectical notion of God does not remain conceptual but is related to 
the painful experiences of life in the world.   
 Sobrino’s connection to the painful experiences of life in the world is evident in 
his discussion of epistemology.  Sobrino, like Moltmann, argues that knowledge of God 
drawn from the cross is dialectical knowledge.  He notes that while knowledge of God 
always presupposes relating God to something positive, God is revealed on the cross 
through abandonment, silence, and inactivity.138  This raises serious questions about 
God’s power in relation to sin.  On the cross, sin seems to have more power than God.139  
Sobrino notes that the testimony of the New Testament is that what is revealed on the 
cross is God’s love.140  Sobrino argues that the revelation of God on the cross is the result 
of God’s original choice of incarnation.  That choice of incarnation was a choice to side 
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with humanity.  The cross is the culmination of that choice and therefore reveals the 
extent to which God is on the side of suffering humanity.  God’s love extends to the point 
that God will be a “God at our mercy.”  Sobrino equates the title “the Crucified God” 
with “God of Solidarity,” and claims that what is transcendent about God is what is least 
esoteric and most common, God’s love.141 
 Sobrino’s claim that on the cross God is revealed as “God at our mercy,” and the 
“God of solidarity,” leads to two insights regarding the epistemological route to 
knowledge of God.  First, contemplation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ is 
contemplation of God’s mercy and love revealed in the suffering of God.  Contemplating 
this suffering leads one to sorrow.  This sorrow opens the human heart to the suffering 
that continues in the world and continues to cause pain to God.  Therefore, it is sorrow 
rather than wonder or sorrow as “a highly qualified sort of wonder” that is the means to 
access to God.142 
 Secondly, contemplation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ is contemplation of 
the God of Solidarity.  God entered into risky solidarity to fight to liberate the oppressed, 
the poor and the marginalized.  Contemplation of God on the cross not only arouses the 
attitude of sorrow but also calls the followers of Christ to work to alleviate suffering, to 
work toward liberation, to fight against the anti-kingdom.  In joining Jesus in working 
toward liberation, disciples of Jesus come to knowledge of God.143   
 Sobrino therefore does not mean the same thing as Moltmann when he argues that 
knowledge of God is dialectical.  Moltmann argues that God is known in weakness, in 
                                                 
141 Ibid., 232. 
142 Sobrino, Christology at the Crossroads, 199. 
143 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, 275; Alfred T. Hennely, S.J. “Theological Method: The Southern 
Exposure,” Theological Studies 38 (1977): 721. 
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suffering, and in helplessness, but Sobrino claims that God is known when weakness, 
suffering and helplessness meet the power of God, the power of suffering love, a power 
that is transformative and results in a changed world.  Furthermore, Sobrino guards 
against the conceptual extremism expressed by Moltmann in two important ways.  First, 
sorrow as a highly qualified sort of wonder does not eliminate analogy or push analogy 
off to an eschatological frontier.  Rather sorrow is an expression of God’s love revealed 
in the midst of suffering that leads those who contemplate it to love of God and love of 
neighbor.  Second, while Sobrino points to the cross as a central revelation of God for 
Christians, he recognizes that it is one revelatory event amongst others.  Sobrino insists 
that the revelation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ should be held in tension with 
other revelatory events such as creation and exodus.144   
 Sobrino’s dialectical notion of God is not drawn from the singular event of the 
cross.  Rather, it is informed by exploration of the risk and vulnerability of Jesus’ 
relational identity and recognition of different theological voices in the biblical text.  
While Sobrino’s approach to the meaning of the cross is through the lens of theodicy, 
because he articulates more fully than Moltmann the role of sin, he stays more connected 
to the drama of guilt and forgiveness at the heart of the biblical narrative and therefore 
more connected to history.  Sobrino does not attempt to conceptualize God apart from the 
drama.  His attention to sin is attention to both the sin of the oppressors and the sin of the 
oppressed.  For this reason his dialectical notion of God maintains the tension between 
God’s sovereignty and God’s compassion to the point of pathos that Brueggemann finds 
essential in an Old Testament theology of God.   
                                                 
144 Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, 247. 
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 Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino approach their theological projects with 
acute attentiveness to the voices of the marginalized, drawing upon these voices to 
articulate a theology of God.  All three theologians wrestle with the tension caused by 
recognizing the importance of triumphant faith claims while at the same time 
understanding that these important claims can result in a misuse of power, a 
simplification of the causes of pain, and a notion of God detached from suffering.  
Moltmann and Sobrino are especially sensitive to reshaping notions of God’s power as 
the power of suffering love.  In reshaping notions of God as the power of suffering love, 
however, there is a risk of reducing the tension between God’s sovereignty and God’s 
compassion to the point of pathos.  Brueggemann’s theology of God drawn from the Old 
Testament insists that maintaining this tension is necessary for faith and for right speech 
about God.  Without that tension, the notion of God is reduced from the overwhelming, 
destabilizing presence that the Old Testament describes to a notion that fits within our 
rational systems of thought.145  Once a notion of God is reduced to a closed system of 
thought, there is a danger that the reduced notion of God will be manipulated and 
expressions of pain that challenge that notion will be eliminated.  For this reason, 
Brueggemann, Moltmann, and Sobrino insist that the voices of pain provide the vital, life 
giving questions for theological inquiry.  Until the world is fully redeemed, the questions 
raised in suffering are the questions that keep theological inquiry open to a meeting with 
the overwhelming, destabilizing, suffering love of God.    
                                                 
145 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 45. 
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Chapter Five 
Conclusions and Implications for Christian Theology and Practice 
 
 In his book, An Introduction to the New Testament, Raymond Brown draws 
attention to the fact that many speeches and sermons in the book of Acts begin by 
recounting Old Testament stories.1  The book of Acts provides evidence that the Old 
Testament was an important source for preaching in the early Christian church.  Despite 
this evidence however, there have been times in history when the Old Testament has been 
neglected as a source for preaching.  Brown writes,  
By way of particular example, for centuries the OT (except for verses 
from the Psalms) was never read in Roman Catholic churches on Sundays, 
a neglect that left people unfamiliar with what was taught so well there.  In 
the aftermath of Vatican II that defect has been corrected, and yet it is 
disappointing how seldom the OT readings are the subject of the homily.  
Preachers turn too easily and quickly to the Gospel reading for their topic, 
even when the very thing that might most challenge their audience is the 
OT passage!2  
 
Despite this neglect, Brown argues that recalling the Old Testament story is vital for 
Christianity.  Brown writes,  
Long centuries after God first called the Hebrew slaves and made them the 
people of Israel, their self-understanding would be tested as to whether 
anything had really changed because of that calling, especially when they 
lost the Promised Land and were carried off into exile.  In other words, 
they lived through beforehand what has often been the Christian 
experience in the centuries after Jesus.  Both Jews and Christians have 
needed faith in order to see God’s realities in and through a long history 
where at times God seems to be absent.  The New Testament alone covers 
too short a period of time and is too filled with success to give Christians 
such lessons.3 
 
 Brown observes that because the Old Testament covers a longer period of history 
than the New Testament, it contains within it lessons for living through times when 
                                                 




evidence of God’s presence is difficult to find.  Systematic theologies focused on the 
cross of Jesus Christ view the cross as both the point of deepest insight into the 
experience of God’s silence and the deepest revelation of God’s identity.  Without 
denying that the cross provides the deepest insight into the experience of God’s silence, 
the faith lessons learned by the people of Israel as they lived through long periods of 
history when God’s silence dominated, can provide insights that both challenge and 
deepen Christian contemplation of God’s revelation on the cross of Jesus Christ.  The 
root of those insights lies in recognizing both the importance and complexity of the 
speech about God in the Old Testament.   
 This concluding chapter will explore the implications of the conversation between 
the Old Testament theology of Walter Brueggemann and the theologies of the cross of 
Jürgen Moltmann and Jon Sobrino for Christian theology and practice.  The focus will be 
on the insights gained for a theology of the cross through the incorporation of Old 
Testament theology’s discernment of God in silence, absence, hiddenness, and suffering.  
Attention will be given to Christian theology’s response to the theodicy question, the role 
and significance of history in Christian theology, the role and freedom of the human 
partner in the relationship between God and human beings, and the role of lament in 
Christian theology and practice. 
Conclusions and Implications of this Study for Christian Theology 
 While the theologies of Moltmann and Sobrino center on God’s revelation on the 
cross of Jesus Christ, both recognize that God’s relationship to Israel in the Old 
Testament is foundational for interpreting the meaning and significance of Jesus’ life, 
death and resurrection.  Both these theologians, in different ways, draw attention to the 
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significance of history as the mode of God’s revelation.  Moltmann understands that the 
unfolding revelation of God in the Old Testament is tied to historical events that create 
tension when the lived experience of Israel calls into question both the promises of God 
and the traditions of Israel formed to remember and celebrate those promises.  As Israel 
lives through difficult historical times, their struggle with the questions evoked by their 
lived experience yields deeper insights into the promises of God and as a result, the 
traditions of Israel are re-shaped and re-used often with an accompanying deepening of 
faith.4 
 Sobrino emphasizes God’s relationship to history by noting five Old Testament 
traditions that differ from one another precisely in the way God’s relationship to history 
is described.  The five Old Testament traditions Sobrino points to are: exodus, the 
prophets, apocalyptic texts, wisdom and existential elements.5  Sobrino notes that each 
tradition emphasizes different aspects of the biblical revelation of God.  So for example, 
the exodus tradition emphasizes God’s saving action while the wisdom tradition 
emphasizes God’s provident activity hidden in God’s silence.  While the primary focus of 
Sobrino’s theology is the revelation of God on the cross, he maintains that this revelation 
must be held in tension with other revelatory events in the Old Testament.6   
 For both Moltmann and Sobrino the revelation of God in the Old Testament is 
significant particularly as a basis for understanding the relationship between God and 
history.  For Sobrino, the Old Testament is also a source for understanding the roots of 
                                                 
4 Jürgen Moltmann, Theology of Hope: On the Ground and the Implications of a Christian Eschatology 
(London: SCM Press, 1967), 95-127; Don Schweitzer, “The Consistency of Jürgen Moltmann’s Theology,” 
Studies in Religion 22, no. 2 (1993): 198-199. 
5 Jon Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator: A Historical-Theological View, trans. Paul Burns and Francis 
McDonagh (Maryknoll, NY: Orbis Books, 1993), 136. 
6 Ibid., 136-137. 
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Jesus’ notion of God.  Brueggemann’s thorough study of the theology of God in the Old 
Testament provides a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between God and 
history drawn from the Old Testament text.  This more nuanced understanding 
emphasizes the relationship between God and suffering in the Old Testament.  
Recognizing the relationship between God and suffering in the Old Testament provides a 
foundation for contemplating the relationship between God and suffering revealed on the 
cross of Jesus Christ that is at the heart of the theologies of the cross of both Moltmann 
and Sobrino.   
 Brueggemann’s theology allows the complexity of the theology of God in the Old 
Testament to surface by insisting that in Israel, speech about God moved in two 
directions.  First, Israel testified to God as an active, powerful agent who creates, 
promises, delivers, commands, and leads.  This testimony to God’s transformative action 
is labeled the “majority voice” by Brueggemann and emphasizes the covenantal 
relationship between God and Israel as well as the sovereignty, holiness, and 
transcendence of God.7  A second voice, referred to as the “minority voice” testified to 
the often painful reality of living in the world.  This voice spoke honestly about 
experiencing life in the world with little if any evidence of God’s transformative 
involvement and testified to pain that was not healed, was not redeemed, and that often 
ended in destruction, despair and death.8   While less prominent than the majority voice, 
                                                 
7 Walter Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy (Minneapolis: 
Fortress Press, 1997), 398-399. 
8 Walter Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II: Embrace of Pain,” The Catholic Biblical 
Quarterly 47 no. 3 (July, 1985): 398-399. 
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the minority voice nevertheless exerted a vital influence on Old Testament theology of 
God.9   
 The inclusion of the minority voice in the canon of the Old Testament reveals that 
Israel’s faith in God was open-ended and provisional.  The faith of Israel was not based 
in a closed system of certainty.  Rather, the questions, disruptions, and challenges of the 
minority voice are woven in and throughout Israel’s testimony. The minority voice 
challenges all settled notions of God and will not allow a closed system of thought to 
deny or repress the reality of lived experience.10 The inclusion of the often disputatious 
minority voice shows that at the heart of Israel’s testimony was a God who was 
relational, dialogical, and involved in “every cubit of the drama of guilt and forgiveness” 
described in the biblical narrative.11   
 Despite the lack of evidence of God’s transformative action through long periods 
of Israel’s history, the minority voice reveals that faith continued through these trying 
times.  The minority voice may be a voice of despair and pain but it remains a faithful 
voice included in the faithful testimony of Israel.  Furthermore, Brueggemann insists that 
the minority voice was not simply a way for Israel to release pent up emotions caused by 
difficult circumstances but a means of transforming the situation by calling upon God.12  
The minority voice calls upon God to be involved in the plight of Israel and God’s 
actions in the biblical narrative are often a response to the cries of the minority voice.13  
The voice of pain is not silenced in Israel but rather the questions, arguments, laments 
                                                 
9 Ibid., 414; Idem, Theology of the Old Testament, 322-323. 
 
10 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 323-332. 
11 Walter Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet: Daring Speech for Proclamation, (Minneapolis: Fortress 
Press, 2000), 15. 
12 Brueggemann, “A Shape for Old Testament Theology, II,” 398. 
13 Exodus 2: 23-25. 
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and truth telling of the minority voice became a vital life giving source for theological 
reflection leading to a deeper more profound understanding of God’s involvement with 
Israel.   
 Brueggemann’s attempt to organize the theology of the Old Testament through 
the law court metaphor using testimony (the majority voice) and counter testimony (the 
minority voice) highlights the importance of a dialectical notion of God in the Old 
Testament.  A dialectical notion of God emerges because God is transcendent, sovereign 
and free and at the same time relational, dialogical, and involved in the ambiguities of life 
in the world.  What is significant about Brueggemann’s theological project is that it 
shows that the minority voice is not separated out appearing only at certain points in 
Israel’s history, but rather throughout all biblical literature there is interplay of testimony 
and counter-testimony, of certainty and ambiguity.  The questions raised by life 
circumstances are the constant source for deeper theological reflection and theological 
reflection in the midst of painful life circumstances leads to profound revelation of God. 
 Brueggemann provides examples of the interweaving of the majority and minority 
voice in Israel’s testimony.  As an example of this interweaving he points to creation 
texts that emerge during the exile.14  The exile was a time of crises in Israel raising the 
deepest theological questions, questions concerning God’s power, God’s relationship to 
Israel and the other nations, Israel’s status as a nation and a people, and how to worship 
God in a foreign land.  Yet despite collapse and uncertainty in the theological, 
sociological and political structures of Israel, Israel’s theological reflection during this 
time yielded the creation texts of Isaiah, Jeremiah and Genesis.  These creation texts 
                                                 
14 The  texts Brueggemann discusses are Isaiah 45: 12-13; 40: 28-31; 43:1-44:2; Jer 10:1-16; Amos 4:13; 
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testify to Yahweh’s transcendence, holiness, and sovereignty over the whole world, to 
life as given and ordered by Yahweh, to the responsibility of Israel to live according to 
Yahweh’s purposes and to worship Yahweh as the source and summit of their lives.  This 
example shows that Israel’s speech about God forms a counter-reality.  It is testimony in 
contrast with their lived experience.15  Israel’s most profound theological reflection of 
God as creator of the world and the world as purposely ordered by God did not arise from 
contemplation of the world’s goodness in peaceful, idyllic circumstances.  Rather, this 
reflection took place dialectically in the midst of life circumstances that could lead to 
very different conclusions.   
 The creation texts that emerge during the exile demonstrate that a dialectical 
notion of God is rooted very deeply in the theological testimony of Israel.  These texts 
challenge the notion that Old Testament speech about God can be easily divided between 
traditions that testify to God’s active transformative presence in the world and times 
when God’s activity is difficult to discern.  It shows that the centrality of the theodicy 
question does not begin in Jesus’ cry of dereliction from the cross but is formative 
throughout the shaping and discernment of God’s relationship with Israel.      
 The theodicy question arises and is central to the shaping and discernment of God 
in Israel precisely because of Israel’s notion of God.  If Israel understood God to be 
impersonal, non–relational and existing in perfected transcendence independent of the 
lived experience of human beings there would be no reason to raise questions from 
painful life experiences.  These experiences would simply be accepted as the 
consequence of an impersonal fate.  It is because Israel understands God to be dialogical, 
                                                 
15 Brueggemann, Theology of the Old Testament, 68. 
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personal, and able and willing to act on their behalf that the theodicy question emerges 
and becomes a vital transformative voice.16   
 The theodicy question protects two vital insights in Israel’s speech about God.  
First, Israel understands that God is good and life ordered according to God’s purposes 
should be good.  Second, when life is not good, God has the power to transform the 
situation.  In Israel’s testimony, however, these two insights come into tension with 
history when that history is dominated by suffering that moves beyond any rational 
explanation or theological system.  Remarkably, while Israel experiences times of 
suffering that move beyond rational explanation, the testimony of Israel preserves the 
tension.  Israel maintains hope in the goodness and power of God despite evidence to the 
contrary and at the same time will not repress the truth of their experience in order to 
maintain a theological ideal.17  Rather their suffering reinforces their hope and their hope 
is more deeply understood in the midst of their suffering.  When the people of Israel 
experience pain, that pain becomes the source for communion with God.  Communion 
with God arising from painful life circumstances often takes the form of challenging, 
pleading, lamenting and intense wrestling rather than peaceful contemplation but it is 
precisely these forms of communion that point most clearly to the revelation of God as 
dialogical and open to history. 
 Brueggemann points to the lament tradition of Israel as an indication of the 
dialogical, open, provisional nature of God revealed in Old Testament theology.  He 
argues that through the lament tradition, Israel avoids closure in their theological 
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system.18  Noting that all theological systems have a tendency toward closure, he draws 
attention to two prevalent forms of closure operating in contemporary Christian theology: 
the denial of the irrationality of the human process and the denial of God as a party at 
risk.19  Moltmann and Sobrino do not explicitly discuss these two forms of denial and yet 
in their theologies of the cross they emphasize both innocent suffering and God’s 
participation in suffering, an emphasis that implicitly aims at overcoming the forms of 
denial discussed by Brueggemann.  Study of the dialogical structure of Israel’s speech 
about God provides fertile ground for overcoming these two forms of closure in Christian 
theology. 
 Brueggemann argues that by denying the irrationality of the human process and 
denying that God is at risk, Christian theology is tempted toward reduction of the biblical 
drama of guilt and forgiveness in two directions.  On the one hand, there is a temptation 
toward a system of retributive justice with its clear cut categories of right and wrong, of 
blessing and curse.  On the other hand, there is a temptation toward ignoring all 
categories of right and wrong through an understanding of grace that too cleanly and 
easily wipes away all guilt through God’s sacrificial, forgiving love.20  Both temptations 
miss the complexity of guilt and forgiveness as it is revealed in the biblical narrative and 
most importantly God’s involvement in the pain caused by that drama of guilt and 
forgiveness.   
 According to Brueggemann, the lament tradition shows the openness of Old 
Testament theology to the irrationality of the human process.  The laments of Israel 
                                                 
18 Walter Brueggemann, “Costly Loss of Lament,” Journal for the Study of the Old Testament 36, (1986): 
61; idem, “Friday Voice of Faith,” Calvin Theological Journal 36, no. 1 (April 2001): 12. 
19 Brueggemann, “Friday Voice of Faith,” 15. 
20 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 14-15. 
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reveal that Israel did not attribute all pain to sin, nor was God addressed as if God were 
completely innocent of blame.  Rather, many factors contributing to the painful 
circumstances of people in pain were articulated in the laments of Israel.  Those factors 
included not only sin but also enemies of Israel, enemies of God, sickness and chaos.21  
The inclusion of these factors shows that Israel’s faith relationship with God was open-
ended and provisional.  All the complexity of life in the world, experiences that were 
clearly understood as well as experiences that moved beyond rational explanation were 
included in Israel’s theological reflection and more importantly in their interaction with 
God.  Furthermore, the lament tradition shows that Israel did not reduce the relationship 
between God and human beings to the issue of sin and forgiveness or to the problem of 
death as the cessation of life.22  Rather all pain and suffering, the pain and suffering 
caused by sin as well as the pain and suffering that could not be explained, was included 
as important in Israel’s relationship with God.   
 Israel understood that their life was dependent on their relationship with God.  
Life was given to them as both gift and task.  This life given to them did not consist of 
mere survival, however.  Life lived as gift and task in relationship with God was to be 
abundant and full, a life of blessing.  The belief that life lived with God should be good 
and abundant is the foundation of the lament tradition in Israel.  In the lament tradition, 
Israel expresses either to God against neighbor, or to God against God the truth that their 
lived experience falls short of the life of blessing promised by God.23  The importance of 
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the lament tradition is not limited to expression of this pain, however.  In Old Testament 
theology, laments are linked to God’s salvific action.24 
 Brueggemann points out that the exodus tradition of Israel begins with a lament.  
Israel cries out to God from bondage and the result is God’s saving action on their 
behalf.25  Throughout the Old Testament, God’s active transformative presence is tied to 
dialogue with human beings.  Abraham and Moses are exemplary figures in Israel.  Both 
are boldly challenging in their conversations with God and God responds to their 
challenges.  God saves Lot in response to Abraham’s challenge concerning the 
relationship between God’s justice and the plight of the innocent and God continues to be 
present with Israel after the golden calf incident because of Moses’ mediation on their 
behalf.26  Brueggemann notes that in the Old Testament, the challenges directed to God 
that arises from painful life experiences drive the drama between God and Israel.  He 
writes, 
The sequence of lament-response from God evidences that the sovereign 
presence of Yahweh would be neither visible nor effective unless Israel 
sounded its voice of protest and hurt.  If Israel had remained mute in 
submission and passive in pain, then Yahweh’s sovereignty would not be 
enacted.27  
 
 In the above quotation, Brueggemann claims that Yahweh’s sovereignty is 
enacted through the bold laments of Israel.  Through analysis of the interactionism 
between God and Israel during the exile he claims that not only is Yahweh’s sovereignty 
enacted, but the character of Yahweh is impinged upon by that interaction.28  
Brueggemann asserts that in the event of the exile, God is at risk.  God is at risk because 
                                                 
24 Westermann, “Role of Lament,” 21.  
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26 Gen 18:16-33; Gen 19: 29; Ex: 32: 30-34; 33: 12-17; Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 54. 
27 Ibid., 65. 
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God freely chooses to be connected in a covenant relationship with Israel and is therefore 
not unaffected by Israel’s response toward God.  Israel’s sin is a problem for God and 
God suffers with Israel during the exile.  God is open to Israel’s history and God is 
involved in Israel’s suffering.29 
 Brueggemann notes two movements of God toward Israel during the exile.  The 
first movement is characterized by distance.  God abandons Israel in response to Israel’s 
sin.  Brueggemann notes that while the extent of that abandonment is impossible to 
ascertain, there are Old Testament texts that testify to a clear break between God and 
Israel.30  The second movement is toward reconciliation that comes as a result of God’s 
compassion toward Israel.  The compassion of God, however, is deepened as a result of 
the event of the exile.  Brueggemann claims that the exile evokes new depths of 
compassion in God and a new resolve for fidelity toward Israel.31   
 Importantly, Brueggemann’s analysis of the book of Job reveals that while God is 
dialogical, responds to Israel’s cries of lament and is open to Israel’s history and 
therefore at risk, at the same time God remains transcendent, sovereign and free.  
Brueggemann points out that God’s response to Job is not one of accommodation or 
saving action.  Rather, God’s speeches to Job emphasize God’s transcendence and 
freedom, a transcendence and freedom that move beyond the rational human systems of 
theological reflection that are the subject of the speeches of Job’s friends.32  Despite 
God’s lack of concession to Job’s demands for explanation, Job is transformed by the 
sheer power of the presence of God.  While drawing attention to God’s endorsement of 
                                                 
29 Ibid. 173-180. 
30 Ibid., 173. 
31 Ibid., 180; idem, Theology of the Old Testament, 311. 
32 Brueggemann, Finally Comes the Poet, 62. 
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Job’s honest speech, Brueggemann notes that the emphasis of the dialogue between God 
and Job is on the freedom of God to be God.33    
 A significant contribution of Brueggemann’s theology of the Old Testament is his 
insistence upon the freedom of God to be God even to the point of putting the stability of 
God as risk.34  By insisting on the freedom of God to be God, Brueggemann’s theology of 
God maintains a dialectical tension between God’s freedom from the ambiguities of the 
world and God’s compassion to the point of pathos.35  At the same time, his theology 
emphasizes that the deepest revelation of God often arises in the midst of life’s most 
painful circumstances.36  Why does the deepest revelation of God arise in the midst of 
life’s most painful circumstances?  One possible answer is that suffering calls all forms of 
certainty into question.  Suffering forces confrontation with the realities of life that move 
beyond human control.  The God who is revealed in the midst of life’s most painful 
circumstances is not subject to rational systems but comes as sheer gift in transformative 
freedom.   
 Brueggemann’s theology of God emphasizing the relationship between God and 
suffering in the Old Testament highlights the centrality and purpose of the theodicy 
question for revealing God, the dialectical nature of revelation leading to a dialectical 
notion of God and the importance of avoiding closure in theology.  Brueggemann 
specifically focuses on closure that is the result of two forms denial, denial of the 
irrationality of the human process and denial of God as a party at risk.  The insights that 
arise from Brueggemann’s study have meaning for Christian theology and when used as a 
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lens for viewing the theologies of the cross of Moltmann and Sobrino contribute to a 
deeper understanding of God’s revelation on the cross of Jesus Christ.   
 It was stated above that the theodicy question is interwoven throughout the 
testimony of the Old Testament text and is rooted in Israel’s understanding of God.  The 
theodicy question in the Old Testament prevented the articulation of the experience of 
suffering from being repressed by a system that claimed to be able to explain its cause.  It 
also prevented suffering from being accepted as a new form of certainty.  Jon Sobrino 
acknowledges the importance of the theodicy question in the Old Testament and claims 
that the New Testament’s interpretation of the meaning of the cross of Jesus Christ is 
shaped by the Old Testament’s approach to the theodicy question.37  Even before this 
explicit reference to the importance of the theodicy question however, the revelation of 
God preserved by the theodicy question in the Old Testament exerts influence on 
Sobrino’s description of Jesus’ mission. 
 Sobrino relies on the gospel of Mark for his analysis of Jesus’ mission and divides 
Jesus’ mission into two movements separated by the Galilean crises.38  In the first 
movement, Jesus proclaims the coming of God’s kingdom and actively brings God’s 
power to bear on the world through teaching, preaching, healing, casting out demons, and 
forgiving sins.  Sobrino argues that Jesus’ notion of God during this period of his mission 
is drawn from and in continuity with the exodus, prophetic, apocalyptic and wisdom 
traditions of the Old Testament.39  The second movement in Jesus’ life is characterized 
by failure.  Jesus realizes that he will not overcome the power of the anti-kingdom and 
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that his inevitable future is suffering and death.  Sobrino claims that Jesus’ notion of God 
in this second movement of his life is drawn from his own existential experience of 
God’s silence.  While Jesus’ existential experience is similar to existential traditions in 
the Old Testament, Sobrino claims that Jesus’ notion of God during this trial of his life 
moves beyond the testimony of the Old Testament and is unique to Jesus.40   
 The strength of Sobrino’s analysis of Jesus’ notion of God is that by dividing 
Jesus’ life into two movements, he maintains a dialectical tension between Jesus’ notion 
of God in the first part of his mission, a time characterized by God drawing near and his 
experience of suffering in the second part of his mission, a time dominated by God’s 
silence.  By describing Jesus’ mission in this way, Sobrino protects the two vital insights 
that are also protected by the theodicy question in Israel’s speech about God.  One that 
God is good and life ordered according to God’s purposes should be good.  Two, when 
life is not good, God has the power to transform the situation.  The first half of Jesus’ 
mission testifies to God’s goodness and the hope for God’s blessing that should 
characterize the life of the faithful.  The evident message of Jesus’ mission in the first 
half of Mark’s gospel is that it is good news for God to draw near.  This belief in God’s 
goodness is contrasted in Jesus’ own history however in the second half of his mission.  
Jesus’ suffering and death on the cross experienced in the midst of God’s silence calls 
into question both the goodness of God and God’s power to transform the situation.  
Jesus continues to trust and hope in the goodness and power of God but this goodness and 
power is not evident.41   
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 Sobrino describes Jesus’ relationship to God throughout his lifetime as one of 
trust-availability.42  In the first half of his mission, that trust-availability results in Jesus’ 
acts of power.  In the second half of Jesus’ mission however, the anti-kingdom seems to 
have more power than God and therefore trust-availability is characterized not by acts of 
power but by surrender.  Sobrino describes that surrender as “letting God be God.”43  
Jesus’ movement from actively bringing God’s transformative presence to bear on the 
world to surrender to God as mystery is not described as smooth and seamless by the 
New Testament writers.  Jesus’ prayer in the garden of Gethsemane is characterized by 
anguish and a request to “take this cup away from me.”44  The last words of Jesus 
recorded in the gospels of Mark and Matthew are words of dereliction taken from an Old 
Testament lament.45  The theodicy question lies at the heart of Jesus’ history.   
 Bringing Brueggemann’s Old Testament theology of God into conversation with 
Sobrino’s analysis of Jesus’ mission leads to deeper insights into the theodicy question at 
the heart of Jesus’ life.  The theodicy question is central for revelation of God in both 
Jesus’ ministry and in the Old Testament.  Life in the world is characterized by ambiguity 
and forces that move beyond a rational system.  Faith in God therefore consists of 
communion with God throughout all of life’s experiences.  At times that communion 
might result in God’s transformative power working through the faithful.  At other times, 
however that communion will either consist of arguing, lamenting, and wrestling with 
God or surrender to God in the midst of the mystery of God’s silence.  The recognition of 
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different forms of communion with God places emphasis on the relational, dialogical 
nature of God.  Because God is relational and dialogical, God is involved in suffering.    
 God’s relationship to suffering is central to Old Testament speech about God and 
forms the backdrop for understanding God’s relationship to suffering as it is revealed on 
the cross of Jesus Christ.  Suffering, particularly the suffering of the innocent, strips away 
attempts to fit God into a system, to tame God by reducing the mystery, or to deny the 
irrationality of the human experience, the power of sin or that God is a party at risk. 
 Sobrino argues that Jesus’ death on the cross is the consequence of incarnation.  
In the incarnation, God chooses to draw near to human beings in love.  Incarnation 
involves risk for God because entering into the human situation means entering into the 
vulnerability of human life, which is subject to the powers of sin, chaos, and death.  
Sobrino argues that the incarnation reveals the extent to which God is on our side.  God is 
on our side to the point of being a God “at our mercy.”46   
 In exploring God’s relationship to suffering, Moltmann discusses Shekinah 
theology as background for understanding the relationship between God and suffering 
revealed on the cross.  The Shekinah theology of the rabbis’ focuses on God’s 
involvement with human suffering and concludes that God suffered with and on behalf of 
Israel to the point of entering into exile with them.  Moltmann notes that according to this 
theology, God suffers not only on behalf of the innocent but also on behalf of the guilty.47   
 Sobrino appeals to incarnation and Moltmann appeals to Shekinah theology in 
order to emphasize that God’s relationship to history is marked by risk and vulnerability, 
a risk and vulnerability that involves suffering.  Moltmann and Sobrino draw attention to 
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the fact that God freely chooses to enter into this risk and vulnerability for the sake of 
human beings and this choice highlights God’s mercy.48  In contemplating the 
relationship between God and suffering, God’s mercy is revealed.   
 Both Moltmann and Sobrino indicate that Jesus’ notion of God differs from his 
contemporaries specifically in the accent Jesus places on Gods’ freedom to show grace 
through compassionate love.49  God’s freedom to show grace through compassionate love 
is most clearly seen in God’s mercy.  Jesus’ contemplation of the mercy of God is 
foundational for Jesus’ ministry to the marginal members of society and leads him to 
understand the need to eradicate sin by bearing it.50  Most importantly however, Jesus’ 
ministry and his death and resurrection reveal that God’s mercy is not without power.51   
 Mercy is a power that opposes and is opposed to the world’s vision of power.  In 
the world’s vision of power, power is associated with control over others while mercy is 
associated with giving up or not exercising power over others.  Mercy is not an 
authoritative power that controls and manipulates people from the outside.  Rather it is a 
form of power that meets people in the midst of their pain, embraces them and renews 
them through liberation.  The issue of the use and misuse of power is significant in the 
theologies of Brueggemann, Moltmann and Sobrino as each of these theologians 
recognizes the connection between notions of God and political systems.    
 Brueggemann argues that there is a correlation between closed and authoritative 
political, sociological and theological systems and the abuse of power.  The more abusive 
a system is the more closed it is to hearing the undercurrent of the voices of pain in that 
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society.  Visible pain bearers are a problem for an abusive system because the suffering 
of the pain bearers challenges the certainty that is necessary for maintaining authoritative 
power.52  Jesus’ acts of power in bringing the kingdom of God to bear on the world were 
directed in large part to people on the margins of Israelite society: the sick, the poor, the 
mentally ill, women and sinners.  Jesus, grounded in God’s mercy, actively reaches out to 
these people and by doing so makes both the pain bearers and God’s transformative 
mercy visible.  Mercy has power in Jesus ministry, life giving transformative power.  
God is the source of that power.  Because of Jesus’ relationship of trust-availability to 
God, God’s life giving transformative power is visible through acts of mercy often 
directed to those with very little power in the world.  The force of the power of mercy in 
Jesus’ ministry is seen in the determinative effort to silence Jesus.  Jesus’ preaching, 
teaching and healing ministry while peaceful nevertheless raised tremendous opposition 
from both the Jewish leadership of Israel and the leaders of the Roman Empire.53   
 Jesus’ contemplation of God’s mercy leads him to the cross and the cross is the 
event that most definitively reveals God’s mercy.  Both Moltmann and Sobrino recognize 
the cross as the revelation of God’s active participation in suffering for the sake of and in 
solidarity with human beings.  The New Testament states that what is revealed on the 
cross is God’s love, a love that is characterized as self-emptying and merciful.  The 
resurrection of Jesus confirms that this love has power but it is a form of power not easily 
recognized or understood.  Elizabeth Johnson writes,  
We seek an understanding that does not divide power and compassionate 
love in a dualistic framework that identifies love with a resignation of 
power and the exercise of power with a denial of love.  Rather, we seek to 
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53 Moltmann, Crucified God, 127; Sobrino, Jesus the Liberator, 209. 
 230 
integrate these two, seeing love as the shape in which divine power 
appears.54                                                     
 
 Recognizing that in Jesus’ ministry the accent is on God’s freedom to show grace 
through compassionate love and understanding that this love is characterized as self-
emptying and merciful is both challenge and threat to the world’s vision of power and 
authority.  If “love is the shape in which divine power appears” than that power cannot be 
controlled or manipulated by either the political or religious leadership.  Instead, it comes 
as sheer gift in freedom.   
 The difficulty in understanding this form of power is seen in the temptation 
toward a theology of glory that represses or denies the theology of the cross.  The notion 
of God drawn from the cross is a notion that emphasizes God’s real participation in 
suffering.  Jesus’ question from the cross, “My God, my God why have you forsaken 
me?”55 is in continuity with all the faithful who have experienced the impotence and 
inexplicability of suffering that cannot be reconciled with the goodness and promises of 
God.  Yet in this same cry is also seen the participation of God in the suffering of the 
world.  Biblical notions of God emerge from and remain connected to the ambiguities of 
life in the world.  Because God is dialogical, provisional, open-ended and most 
importantly a God of compassionate love, God participates in suffering and through that 
participation redeems it.  The notion of God drawn from the cross has important 
implications for Christian practice.  
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Conclusions and Implications of this Study for Christian Practice 
 Moltmann claims that the crucified Christ is the central revelation of God for 
Christians and therefore the foundation for both seeing and experiencing God in the 
world.  Moltmann points to a question that emerges from this claim; “Which God 
motivates my faith: the crucified God or the gods of religion, race and class?”56   The 
issue at stake in this question is the shape in which divine power appears.57  
 Moltmann argues that the revelation of God on the cross of Jesus Christ leads to a 
revolution in the notion of God.58  The cross challenges what Moltmann refers to as the 
god of theism. The god of theism is a notion of God linked to questions that arise from 
the transitory and vulnerable nature of human existence in the world.59  Human beings 
seek security and control over all the uncontrollable elements that dominate their lives 
and look to God as a solution.  The problem is that as they look to God as a solution to 
their suffering, they project onto God the same type of power that is used as a tool of 
domination in the world.  Moltmann claims that looking to God for this type of power 
results in a God that looks like Caesar.  The consequence of a notion of God that looks 
like Caesar is that the only proper relationship for human beings with this type of God is 
one characterized by obedience and reverence.60 
 Sobrino states that the notion of God drawn from the cross of Jesus Christ is a 
notion that unmasks idols.  He describes an idol as a false notion of God and argues that 
the most common reason for a person to invest in a false notion of God is in order to 
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justify and maintain entitlement to power, control and security.61  Sobrino defines sin as 
handing everything over to God except what secures oneself.62   Idols are created by 
projecting the need for power, security and control onto a transcendent source that 
confirms and affirms the status quo.  Idols assure people that things do not need to 
change and that the power structures that operate in the world are accepted and even 
supported by a false God that is made in their image.63   
 Moltmann and Sobrino recognize that political, sociological and theological 
systems are interwoven and receive legitimacy through association with a particular 
notion of God.  Systems that abuse power appeal to a notion of God that supports the 
power structures of the system.64  Likewise, both Moltmann and Sobrino argue that the 
notion of God drawn from the cross of Jesus Christ is a challenge to the notion of God 
that is tied to dominating, authoritative and closed systems.  The notion of God drawn 
from the cross cannot be coerced and used to support unjust power structures.  Rather the 
notion of God drawn from the cross points to self-emptying, merciful love given and 
received in freedom.  If the crucified God motivates faith than a very different conception 
of the proper relationship between faithful people and God emerges.   
 Before discussing the implications for Christian practice that emerge when the 
crucified God motivates faith, it is helpful to discuss the problems that have been created 
for Christian practice when faith is not motivated by the crucified God.  Problems have 
been created for Christian practice by appealing to a notion of God that is not drawn from 
the cross but instead fits the cross into a theological system that protects a theistic notion 
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of God.  When the cross is fit into a theological system that protects a theistic notion of 
God then the cross is viewed less as a revelation of God and more as an event in which 
God forgives sin.  Viewing the cross as an event in which God forgives sin rather then as 
a revelation of God leads to two problems in Christian theology that impact Christian 
practice.  First, the drama of grace and forgiveness in the biblical narrative, a drama that 
emphasizes the dialogical, open, provisional nature of God and the responsibility of 
human beings is reduced on both sides.  Emphasis is placed on God’s forgiveness of sins 
without an accompanying attention to God’s participation in suffering and likewise, 
emphasis is placed on human liberation from sin through grace without an accompanying 
attention to human responsibility.  A trajectory begins toward a universalized 
understanding of Christ that ignores Jesus’ history and toward eternal life as the goal of 
Christian faith.65  As this trajectory is followed the emphasis in Christian practice moves 
toward an individualistic personal piety and away from a faith that confronts unjust 
political and sociological systems and is engaged in alleviating suffering in the world.66   
 Secondly, viewing the cross as an event in which God forgives sins reduces 
complexity by narrowing the many issues that affect the relationship between God and 
human beings down to the one issue of sin and guilt.  The result is that the many 
emotions arising from painful life experiences, emotions of doubt, fear, sadness, anguish, 
and anger are narrowed to the one emotion that is acceptable for human beings to have in 
relationship with a theistic notion of God, guilt.67  
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 Furthermore, the individualistic personal piety that develops out of the effort to 
maintain a theistic notion of God is one that emphasizes obedience and reverence.68  God 
is seen as the solution to the problems and suffering caused by the transitory and 
vulnerable nature of existence.  Prayers directed to God revolve around issues of power 
and control.  The fortunate people in the world who have the most power and control 
over their own lives consider their wealth and happiness a blessing from God.  On the 
other hand, when suffering impinges on their lives, people pray to God to fix and change 
their situation but expect that change to break into and upon their lives.  The expectation 
is that God’s power is exercised externally upon people.  God is not expected to act with 
or from within them.  God’s power to change the situation is the substance of faith and a 
changed situation is evidence of God’s blessing.  Communion with God becomes limited 
to praise and petition and becomes associated with times of life when evidence of God 
can be found in blessing and transformation.  The hard stretches of life in which evidence 
of God’s presence is difficult to find either become repressed, accepted as part of God’s 
plan or associated with sin and guilt.  Faith associated with this notion of God results in 
keeping people childlike in their relationship with God.69  God is the divine father and 
adult responsibility is yielded over to God.  Confession of sin and repentance become the 
only means for dealing with the overwhelming issues caused by chaos, disorder, pain, 
injustice and suffering.70 
 The problems for contemporary Christianity that arise when a theistic notion of 
God is maintained are similar to the problems Brueggemann points to when discussing 
the loss of lament in Christian worship.  Brueggemann claims that the loss of lament in 
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contemporary Christianity is essentially the loss of the theology of the cross.71  He argues 
that the lament tradition of Israel emphasized interactionism as essential in the 
relationship between God and human beings and insured engagement with God through 
all of life’s experiences.72  The loss of lament results in reduced forms of communion 
with God.  Without lament, issues that arise from chaos, disorder, pain, injustice and 
suffering are repressed, denied or covered up.73  This has serious implications for 
Christian practice.   
 Brueggemann observes two possible directions that people take in responding to 
reduced forms of communion with God that are the result of the loss of lament in 
Christian worship.  The first possibility is that a person who is confronted by the forces of 
chaos, disorder, injustice, or suffering and is unable to express or confront God with the 
raw, unpleasant emotions that arise from painful life experiences will eventually find the 
relationship with God unimportant.  Unwilling to repress or deny the reality of their lived 
experience and finding no place in the Christian community to express their pain they 
will simply leave the community.  This response causes isolation and results in loneliness 
and anxiety.74   
 A second possibility is that while God remains very important, in order to protect 
Gods’ sovereignty feelings of doubt, fear, sadness, rage and anguish at unjust or irrational 
suffering will be converted to feelings of guilt.  Accompanying the conversion of feelings 
to guilt is a yielding of responsibility to God.  Brueggemann argues that this response 
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results in internalized emotions that are eventually expressed as violence either toward 
the self or toward others.75   
 Brueggemann suggests that the loss of lament in Christian worship results in the 
loss of honesty about the pain of lived experience.  He argues that in many churches 
while God is being praised in the sanctuary, pastoral care is taking place in the 
basement.76  This separation of praise and pain results in people praying to God but not 
honestly engaging God.77  In addition, Brueggemann argues that when protest over 
injustice is disallowed at the altar it is perceived as unacceptable in other public arenas as 
well.  The spill over effect of repressing the expression of pain in public worship is that in 
all public places the injustice of innocent suffering is not given voice and the necessary 
challenge to authorities that misuse power is effectively silenced.78   
 Brueggemann’s analysis of the loss of lament focuses on problems created for 
Christian practice when there is a division between the emotions and issues raised by 
painful life experiences and engagement with God.  This division leads to apathy in 
Christian practice.  Either God becomes unimportant to people and a practical atheism 
results or a theistic notion of God dominates and human responsibility for engagement in 
the issues of the world that cause and lead to suffering is neglected.  What the practice of 
lament and a notion of God drawn from the cross have in common is that they affirm that 
the questions raised from the midst of painful life experiences are vital and life giving for 
the Christian community.  These questions are vital and life giving because they are 
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directed to the crucified God, who through self emptying merciful love freely chooses to 
enter into, participate and redeem all forms of suffering in the world.   
 Because the crucified God chooses to enter into, participate and redeem all forms 
of suffering, dialogue with God through all of life’s experiences is essential for Christian 
practice.  The engagement between faithful people, experience in the world and God is an 
engagement that at times may be peaceful but at other times may be filled with anguish.  
Dialogue with God is not limited to praise and petition but includes arguing, lamenting, 
and wrestling with God as well as surrender to God as mystery.  For genuine dialogue to 
occur, speech must be honest, the possibility of redistribution of power must be present, 
and the freedom of both partners in the dialogue is essential.  Jesus provides Christians 
with a model for dialogue with God.  Like Jesus, the Christian response to God is not one 
of mere obedience and reverence but one that can be described as trust-availability.  
Trust-availability requires whole adult responsible selves who through discernment are 
able to recognize when to yield to God and when to take initiative and adopt a posture of 
assertion directed toward God.  Like Jesus, a response of trust-availability to God 
involves risk. 
 When continuity between Old Testament theology and the theology of the cross is 
maintained then Jesus’ lament from the cross is informed by the lament tradition in the 
Old Testament.  The lament tradition in the Old Testament is tied to the issue of 
theodicy.79  The theodicy question protects the insight that God is good and life ordered 
according to God’s purposes is good and yet recognizes that the realities of life challenge 
that insight.  Faith is confronting that challenge with hope and trust-availability knowing 
that while God can and will work through the faithful with power it is a power not easily 
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recognized by the world.  Sobrino claims that in Jesus’ journey to the cross he remains 
faithful to God in a world that really wanted a very different kind of God.80  The power of 
merciful compassionate love opposes and is opposed by the world’s vision of power.   
The engagement between faithful people, the experience of life in the world and 
the crucified God is a faith without certainty.  Openness to the world means openness to 
the theodicy question and if the theodicy question is a central component of Christian 
faith then that faith is open-ended and provisional. The open-ended provisional nature of 
faith is rooted in God’s openness to history.  God’s openness to history is marked by 
God’s free entry into the risk and vulnerability of life in the world, a risk and 
vulnerability that leads to the cross. Contemplating the cross opens the heart to sorrow.81  
The Christian heart is open to both the suffering in the world and to God’s participation 
in that suffering.  Openness to suffering in the world and God’s participation in that 
suffering leads to active engagement in working to alleviate suffering by bringing God’s 
merciful love to bear on the world.82  Engagement in, with and for the suffering in the 
world is essential for Christian practice.  That engagement is marked by compassionate 
love and hope.  For Christians, sorrow does not lead to despair.  Rather, as Christians 
enter fully into the risk and vulnerability of life in the world, they find that not only is 
hope deepened through encounter with suffering but also new life emerges through this 
encounter.  New life is forged where suffering and hope meet because it is in the midst of 
the risk and vulnerability of life in the world that one is drawn into and encounters the 
life giving transformative presence of the crucified God.    
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